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
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


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LETTERS

ON THE

STUDY and USE

OF

HISTORY.

To which are added,

Two other LETTERS, and REFLECTIONS
UPON EXILE.

LETTERS

ON THE

STUDY and USE

OF

HISTORY.

By the late RIGHT HONORABLE

HENRY ST. JOHN,

LORD VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE.

VOL. II.

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LETTER VIII.

The ſame ſubject continued from the year one thouſand ſix hundred eighty eight.

YOUR lordſhip will find, that the objects propoſed by the alliance of one thouſand ſix hundred eighty nine between the emperor and the ſtates, to which England acceded, and which was the foundation of the whole confederacy then formed, were no leſs than to reſtore all things to the terms of the Weſtphalian and Pyrenean treaties, by the war; and to preſerve them in that ſtate after the war, by a defenſive alliance and guarranty of the ſame confederate powers againſt France. The particular as well as general meaning of this engagement was plain enough: and if it had

not been ſo, the ſenſe of it would have been ſufficiently determined, by that ſeparate article, in which England and Holland obliged themſelves to aſſiſt the 'houſe of Auſtria, in taking and keeping 'poſſeſſion of the Spaniſh monarchy, 'whenever the caſe ſhould happen of the 'death of CHARLES the ſecond, without 'lawful heirs.' This engagement was double, and thereby relative to the whole political ſyſtem of Europe, alike affected by the power and pretenſions of France. Hitherto the power of France had been alone regarded, and her pretenſions ſeemed to have been forgot: or to what purpoſe ſhould they have been remembered, whilſt Europe was ſo unhappily conſtituted, that the ſtates at whoſe expence ſhe increaſed her power, and their friends and allies, thought that they did enough upon every occaſion if they made ſome tolerable compoſition with her? They who were not in circumſtances to refuſe confirming preſent, were little likely to take

take effectual meaſures againſt future, uſurpations. But now as the alarm was greater than ever, by the outrages that France had committed, and the intrigues ſhe had carried on; by the little regard ſhe had ſhewn to public faith, and by the airs of authority ſhe had aſſumed twenty years together: ſo was the ſpirit againſt her raiſed to an higher pitch, and the means of reducing her power, or at leaſt of checking it, were increaſed. The princes and ſtates who had neglected or favoured the growth of this power, which all of them had done in their turns, ſaw their error; ſaw the neceſſity of repairing it, and ſaw that unleſs they could check the power of France, by uniting a power ſuperior to her's, it would be impoſſible to hinder her from ſucceeding in her great deſigns on the Spaniſh ſucceſſion. The court of England had ſubmitted not many years before to abet her uſurpations, and the king of England had ſtooped to be her

penſioner. But the crime was not national. On the contrary, the nation had cried out loudly againſt it, even whilſt it was committing: and as ſoon as ever the abdication of king JAMES, and the elevation of the prince of ORANGE to the throne of England happened, the nation engaged with all imaginable zeal in the common cauſe of Europe, to reduce the exorbitant power of France, to prevent her future and to revenge her paſt attempts; for even a ſpirit of revenge prevailed, and the war was a war of anger as well as of intereſt.

UNHAPPILY this zeal was neither well conducted, nor well ſeconded. It was zeal without ſucceſs, in the firſt of the two wars that followed the year one thouſand ſix hundred eighty eight; and zeal without knowledge, in both of them. I enter into no detail concerning the events of theſe two wars. This only I obſerve on the firſt of them, that the

treaties of Ryſwic were far from anſwering the ends propoſed and the engagements taken by the firſt grand alliance. The power of France, with reſpect to extent of dominions and ſtrength of barrier, was not reduced to the terms of the Pyrenean treaty, no not to thoſe of the treaty of Nimeghen. Lorrain was reſtored indeed with very conſiderable reſerves, and the places taken or uſurped on the other ſide of the Rhine: but then Straſbourg was yielded up abſolutely to France by the emperor, and by the empire. The conceſſions to Spain were great, but ſo were the conqueſts and the encroachments made upon her by France, ſince the treaty of Nimeghen; and ſhe got little at Ryſwic, I believe nothing more than ſhe had ſaved at Nimeghen before. All theſe conceſſions however, as well as the acknowledgement of king WILLIAM; and others made by LEWIS the fourteenth after he had taken Ath and Barcelona, even during

the courſe of the negotiations, compared with the loſſes and repeated defeats of the allies and the ill ſtate of the confederacy, ſurprized the generality of mankind, who had not been accuſtomed to ſo much moderation and generoſity on the part of this prince. But the pretenſions of the houſe of Bourbon, on the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, remained the ſame. Nothing had been done to weaken them; nothing was prepared to oppoſe them: and the opening of this ſucceſſion was viſibly at hand; for CHARLES the ſecond had been in immediate danger of dying about this time. His death could not be a remote event: and all the good queen's endeavours to be got with child had proved ineffectual. The league diſſolved, all the forces of the confederates diſperſed, and many diſbanded; France continuing armed, her forces by ſea and land increaſed and held in readineſs to act on all ſides, it was plain that the confederates had failed in the firſt object of the grand alliance,

alliance, that of reducing the power of France; by ſucceeding in which alone they could have been able to keep the ſecond engagement, that of ſecuring the ſucceſſion of Spain to the houſe of Auſtria.

AFTER this peace what remained to be done? In the whole nature of things there remained but three. To abandon all care of the Spaniſh ſucceſſion was one; to compound with France upon this ſucceſſion was another; and to prepare, like her, during the interval of peace to make an advantageous war whenever CHARLES the ſecond ſhould die, was a third. Now the firſt of theſe was to leave Spain, and in leaving Spain, to leave all Europe in ſome ſort at the mercy of France: ſince whatever diſpoſition the Spaniards ſhould make of their crown, they were quite unable to ſupport it againſt France: ſince the emperor could do little without his allies; and ſince Bavaria, the third pre-

tender, could do ſtill leſs, and might find, in ſuch a caſe, his account perhaps better in treating with the houſe of Bourbon than with that of Auſtria. More needs not be ſaid on this head; but on the other two, which I ſhall conſider together, ſeveral facts are proper to be mentioned, and ſeveral reflexions neceſſary to be made.

WE might have counter-worked, no doubt, in their own methods of policy, the councils of France, who made peace to diſſolve the confederacy, and great conceſſions, with very ſuſpicious generoſity, to gain the Spaniards: we might have waited like them, that is in arms, the death of CHARLES the ſecond, and have fortified in the mean time the diſpoſitions of the king, the court and people of Spain, againſt the pretenſions of France: we might have made the peace, which was made ſome time after that, between the emperor and the Turks, and have obliged the

the former at any rate to have ſecured the peace of Hungary, and to have prepared, by theſe and other expedients, for the war that would inevitably break out on the death of the king of Spain.

BUT all ſuch meaſures were rendered impracticable, by the emperor chiefly. Experience had ſhewn, that the powers who engaged in alliance with him muſt expect to take the whole burden of his cauſe upon themſelves; and that Hungary would maintain a perpetual diverſion in favour of France, ſince he could not reſolve to lighten the tyrannical yoke he had eſtabliſhed in that country and in Tranſilvania, nor his miniſters to part with the immenſe confiſcations they had appropriated to themſelves. Paſt experience ſhewed this: and the experience that followed confirmed it very fatally. But further; there was not only little aſſiſtance to be expected from him by thoſe who ſhould engage in

in his quarrel: he did them hurt of another kind, and deprived them of many advantages by falſe meaſures of policy and unſkilful negotiations. Whilſt the death of CHARLES the ſecond was expected almoſt daily, the court of Vienna ſeemed to have forgot the court of Madrid, and all the pretenſions on that crown. When the count d'HARRACH was ſent thither, the imperial councils did ſomething worſe. The king of Spain was ready to declare the archduke CHARLES his ſucceſſor; he was deſirous to have this young prince ſent into Spain: the bent of the people was in favour of Auſtria, or it had been ſo, and might have been eaſily turned the ſame way again. At court no cabal was yet formed in favour of Bourbon, and a very weak intrigue was on foot in favour of the electoral prince of Bavaria. Not only CHARLES might have been on the ſpot ready to reap the ſucceſſion, but a German army might have been there to defend

ſend it; for the court of Madrid inſiſted on having twelve thouſand of theſe troops, and rather than not have them offered to contribute to the payment of them privately: becauſe it would have been too impopular among the Spaniards, and too prejudicial to the Auſtrian intereſt, to have had it known that the emperor declined the payment of a body of his own troops that were demanded to ſecure that monarchy to his ſon. Theſe propoſals were half refuſed, and half evaded: and in return to the offer of the crown of Spain to the archduke, the imperial councils aſked the government of Milan for him. They thought it a point of deep policy to ſecure the Italian provinces, and to leave to England and Holland the care of the Low Countries, of Spain, and the Indies. By declining theſe propoſals the houſe of Auſtria renounced in ſome ſort the whole ſucceſſion: at leaſt ſhe gave England and Holland reaſons, whatever engage-

engagements theſe powers had taken, to refuſe the harder taſk of putting her into poſſeſſion by force; when ſhe might, and would not procure, to the Engliſh and Dutch and her other allies, the eaſier taſk of defending her in this poſſeſſion.

I SAID that the meaſures mentioned above were rendered impracticable by the emperor; chiefly, becauſe they were rendered ſo likewiſe by other circumſtances at the ſame conjuncture. A principal one I ſhall mention, and it ſhall be drawn from the ſtate of our own country, and the diſpoſition of our people. Let us take this up from king WILLIAM's acceſſion to our crown. During the whole progreſs that LEWIS the fourteenth made towards ſuch exorbitant power, as gave him well grounded hopes of acquiring at laſt to his family the Spaniſh monarchy, England had been either an idle ſpectator of all that paſſed on the continent, or a faint and uncertain ally againſt

againſt France, or a warm and ſure ally on her ſide, or a partial mediator between her and the powers confederated in their common defence. The revolution produced as great a change in our foreign conduct, as in our domeſtic eſtabliſhment: and our nation engaged with great ſpirit in the war of one thouſand ſix hundred eighty eight. But then this ſpirit was raſh, preſumptuous, and ignorant, ill conducted at home, and ill ſeconded abroad: all which has been touched already. We had waged no long wars on the continent, nor been very deeply concerned in foreign confederacies, ſince the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The hiſtory of EDWARD the third, however, and of the firſt twelve or fifteen years of HENRY the ſixth might have taught us ſome general but uſeful leſſons, drawn from remote times, but applicable to the preſent. So might the example of HENRY the eigth, who ſquandered away great ſums for

for the profit of taking a town, or the honor of having an emperor in his pay; and who divided afterwards by treaty the kingdom of France between himſelf and CHARLES the fifth, with ſucceſs ſo little anſwerable to ſuch an undertaking, that it is hard to believe his Imperial and Engliſh majeſty were both in earneſt. If they were ſo, they were both the bubbles of their preſumption. But it ſeems more likely that HENRY the eigth was bubbled on this occaſion by the great hopes that CHARLES held out to flatter his vanity: as he had been bubbled by his father-in-law FERDINAND at the beginning of his reign, in the war of Navarre. But theſe reflections were not made, nor had we enough conſidered the example of ELISABETH, the laſt of our princes who had made any conſiderable figure abroad, and from whom we might have learned to act with vigour, but to engage with caution, and always to proportion our aſſiſtance according to our abilities, and the real neceſſities

ceſſities of our allies. The frontiers of France were now ſo fortified, her commerce and her naval force were ſo increaſed, her armies were grown ſo numerous, her troops were ſo diſciplined, ſo inured to war, and ſo animated by a long courſe of ſucceſsful campaigns, that they who looked on the ſituation of Europe could not fail to ſee how difficult the enterprize of reducing her power was become. Difficult as it was, we were obliged, on every account and by reaſons of all kinds, to engage in it: but then we ſhould have engaged with more forecaſt, and have conducted ourſelves in the management of it, not with leſs alacrity and ſpirit, but with more order, more oeconomy, and a better application of our efforts. But they who governed were glad to engage us at any rate: and we entered on this great ſcheme of action, as our nation is too apt to do, hurried on by the ruling paſſion of the day. I have been told by ſeveral, who were on

the ſtage of the world at this time, that the generality of our people believed and were encouraged to believe, the war could not be long, if the king was vigorouſly ſupported: and there is a humdrum ſpeech of a ſpeaker of the houſe of commons, I think, who humbly deſired his majeſty to take this opportunity of reconquering his ancient dutchy of Aquitain. We were ſoon awaked from theſe gawdy dreams. In ſeven or eight years no impreſſion had been made on France, that was beſieged as it were on every ſide: and after repeated defeats in the Low-Countries where king WILLIAM laid the principal ſtreſs of the war, his ſole triumph was the retaking of Namur, that had been taken by the French a few years before. Unſuſtained by ſucceſs abroad, we are not to wonder that the ſpirit flagged at home; nor that the diſcontents of thoſe who were averſe to the eſtabliſhed government, uniting with the far greater number of thoſe who

diſliked

diſliked the adminiſtration, inflamed the general diſcontents of the nation, oppreſſed with taxes, pillaged by uſurers, plundered at ſea, and diſappointed at land. As we run into extreams always, ſome would have continued this war at any rate, even at the ſame rate: but it was not poſſible they ſhould prevail in ſuch a ſituation of affairs, and ſuch a diſpoſition of minds. They who got by the war, and made immenſe fortunes by the neceſſities of the public, were not ſo numerous nor ſo powerful, as they have been ſince. The monied intereſt was not yet a rival able to cope with the landed intereſt, either in the nation, or in parliament. The great corporations that had been erected more to ſerve the turn of party, than for any real national uſe, aimed indeed even then at the ſtrength and influence which they have ſince acquired in the legiſlature; but they had not made the ſame pro-

greſs by promoting national corruption, as they and the court have made ſince. In ſhort the other extream prevailed. The generality of people grew as fond of getting out of the war, as they had been of entering into it: and thus far perhaps, conſidering how it had been conducted, they were not much to be blamed. But this was not all; for when King WILLIAM had made the peace, our martial ſpirit became at once ſo pacific, that we ſeemed reſolved to meddle no more in the affairs of the continent, at leaſt to imploy our arms no more in the quarrels that might ariſe there; and accordingly we reduced our troops in England to ſeven thouſand men.

I HAVE ſometimes conſidered, in reflecting on theſe paſſages, what I ſhould have done, if I had ſat in parliament at that time; and have been forced to own myſelf, that I ſhould have voted for diſbanding

banding the army then; as I voted in the following parliament for cenſuring the partition treaties. I am forced to own this, becauſe I remember how imperfect my notions were of the ſituation of Europe in that extraordinary criſis, and how much I ſaw the true intereſt of my own country in an half light. But, my lord, I own it with ſome ſhame; becauſe in truth nothing could be more abſurd than the conduct we held. What! becauſe we had not reduced the power of France by the war, nor excluded the houſe of Bourbon from the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, nor compounded with her upon it by the peace; and becauſe the houſe of Auſtria had not helped herſelf, nor put it into our power to help her with more advantage and better proſpect of ſucceſs—were we to leave that whole ſucceſſion open to the invaſions of France, and to ſuffer even the contingency to ſubſiſt, of ſeeing thoſe monarchies united? What! becauſe it was become extravagant, after the trials ſo lately

made, to think ourſelves any longer engaged by treaty or obliged by good policy to put the houſe of Auſtria in poſſeſſion of the whole Spaniſh monarchy, and to defend her in this poſſeſſion by force of arms, were we to leave the whole at the mercy of France? If we were not to do ſo, if we were not to do one of the three things that I ſaid above remained to be done, and if the emperor put it out of our power to do anpther of them with advantage; were we to put it ſtill more out of our power, and to wait unarmed for the death of the king of Spain? In fine, if we had not the proſpect of diſputing with France, ſo ſucceſsfully as we might have had it, the Spaniſh ſucceſſion whenever it ſhould be open; were we not only to ſhew by diſarming, that we would not diſpute it at all, but to cenſure likewiſe the ſecond of the three things mentioned above and which King WILLIAM put in practiſe, the compounding with France, to prevent

if

if poſſible a war, in which we were averſe to engage?

ALLOW me to puſh theſe reflexions a little further, and to obſerve to your lordſhip, that if the propoſal of ſending the archduke into Spain had been accepted in time by the imperial court, and taken effect and become a meaſure of the confederacy, that war indeed would have been protracted; but France could not have hindered the paſſage of this prince and his German forces, and our fleet would have been better employed in eſcorting them, and in covering the coaſts of Spain and of the dominions of that crown both in Europe and in America, than it was in ſo many unmeaning expeditions from the battle of La Hogue to the end of the war. France indeed would have made her utmoſt efforts to have had ſatisfaction on her pretenſions, as ill founded as they were. She would have ended that war, as we begun

the next, when we demanded a reaſonable ſatisfaction for the emperor: and tho I think that the allies would have had, in very many reſpects, more advantage in defending Spain, than in attacking France; yet, upon a ſuppoſition that the defence would have been as ill conducted as the attack was, and that by conſequence, whether CHARLES the ſecond had lived to the concluſion of this war, or had died before it, the war muſt have ended in ſome partition or other; this partition would have been made by the Spaniards themſelves. They had been forced to compound with France on her former pretenſions, and they muſt and they would have compounded on theſe, with an Auſtrian prince on the throne; juſt as they compounded, and, probably much better than they compounded, on the pretenſions we ſupported againſt them, when they had a prince of Bourbon on their throne. France could not have diſtreſſed the Spaniards, nor have

over-run their monarchy, if they had been united; and they would have been united in this caſe, and ſupported by the whole confederacy, as we diſtreſſed both France and them, over-run their monarchy in one hemiſphere, and might have done ſo in both, when they were diſunited, and ſupported by France alone. France would not have acted, in ſuch negotiations, the ridiculous part which the emperor acted in thoſe that led to the peace of Utrecht, nor have made her bargain worſe by neglecting to make it in time. But the war ending as it did, tho I cannot ſee how king WILLIAM could avoid leaving the crown of Spain and that entire monarchy at the diſcretion of LEWIS the fourteenth, otherwiſe than by compounding to prevent a new war, he was in no ſort prepared to make; yet it is undeniable, that, by conſenting to a partition of their monarchy, he threw the Spaniards into the arms of France. The firſt partition might have taken place,

perhaps, if the electoral prince of Bavaria had lived, whom the French and Spaniards too would have ſeen much more willingly than the archduke on the throne of Spain. For among all the parties into which that court was divided in one thouſand ſix hundred and ninety eight when this treaty was made, that of Auſtria was grown the weakeſt, by the diſguſt taken at a German queen, and at the rapacity and inſolence of her favourites. The French were looked upon with eſteem and kindneſs at Madrid; but the Germans were become, or growing to be, objects of contempt to the miniſters, and of averſion to the people. The electoral prince died in one thouſand ſix hundred and ninety nine. The ſtar of Auſtria, ſo fatal to all thoſe who were obſtacles to the ambition of that houſe, prevailed; as the elector expreſſed himſelf in the firſt pangs of his grief. The ſtate of things changed very much by this death. The archduke was to

have Spain and the Indies, according to a ſecond partition: and the Spaniards, who had expreſſed great reſentment at the firſt, were puſhed beyond their bearing by this. They ſoon appeared to be ſo; for the ſecond treaty of partition was ſigned in March one thouſand ſeven hundred; and the will was made, to the beſt of my remembrance, in the October following. I ſhall not enter here into many particulars concerning theſe great events. They will be related faithfully, and I hope fully explained, in a work which your lordſhip may take the trouble very probably of peruſing ſome time or other, and which I ſhall rather leave, than give to the public. Something however muſt be ſaid more, to continue and wind up this ſummary of the latter period of modern hiſtory.

FRANCE then ſaw her advantage, and improved it no doubt, tho not in the manner, not with the circumſtances, that ſome lying ſcriblers of memorials

and anecdotes have advanced. She had ſent one of the ableſt men of her court to that of Madrid, the marſhal of HARCOURT, and ſhe had ſtipulated in the ſecond treaty of partition, that the archduke ſhould go neither into Spain nor the dutchy of Milan, during the life of CHARLES the ſecond. She was willing to have her option between a treaty and a will. By the acceptation of the will, all king WILLIAM's meaſures were broke. He was unprepared for war as much as when he made theſe treaties to prevent one; and if he meant in making them, what ſome wiſe, but refining men have ſuſpected, and what I confeſs I ſee no reaſon to believe, only to gain time by the difficulty of executing them, and to prepare for making war, whenever the death of the king of Spain ſhould alarm mankind, and rouze his own ſubjects out of their inactivity and neglect of foreign intereſts: if ſo, he was diſappointed in that too; for France took

took poſſeſſion of the whole monarchy at once, and with univerſal concurrence, at leaſt without oppoſition or difficulty, in favour of the duke of ANJOU. By what has been obſerved, or hinted rather very ſhortly, and I fear a little confuſedly, it is plain that reducing the power of France, and ſecuring the whole Spaniſh ſucceſſion to the houſe of Auſtria, were two points that King WILLIAM, at the head of the Britiſh and Dutch common-wealths and of the greateſt confederacy Europe had ſeen, was obliged to give up. All the acquiſitions that France cared to keep for the maintenance of her power were confirmed to her by the treaty of Ryſwic; and King WILLIAM allowed, indirectly at leaſt, the pretenſions of the houſe of Bourbon to the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, as LEWIS the fourteenth allowed, in the ſame manner, thoſe of the houſe of Auſtria, by the treaties of partition. Strange Situation! in which no expedient remained to prepare for

for an event, viſibly ſo near, and of ſuch vaſt importance as the death of the king of Spain, but a partition of his monarchy, without his conſent, or his knowledge! If king WILLIAM had not made this partition, the emperor would have made one, and with as little regard to trade, to the barrier of the ſeven provinces, or to the general ſyſtem of Europe, as had been ſhewed by him when he made the private treaty with France already mentioned, in one thouſand ſix hundred ſixty eight. The miniſters of Vienna were not wanting to inſinuate to thoſe of France overtures of a ſeparate treaty, as more conducive to their common intereſts than the acceſſion of his imperial majeſty to that of partition. But the councils of Verſailles judged very reaſonably, that a partition made with England and Holland would be more effectual than any other, if a partition was to take place: and that ſuch a partition would be juſt as effectual as one made with

with the emperor, to furniſh arguments to the emiſſaries of France, and motives to the Spaniſh councils, if a will in favour of France could be obtained. I repeat it again; I cannot ſee what king WILLIAM could do in ſuch circumſtances as he found himſelf in after thirty years ſtruggle, except what he did: neither can I ſee how he could do what he did, eſpecially after the reſentment expreſſed by the Spaniards, and the furious memorial preſented by CANALES on the concluſion of the firſt treaty of partition, without apprehending that the conſequence would be a will in favour of France. He was in the worſt of all political circumſtances, in that wherein no one good meaſure remains to be taken, and out of which he left the two nations, at the head of whom he had been ſo long, to fight and negotiate themſelves and their confederates, as well as they could.

WHEN

WHEN this will was made and accepted, LEWIS the fourteenth had ſucceeded, and the powers in oppoſition to him had failed, in all the great objects of intereſt and ambition, which they had kept in ſight for more than forty years; that is from the beginning of the preſent period. The actors changed their parts in the tragedy that followed. The power, that had ſo long and ſo cruelly attacked, was now to defend, the Spaniſh monarchy: and the powers, that had ſo long defended it, were now to attack it. Let us ſee how this was brought about; and that we may ſee it the better, and make a better judgment of all that paſſed from the death of CHARLES the ſecond to the peace of Utrecht, let us go back to the time of his death, and conſider the circumſtances that formed this complicated ſtate of affairs, in three views; a view of right, a view of policy, and a view of power.

THE

THE right of ſucceeding to the crown of Spain would have been undoubtedly in the children of MARIA THERESA, that is in the houſe of Bourbon; if this right had not been barred by the ſolemn renunciations ſo often mentioned. The pretenſions of the houſe of Auſtria were founded on theſe renunciations, on the ratification of them by the Pyrenean treaty, and the confirmation of them by the will of Philip the fourth. The pretenſions of the houſe of Bourbon were founded on a ſuppoſition, it was indeed no more, and a vain one too, that theſe renunciations were in their nature null. On this foot the diſpute of right ſtood during the life of CHARLES the ſecond, and on the ſame it would have continued to ſtand even after his death, if the renunciations had remained unſhaken; if his will, like that of his father, had confirmed them, and had left the crown, in purſuance of them, to the houſe of Auſtria. But the will of CHARLES the

ſecond,

ſecond, annulling theſe renunciations, took away the ſole foundation of the Auſtrian pretenſions; for, however this act might be obtained, it was juſt as valid as his father's, and was confirmed by the univerſal concurrence of the Spaniſh nation to the new ſettlement he made of that crown. Let it be, as I think it ought to be granted, that the true heirs could not claim againſt renunciations that were, if I may ſay ſo, conditions of their birth: but CHARLES the ſecond had certainly as good a right to change the courſe of ſucceſſion agreeably to the order of nature and the condition of that monarchy, after his true heirs were born, as PHILIP the fourth had to change it, contrary to this order and this conſtitution, before they were born, or at any other time. He had as good a right in ſhort to diſpenſe with the Pyrenean treaty, and to ſet it aſide in this reſpect, as his father had to make it: ſo that the renunciations being annulled

by

by that party to the Pyrenean treaty who had exacted them, they could be deemed no longer binding, by virtue of this treaty, on the party who had made them. The ſole queſtion that remained therefore between theſe rival houſes, as to right, was this, whether the engagements taken by LEWIS the fourteenth in the partition treaties obliged him to adhere to the terms of the laſt of them in all events, and to deprive his family of the ſucceſſion which the king of Spain opened, and the Spaniſh nation offered to them; rather than to depart from a compoſition he had made, on pretenſions that were diſputable then, but were now out of diſpute? It may be ſaid, and it was ſaid, that the treaties of partition being abſolute, without any condition or exception relative to any diſpoſition the king of Spain had made or might make of his ſucceſſion, in favour of Bourbon or Auſtria; the diſpoſition made by his will, in favour of the duke of ANJOU,

could not affect the engagements ſo lately taken by LEWIS the fourteenth in theſe treaties, nor diſpenſe with a literal obſervation of them. This might be true on ſtrict principles of juſtice; but I apprehend that none of theſe powers, who exclaimed ſo loudly againſt the perfidy of France in this caſe, would have been more ſcrupulous in a parallel caſe. The maxim *ſummum jus eſt ſumma injuria* would have been quoted, and the rigid letter of treaties would have been ſoftened by an equitable interpretation of their ſpirit and intention. His imperial majeſty, above all, had not the leaſt color of right to exclaim againſt France on this occaſion; for in general, if his family was to be ſtripped of all the dominions they have acquired by breach of faith, and means much worſe than the acceptation of the will, even allowing all the invidious circumſtances imputed to the conduct of France to be true, the Auſtrian family would ſink from their

preſent

preſent grandeur to that low ſtate they were in two or three centuries ago. In particular, the emperor who had conſtantly refuſed to accede to the treaties of partition, or to ſubmit to the diſpoſitions made by them, had not the leaſt plauſible pretence to object to LEWIS the fourteenth, that he departed from them. Thus I think the right of the two houſes ſtood on the death of CHARLES the ſecond. The right of the Spaniards, an independent nation, to regulate their own ſucceſſion, or to receive the prince whom their dying monarch had called to it; and the right of England and Holland to regulate this ſucceſſion, to divide, and parcel out this monarchy in different lots, it would be equally fooliſh to go about to eſtabliſh. One is too evident, the other too abſurd, to admit of any proof. But enough has been ſaid concerning right, which was in truth little regarded by any of the parties concerned immediately or remotely in the whole

courſe of theſe proceedings. Particular intereſts were alone regarded, and theſe were purſued as ambition, fear, reſentment, and vanity directed: I mean the ambition of the two houſes contending for ſuperiority of power; the fear of England and Holland leſt this ſuperiority ſhould become too great in either; the reſentment of Spain at the diſmemberment of that monarchy projected by the partition treaties; and the vanity of that nation, as well as of the princes of the houſe of Bourbon: for as vanity mingled with reſentment to make the will, vanity had a great ſhare in determining the acceptation of it.

LET us now conſider the ſame conjuncture in a view of policy. The policy of the Spaniſh councils was this. They could not brook that their monarchy ſhould be divided: and this principle is expreſſed ſtrongly in the will of CHARLES the ſecond, where he exhorts his ſubjects

not to ſuffer any diſmemberment or diminution of a monarchy founded by his predeceſſors with ſo much glory. Too weak to hinder this diſmemberment by their own ſtrength, too well appriſed of the little force and little views of the court of Vienna, and their old allies having engaged to procure this diſmemberment even by force of arms; nothing remained for them to do, upon this principle, but to detach France from the engagements of the partition treaties, by giving their whole monarchy to a prince of the houſe of Bourbon. As much as may have been ſaid concerning the negotiations of France to obtain a will in her favour, and yet to keep in reſerve the advantages ſtipulated for her by the partition-treaties, if ſuch a will could not be obtained, and tho I am perſuaded that the marſhal of HARCOURT, who helped to procure this will, made his court to LEWIS the fourteenth as much as the

marſhal of TALLARD, who negotiated the partitions; yet it is certain, that the acceptation of the will was not a meaſure definitely taken at Verſailles when the king of Spain died. The alternative divided thoſe councils, and without entering at this time into the arguments urged on each ſide, adhering to the partitions ſeemed the cauſe of France, accepting the will that of the houſe of Bourbon.

IT has been ſaid by men of great weight in the councils of Spain, and was ſaid at that time by men as little fond of the houſe of Bourbon, or of the French nation, as their fathers had been; that if England and Holland had not formed a confederacy and begun a war, they would have made Philip the fifth as good a Spaniard as any of the preceding Philips, and not have endured the influence of French councils in the adminiſtration of their government: but that we threw

threw them entirely into the hands of France when we began the war, becauſe the fleets and armies of this crown being neceſſary to their defence, they could not avoid ſubmitting to this influence as long as the ſame neceſſity continued; and, in fact, we have ſeen that the influence laſted no longer. But notwithſtanding this, it muſt be confeſſed, that a war was unavoidable. The immediate ſecuring of commerce and of barriers, the preventing an union of the two monarchies in ſome future time, and the preſervation of a certain degree at leaſt of equality in the ſcales of power, were points too important to England, Holland, and the reſt of Europe, to be reſted on the moderation of French, and the vigour of Spaniſh councils, under a prince of the houſe of France. If ſatisfaction to the houſe of Auſtria, to whoſe rights England and Holland ſhewed no great regard whilſt they were better founded than they were ſince the will, had been

alone concerned; a drop of blood ſpilt, or five ſhillings ſpent in the quarrel, would have been too much profuſion. But this was properly the ſcale into which it became the common intereſt to throw all the weight that could be taken out of that of Bourbon. And therefore your lordſhip will find, that when negotiations with d'AVAUX were ſet on foot in Holland to prevent a war, or rather on our part to gain time to prepare for it, in which view the Dutch and we had both acknowledged PHILIP king of Spain; the great article on which we inſiſted was, that reaſonable ſatisfaction ſhould be given the emperor, upon his pretenſions founded on the treaty of partition. We could do no otherwiſe; and France, who offered to make the treaty of Ryſwic the foundation of that treaty, could do no otherwiſe than refuſe to conſent that the treaty of partition ſhould be ſo, after accepting the will, and thereby engaging to oppoſe

poſe all partition or diſmemberment of the Spaniſh monarchy. I ſhould mention none of the other demands of England and Holland, if I could neglect to point out to your lordſhip's obſervation, that the ſame artifice was employed at this time, to perplex the more a negotiation that could not ſucceed on other accounts, as we ſaw employed in the courſe of the war, by the Engliſh and Dutch miniſters, to prevent the ſucceſs of negotiations that might, and ought to have ſucceeded. The demand I mean is that of a 'liberty not only to explain the terms 'propoſed, but to increaſe or amplify 'them, in the courſe of the negotiation.' I do not remember the words, but this is the ſenſe, and this was the meaning of the confederates in both caſes.

IN the former, king WILLIAM was determined to begin the war by all the rules of good policy; ſince he could not obtain, nay ſince France could not grant in

in that conjuncture, nor without being forced to it by a war, what he was obliged by theſe very rules to demand. He intended therefore nothing by this negotiation, if it may be called ſuch, but to preſerve forms and appearances, and perhaps, which many have ſuſpected, to have time to prepare, as I hinted juſt now, both abroad and at home. Many things concurred to favour his preparations abroad. The alarm, that had been given by the acceptation of the will, was increaſed by every ſtep that France made to ſecure the effect of it. Thus, for inſtance, the ſurpriſing and ſeizing the Dutch troops, in the ſame night, and at the ſame hour, that were diſperſed in the garriſons of the Spaniſh Netherlands, was not excuſed by the neceſſity of ſecuring thoſe places to the obedience of PHILIP, nor ſoftened by the immediate diſmiſſion of thoſe troops. The impreſſion it made was much the ſame as thoſe of the ſurprizes and ſeizures of France in former uſurpations. No one knew

knew then, that the ſovereignty of the ten provinces was to be yielded up to the elector of *Bavaria*: and every one ſaw that there remained no longer any barrier between France and the ſeven provinces. At home, the diſpoſition of the nation was abſolutely turned to a war with France, on the death of king JAMES the ſecond, by the acknowledgment LEWIS the fourteenth made of his ſon as king of England. I know what has been ſaid in excuſe for this meaſure, taken, as I believe, on female importunity; but certainly without any regard to public faith, to the true intereſt of France in thoſe circumſtances, or to the true intereſt of the prince thus acknowledged, in any. It was ſaid, that the treaty of Ryſwic obliging his moſt chriſtian majeſty only not to diſturb king WILLIAM in his poſſeſſion, he might, without any violation of it, have acknowledged this prince as king of England; according to the political caſuiſtry of the French,

and the example of France, who finds no fault with the powers that treat with the kings of England, altho the kings of England retain the title of kings of France; as well as the example of Spain, who makes no complaints that other ſtates treat with the kings of France, altho the kings of France retain the title of Navarre. But beſides that the examples are not appoſite, becauſe no other powers acknowledge in form the king of England to be king of France, nor the king of France to be king of Navarre; with what face could the French excuſe this meaſure? Could they excuſe it by urging that they adhere to the ſtrict letter of one article of the treaty of Ryſwic, againſt the plain meaning of that very article and againſt the whole tenor of that treaty; in the ſame breath with which they juſtified the acceptation of the will, by pretending they adhered to the ſuppoſed ſpirit and general intention of the treaties of partition, in contradiction to the letter,

letter, to the ſpecific engagements, and to the whole purport of thoſe treaties? This part of the conduct of LEWIS the fourteenth may appear juſtly the more ſurpriſing; becauſe in moſt other parts of his conduct at the ſame time, and in ſome to his diſadvantage, he acted cautiouſly, endeavoured to calm the minds of his neighbours, to reconcile Europe to his grandſon's elevation, and to avoid all ſhew of beginning hoſtilities.

THO king WILLIAM was determined to engage in a war with France and Spain, yet the ſame good policy, that determined him to engage, determined him not to engage too deeply. The engagement taken in the grand alliance of one thouſand ſeven hundred and one is, 'To procure 'an equitable and reaſonable ſatisfaction 'to his imperial majeſty for his pretenſion 'to the Spaniſh ſucceſſion; and ſufficient 'ſecurity to the king of England, and the 'ſtates general, for their dominions, and

'for

'for the navigation and commerce of their 'ſubjects, and to prevent the union of the 'two monarchies of France and Spain.' As king of England, as ſtateholder of Holland, he neither could, nor did engage any further. It may be diſputed perhaps among ſpeculative politicians, whether the balance of power in Europe would have been better preſerved by that ſcheme of partition, which the treaties, and particularly the laſt of them propoſed, or by that which the grand alliance propoſed to be the object of the war? I think there is little room for ſuch a diſpute, as I ſhall have occaſion to ſay hereafter more expreſly. In this place I ſhall only ſay, that the object of this war, which king WILLIAM meditated, and queen ANN waged, was a partition, by which a prince of the houſe of Bourbon, already acknowledged by us and the Dutch as king of Spain, was to be left on the throne of that diſmembered monarchy. The wiſdom of thoſe councils ſaw that the peace of Europe might

be

be reſtored and ſecured on this foot, and that the liberties of Europe would be in no danger.

THE ſcales of the balance of power will never be exactly poized, nor in the preciſe point of equality either diſcernible or neceſſary to be diſcerned. It is ſufficient in this, as in other human affairs, that the deviation be not too great. Some there will always be. A conſtant attention to theſe deviations is therefore neceſſary. When they are little, their increaſe may be eaſily prevented by early care and the precautions that good policy ſuggeſts. But when they become great for want of this care and theſe precautions, or by the force of unforeſeen events, more vigour is to be exerted, and greater efforts to be made. But even in ſuch caſes, much reflection is neceſſary on all the circumſtances that form the conjuncture; leſt, by attacking with ill ſucceſs, the deviation be con-

confirmed, and the power that is deemed already exorbitant become more ſo: and leſt by attacking with good ſucceſs, whilſt one ſcale is pillaged, too much weight of power be thrown into the other. In ſuch caſes, he who has conſidered, in the hiſtories of former ages, the ſtrange revolutions that time produces, and the perpetual flux and reflux of public as well as private fortunes, of kingdoms and ſtates as well as of thoſe who govern or are governed in them, will incline to think, that if the ſcales can be brought back by a war, nearly, tho not exactly, to the point they were at before this great deviation from it, the reſt may be left to accidents, and to the uſe that good policy is able to make of them.

When CHARLES the fifth was at the height of his power, and in the zenith of his glory, when a king of France and a pope were at once his priſoners; it

it muſt be allowed, that his ſituation and that of his neighbours compared, they had as much at leaſt to fear from him and from the houſe of Auſtria, as the neighbours of LEWIS the fourteenth had to fear from him and from the houſe of Bourbon, when after all his other ſucceſs, one of his grand-children was placed on the Spaniſh throne. And yet among all the conditions of the ſeveral leagues againſt CHARLES the fifth, I do not remember that it was ever ſtipulated, that 'no peace ſhould be made 'with him as long as he continued to 'be emperor and king of Spain; nor 'as long as any Auſtrian prince conti-'nued capable of uniting on his head 'the Imperial and Spaniſh crowns.'

IF your lordſhip makes the application, you will find that the difference of ſome circumſtances does not hinder this example from being very appoſite, and ſtrong to the preſent purpoſe.

CHARLES the fifth was emperor and king of Spain; but neither was LEWIS the fourteenth king of Spain, nor PHILIP the fifth king of France. That had happened in one inſtance, which it was apprehended might happen in the other. It had happened, and it was reaſonably to be apprehended that it might happen again, and that the Imperial and Spaniſh crowns might continue, not only in the ſame family, but on the ſame heads; for meaſures were taken to ſecure the ſucceſſion of both, to PHILIP the ſon of CHARLES. We do not find however that any confederacy was formed, any engagement taken, nor any war made to remove or prevent this great evil. The princes and ſtates of Europe contented themſelves to oppoſe the deſigns of CHARLES the fifth, and to check the growth of his power occaſionally, and as intereſt invited, or neceſſity forced them to do; not conſtantly. They did perhaps too

little

little againſt him, and ſometimes too much for him: but if they did too little of one kind, time and accident did the reſt. Diſtinct dominions, and different pretenſions, created contrary intereſts in the houſe of Auſtria: and on the abdication of CHARLES the fifth, his brother ſucceeded, not his ſon, to the empire. The houſe of Auſtria divided into a German and a Spaniſh branch: and if the two branches came to have a mutual influence on one another and frequently a common intereſt, it was not till one of them had fallen from grandeur, and till the other was rather aiming at it, than in poſſeſſion of it. In ſhort, PHILIP was excluded from the imperial throne by ſo natural a progreſſion of cauſes and effects, ariſing not only in Germany but in his own family, that if a treaty had been made to exclude him from it in favour of FERDINAND, ſuch a treaty

might have been ſaid very probably to have executed itſelf.

THE precaution I have mentioned, and that was neglected in this caſe without any detriment to the common cauſe of Europe, was not neglected in the grand alliance of one thouſand ſeven hundred and one. For in that, one of the ends propoſed by the war is, to obtain an effectual ſecurity againſt the contingent union of the crowns of France and Spain. The will of CHARLES the ſecond provides againſt the ſame contingency: and this great principle, of preventing too much dominion and power from falling to the lot of either of the families of Bourbon or Auſtria, ſeemed to be agreed on all ſides; ſince in the partition-treaty the ſame precaution was taken againſt an union of the Imperial and Spaniſh crowns. King WILLIAM was enough piqued againſt France. His ancient prejudices were ſtrong and well founded. He had been

worſted

worſted in war, over-reached in negotiation, and perſonally affronted by her. England and Holland were ſufficiently alarmed and animated, and a party was not wanting, even in our iſland, ready to approve any engagements he would have taken againſt France and Spain, and in favour of the houſe of Auſtria; tho we were leſs concerned, by any national intereſt, than any other power that took part in the war, either then, or afterwards. But this prince was far from taking a part beyond that which the particular intereſts of England and Holland, and the general intereſt of Europe, neceſſarily required. Pique muſt have no more a place than affection, in deliberations of this kind. To have engaged to dethrone PHILIP, out of reſentment to LEWIS the fourteenth, would have been a reſolution worthy of CHARLES the twelfth, king of Sweden, who ſacrificed his country, his people, and himſelf at laſt, to his revenge. To have engaged

to conquer the Spaniſh monarchy for the houſe of Auſtria, or to go, in favour of that family, one ſtep beyond thoſe that were neceſſary to keep this houſe on a foot of rivalry with the other, would have been as I have hinted, to act the part of a vaſſal, not of an ally. The former pawns his ſtate, and ruins his ſubjects, for the intereſt of his ſuperior lord, perhaps for his lord's humor, or his paſſion: the latter goes no further than his own intereſts carry him; nor makes war for thoſe of another, nor even for his own, if they are remote, and contingent, as if he fought *pro aris & focis*, for his religion, his liberty, and his property. Agreeably to theſe principles of good policy, we entered into the war that began on the death of CHARLES the ſecond: but we ſoon departed from them, as I ſhall have occaſion to obſerve in conſidering the ſtate of things, at this remarkable conjuncture, in a view of ſtrength.

LET

LET me recal here what I have ſaid ſomewhere elſe. They who are in the ſinking ſcale of the balance of power do not eaſily, nor ſoon, come off from the habitual prejudices of ſuperiority over their neighbours, nor from the confidence that ſuch prejudices inſpire. From the year one thouſand ſix hundred and ſixty ſeven, to the end of that century, France had been conſtantly in arms, and her arms had been ſucceſsful. She had ſuſtained a war, without any confederates, againſt the principal powers of Europe confederated againſt her, and had finiſhed it with advantage on every ſide, juſt before the death of the king of Spain. She continued armed after the peace, by ſea and land. She increaſed her forces, whilſt other nations reduced theirs; and was ready to defend, or to invade her neighbours whilſt, their confederacy being diſſolved, they were in no condition to invade her, and in a bad one to defend themſelves. Spain

and France had now one common cauſe. The electors of Bavaria and Cologne ſupported it in Germany: the duke of Savoy was an ally, the duke of Mantua a vaſſal of the two crowns in Italy. In a word, appearances were formidable on that ſide; and if a diſtruſt of ſtrength, on the ſide of the confederacy, had induced England and Holland to compound with France for a partition of the Spaniſh ſucceſſion; there ſeemed to be ſtill greater reaſon for this diſtruſt after the acceptation of the will, the peaceable and ready ſubmiſſion of the entire monarchy of Spain to PHILIP, and all the meaſures taken to ſecure him in this poſſeſſion. Such appearances might well impoſe. They did ſo on many, and on none more than on the French themſelves, who engaged with great confidence and ſpirit in the war; when they found it, as they might well expect it would be, unavoidable. The ſtrength of France however, tho great, was not ſo great as the French

French thought it, nor equal to the efforts they undertook to make. Their engagement, to maintain the Spaniſh monarchy entire under the dominion of PHILIP, exceeded their ſtrength. Our engagement, to procure ſome out-ſkirts of it for the houſe of Auſtria, was not in the ſame diſproportion to our ſtrength. If I ſpeak poſitively on this occaſion, yet I cannot be accuſed of preſumption; becauſe, how diſputable ſoever theſe points might be when they were points of political ſpeculation, they are ſuch no longer, and the judgment I make is dictated to me by experience. France threw herſelf into the ſinking ſcale, when ſhe accepted the will. Her ſcale continued to ſink during the whole courſe of the war, and might have been kept by the peace as low as the true intereſt of Europe required. What I remember to have heard the duke of MARLBOROUGH ſay, before he went to take on him the command of the army in the

Low

Low Countries in one thouſand ſeven hundred and two, proved true. The French miſreckoned very much, if they made the ſame compariſon between their troops and thoſe of their enemies, as they had made in precedent wars. Thoſe that had been oppoſed to them, in the laſt, were raw for the moſt part when it began, the Britiſh particularly: but they had been diſciplined, if I may ſay ſo, by their defeats. They were grown to be veteran at the peace of Ryſwic, and tho many had been diſbanded, yet they had been diſbanded lately: ſo that even theſe were eaſily formed a-new, and the ſpirit that had been raiſed continued in all. Supplies of men to recruit the armies were more abundant on the ſide of the confederacy, than on that of the two crowns: a neceſſary conſequence of which it ſeemed to be, that thoſe of the former would grow better, and thoſe of the latter worſe, in a long, extenſive, and bloody war. I believe it proved ſo; and

and if my memory does not deceive me, the French were forced very early to ſend recruits to their armies, as they ſend ſlaves to their gallies. A compariſon between thoſe who were to direct the councils, and to conduct the armies on both ſides, is a taſk it would become me little to undertake. The event ſhewed, that if France had had her CONDE', her TURENNE, or her LUXEMBURG, to oppoſe the confederates; the confederates might have oppoſed to her, with equal confidence, their EUGENE of Savoy, their MARLBOROUGH, or their STARENBERG. But there is one obſervation I cannot forbear to make. The alliances were concluded, the quotas were ſettled, and the ſeaſon for taking the field approached, when king WILLIAM died. The event could not fail to occaſion ſome conſternation on one ſide, and to give ſome hopes on the other; for notwithſtanding the ill ſucceſs with which he made war generally, he was looked upon as the

the ſole centre of union that could keep together the great confederacy then forming: and how much the French feared, from his life, had appeared a few years before, in the extravagant and indecent joy they expreſſed on a falſe report of his death. A ſhort time ſhewed how vain the fears of ſome, and the hopes of others were. By his death, the duke of MARLBOROUH was raiſed to the head of the army, and indeed of the confederacy: where he, a new, a private man, a ſubject, acquired by merit and by management a more deciding influence, than high birth, confirmed authority, and even the crown of Great Britain, had given to king William. Not only all the parts of that vaſt machine, the grand alliance, were kept more compact and entire; but a more rapid and vigorous motion was given to the whole: and, inſtead of languiſhing or diſaſtrous campaigns, we ſaw every ſcene of the war full of action.

tion. All thoſe wherein he appeared, and many of thoſe wherein he was not then an actor, but abettor however of their action, were crowned with the moſt triumphant ſucceſs. I take with pleaſure this opportunity of doing juſtice to that great man, whoſe faults I knew, whoſe virtues I admired; and whoſe memory, as the greateſt general and as the greateſt miniſter that our country or perhaps any other has produced, I honor. But beſides this, the obſervation I have made comes into my ſubject, ſince it ſerves to point out to your lordſhip the proof of what I ſaid above, that France undertook too much, when ſhe undertook to maintain the Spaniſh monarchy entire in the poſſeſſion of PHILIP: and that we undertook no more than what was proportionable to our ſtrength, when we undertook to weaken that monarchy by diſmembering it, in the hands of a prince of the houſe of Bourbon, which we had been diſabled

abled by ill fortune and worſe conduct to keep out of them. It may be ſaid that the great ſucceſs of the confederates againſt France proves that their generals were ſuperior to hers, but not that their forces and their national ſtrength were ſo; that with the ſame force with which ſhe was beaten, ſhe might have been victorious; that if ſhe had been ſo, or if the ſucceſs of the war had varied, or been leſs deciſive againſt her in Germany, in the Low Countries and in Italy, as it was in Spain, her ſtrength would have appeared ſufficient, and that of the confederacy inſufficient. Many things may be urged to deſtroy this reaſoning; I content myſelf with one. France could not long have made even the unſucceſsful efforts ſhe did make, if England and Holland had done what it is undeniable they had ſtrength to do; if beſides pillaging, I do not ſay conquering, the Spaniſh Weſt Indies, they had hindered the French from going to the

the South Sea; as they did annually during the whole courſe of the war without the leaſt moleſtation, and from whence they imported into France in that time as much ſilver and gold as the whole ſpecies of that kingdom amounted to. With this immenſe and conſtant ſupply of wealth, France was reduced in effect to bankruptcy before the end of the war. How much ſooner muſt ſhe have been ſo, if this ſupply had been kept from her? The confeſſion of France herſelf is on my ſide. She confeſſed her inability to ſupport what ſhe had undertaken, when ſhe ſued for peace as early as the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſix. She made her utmoſt efforts to anſwer the expectation of the Spaniards, and to keep their monarchy entire. When experience had made it evident that this was beyond her power, ſhe thought herſelf juſtified to the Spaniſh nation, in conſenting to a partition, and was ready to conclude a

peace with the allies on the principles of their grand alliance. But as France ſeemed to flatter herſelf, till experience made her deſirous to abandon an enterprize that exceeded her ſtrength; you will find, my lord, that her enemies began to flatter themſelves in their turn, and to form deſigns and take engagements that exceeded theirs. Great Britain was drawn into theſe engagements little by little; for I do not remember any parliamentary declaration for continuing the war till PHILIP ſhould be dethroned, before the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſix: and then ſuch a declaration was judged neceſſary to ſecond the reſolution of our miniſters and our allies, in departing from the principles of the grand alliance, and in propoſing not only the reduction of the French, but the conqueſt of the Spaniſh monarchy, as the objects of the war. This new plan had taken place, and we had begun to act upon it, two years before, when the

the treaty with Portugal was concluded, and the archduke CHARLES, now emperor, was ſent into Portugal firſt, and into Catalonia afterwards, and was acknowledged and ſupported as king of Spain.

WHEN your lordſhip peruſes the anecdotes of the times here ſpoken of, and conſiders the courſe and event of the great war which broke out on the death of the king of Spain, CHARLES the ſecond, and was ended by the treaties of Utrecht and Radſtat; you will find, that in order to form a true judgment on the whole, you muſt conſider very attentively the great change made by the new plan that I have mentioned; and compare it with the plan of the grand alliance, relatively to the general intereſt of Europe, and the particular intereſt of your own country. It will not, becauſe it cannot be denied, that all the ends of the grand alliance might have been obtained by a

peace in one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſix. I need not recall the events of that, and of the precedent years of the war. Not only the arms of France had been defeated on every ſide; but the inward ſtate of that kingdom was already more exhauſted than it had ever been. She went on indeed, but ſhe ſtaggered and reeled under the burden of the war. Our condition, I ſpeak of Great Britain, was not quite ſo bad: but the charge of the war increaſed annually upon us. It was evident that this charge muſt continue to increaſe, and it was no leſs evident that our nation was unable to bear it without falling ſoon into ſuch diſtreſs, and contracting ſuch debts, as we have ſeen and felt, and ſtill feel. The Dutch neither reſtrained their trade, nor overloaded it with taxes. They ſoon altered the proportion of their quotas, and were deficient even after this alteration in them. But, however, it muſt be allowed, that they exerted their whole ſtrength;

ſtrength; and they and we paid the whole charge of the war. Since therefore by ſuch efforts as could not be continued any longer, without oppreſſing and impoveriſhing theſe nations to a degree, that no intereſt except that of their very being, nor any engagement of aſſiſting an alliance totis viribus can require, France was reduced, and all the ends of the war were become attainable; it will be worth your lordſhip's while to conſider why the true uſe was not made of the ſucceſs of the confederates againſt France and Spain, and why a peace was not concluded in the fifth year of the war. When your lordſhip conſiders this, you will compare in your thoughts what the ſtate of Europe would have been, and that of your own country might have been, if the plan of the grand alliance had been purſued; with the poſſible as well as certain, the contingent as well as neceſſary, conſequences of changing this plan in the manner it was changed. You will

be of opinion, I think, and it ſeems to me, after more than twenty years of recollection, re-examination and reflection, that impartial poſterity muſt be of the ſame opinion; you will be of opinion, I think, that the war was wiſe and juſt before the change, becauſe neceſſary to maintain that equality among the powers of Europe on which the public peace and common proſperity depends: and that it was unwiſe and unjuſt after this change, becauſe unneceſſary to this end, and directed to other and to contrary ends. You will be guided by undeniable facts to diſcover through all the falſe colours which have been laid, and which deceived many at the time, that the war, after this change, became a war of paſſion, of ambition, of avarice, and of private intereſt; the private intereſt of particular perſons and particular ſtates; to which the general intereſt of Europe was ſacrificed ſo entirely, that if the terms inſiſted on by the

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confederates had been granted, nay if even thoſe which France was reduced to grant, in one thouſand ſeven hundred and ten, had been accepted, ſuch a new ſyſtem of power would have been created as might have expoſed the balance of this power to deviations, and the peace of Europe to troubles, not inferior to thoſe that the war was deſigned, when it begun, to prevent. Whilſt you obſerve this in general, you will find particular occaſion to lament the fate of Great Britain, in the midſt of triumphs that have been ſounded ſo high. She had triumphed indeed to the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſix inclufively: but what were her triumphs afterwards? What was her ſucceſs after ſhe proceeded on the new plan? I ſhall ſay ſomething on that head immediately. Here let me only ſay, that the glory of taking towns, and winning battles, is to be meaſured by the utility that reſults from thoſe victories. Victories, that bring ho-

nor to the arms, may bring ſhame to the councils, of a nation. To win a battle, to take a town, is the glory of a general, and of an army. Of this glory we had a very large ſhare in the courſe of the war. But the glory of a nation is to proportion the ends ſhe propoſes, to her intereſt and her ſtrength; the means ſhe employs, to the ends ſhe propoſes, and the vigour ſhe exerts, to both. Of this glory, I apprehend we have had very little to boaſt at any time, and particularly in the great conjuncture of which I am ſpeaking. The reaſons of ambition, avarice, and private intereſt, which engaged the princes and ſtates of the confederacy to depart from the principles of the grand alliance, were no reaſons for Great Britain. She neither expected nor deſired any thing more than what ſhe might have obtained by adhering to thoſe principles. What hurried our nation then, with ſo much ſpirit and ardor, into thoſe of the new plan? Your

lordſhip will anſwer this queſtion to yourſelf, I believe; by the prejudices and raſhneſs of party; by the influence that the firſt ſucceſſes of the confederate arms gave to our miniſters; and the popularity that they gave, if I may ſay ſo, to the war; by antient, and freſh reſentments, which the unjuſt and violent uſurpations, in ſhort the whole conduct of LEWIS the fourteenth for forty years together, his haughty treatment of other princes and ſtates, and even the ſtyle of his court, had created: and to mention no more, by a notion, groundleſs but prevalent, that he was and would be maſter, as long as his grandſon was king of Spain; and that there could be no effectual meaſure taken, tho the grand alliance ſuppoſed that there might, to prevent a future union of the two monarchies, as long as a prince of the houſe of Bourbon ſat on the Spaniſh throne. That ſuch a notion ſhould have prevailed, in the firſt confuſion of thoughts

the Spaniards as ſoon as poſſible from habits of union and intimacy with France; not for continuing them under the ſame neceſſity, till by length of time theſe habits ſhould be confirmed. As to the latter part of this notion, they knew that it was falſe, and ſilly. GARTH, the beſt natured ingenious wild man I ever knew, might be in the right, when he ſaid, in ſome of his poems at that time,

— *An Auſtrian Prince alone*
Is fit to nod upon a Spaniſh throne.

The ſetting an Auſtrian prince upon it, was, no doubt, the ſureſt expedient to prevent an union of the two monarchies of France and Spain; juſt as ſetting a prince of the houſe of Bourbon, on that throne, was the ſureſt expedient to prevent an union of the Imperial and Spaniſh crowns. But it was equally falſe to ſay, in either caſe, that this was the ſole expedient. It would be no paradox, but a propoſition eaſily proved, to advance, that if theſe

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unions had been effectually provided a-gainſt, the general intereſt of Europe would have been little concerned whether PHILIP or CHARLES had noded at Madrid. It would be likewiſe no paradox to ſay, that the contingency of uniting France and Spain under the ſame prince appeared more remote, about the middle of the laſt great war, when the dethronement of PHILIP in favour of CHARLES was made a condition of peace ſine qua non, than the contingency of an union of the Imperial and Spaniſh crowns. Nay, I know not whether it would be a paradox to affirm, that the expedient that was taken, and that was always obvious to be taken, of excluding PHILIP and his race from the ſucceſſion of France, by creating an intereſt in all the other princes of the blood, and by conſequence a party in France itſelf for their excluſion, whenever the caſe ſhould happen, was not in it's nature more effectual than any that could have been taken: and ſome muſt have

have been taken, not only to exclude CHARLES from the empire whenever the caſe ſhould happen that happened ſoon, the death of his brother JOSEPH without iſſue male, but his poſterity likewiſe in all future vacancies of the imperial throne. The expedient that was taken againſt PHILIP at the treaty of Utrecht, they who oppoſed the peace attempted to ridicule; but ſome of them have had occaſion ſince that time to ſee, tho the caſe has not happened, how effectual it would have been if it had: and he, who ſhould go about to ridicule it after our experience, would only make himſelf ridiculous. Notwithſtanding all this, he, who tranſports himſelf back to that time, muſt acknowledge, that the confederated powers in general could not but be of GARTH's mind, and think it more agreeable to the common intereſt of Europe, that a branch of Auſtria, than a branch of Bourbon, ſhould gather the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, and that the maritime powers, as they

they are called impertinently enough, with reſpect to the ſuperiority of Great Britain, might think it was for their particular intereſt to have a prince, dependant for ſome time at leaſt on them, king of Spain, rather than a prince whoſe dependance, as long as he ſtood in any, muſt be naturally on France. I do not ſay, as ſome have done, a prince whoſe family was an old ally, rather than a prince whoſe family was an old enemy; becauſe I lay no weight on the gratitude of princes, and am as much perſuaded that an Auſtrian king of Spain would have made us returns of that ſort in no other proportion than of his want of us, as I am that PHILIP and his race will make no other returns of the ſame ſort to France. If this affair had been entire therefore, on the death of the king of Spain; if we had made no partition, nor he any will, the whole monarchy of Spain would have been the prize to be fought for: and our wiſhes, and ſuch efforts as we were able

to make, in the moſt unprovided condition imaginable, muſt have been on the ſide of Auſtria. But it was far from being entire. A prince of the houſe of Auſtria might have been on the ſpot, before the king of Spain died, to gather his ſucceſſion; but inſtead of this a prince of the houſe of Bourbon was there ſoon afterwards, and took poſſeſſion of the whole monarchy to which he had been called by the late king's will, and by the voice of the Spaniſh nation. The councils of England and Holland therefore preferred very wiſely, by their engagements in the grand alliance, what was more practicable tho leſs eligible, to what they deemed more eligible, but ſaw become by the courſe of events, if not abſolutely impracticable, yet an enterprize of more length, more difficulty, and greater expence of blood and treaſure, than theſe nations were able to bear; or than they ought to bear, when their ſecurity and that of the reſt of Europe might be ſufficiently

ficiently provided for at a cheaper rate. If the confederates could not obtain, by the force of their arms, the ends of the war, laid down in the grand alliance, to what purpoſe would it be to ſtipulate for more? And if they were able to obtain theſe, it was evident that, whilſt they diſmembered the Spaniſh monarchy, they muſt reduce the power of France. This happened; the Low Countries were conquered; the French were driven out of Germany and Italy: and LEWIS the fourteenth, who had ſo long and ſo lately ſet mankind at defiance, was reduced to ſue for peace.

IF it had been granted him in one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſix, on what foot muſt it have been granted? The allies had already in their power all the ſtates that were to compoſe the reaſonable ſatisfaction for the emperor. I ſay, in their power; becauſe tho Naples and Sicily were not actually reduced at that time, yet

yet the expulſion of the French out of Italy, and the diſpoſition of the people of thoſe kingdoms, conſidered, it was plain the allies might reduce them when they pleaſed. The confederate arms were ſuperior till then in Spain, and ſeveral provinces acknowledged CHARLES the third. If the reſt had been yielded to him by treaty, all that the new plan required had been obtained. If the French would not yet have abandoned PHILIP, as we had found that the Caſtilians would not even when our army was at Madrid, all that the old plan, the plan of the grand alliance required, had been obtained; but ſtill France and Spain had given nothing to purchaſe a peace, and they were in circumſtances not to expect it without purchaſing it. They would have purchaſed it, my lord: and France, as well as Spain, would have contributed a larger ſhare of the price, rather than continue the war in her exhauſted ſtate. Such a treaty of peace would have been a third treaty of

partition

partition indeed, but vaſtly preferable to the two former. The great objection to the two former was drawn from that conſiderable increaſe of dominion, which the crown of France, and not a branch of the houſe of Bourbon, acquired by them. I know what may be ſaid ſpeciouſly enough to perſuade, that ſuch an increaſe of dominion would not have augmented, but would rather have weakened the power of France, and what examples may be drawn from hiſtory to countenance ſuch an opinion. I know likewiſe, that the compact figure of France, and the contiguity of all her provinces, make a very eſſential part of the force of her monarchy. Had the deſigns of CHARLES the eighth, LEWIS the twelfth, FRANCIS the firſt, and HENRY the ſecond, ſucceeded, the dominions of France would have been more extenſive, and I believe the ſtrength of her monarchy would have been leſs. I have ſometimes thought that even the loſs of the battle of St. QUENTIN, which

obliged HENRY the ſecond to recal the duke of GUISE with his army out of Italy, was in this reſpect no unhappy event. But the reaſoning which is good, I think, when applied to thoſe times, will not hold when applied to ours, and to the caſe I conſider here; the ſtate of France, the ſtate of her neighbours, and the whole conſtitution of Europe being ſo extremely different. The objection therefore to the two treaties of partition had a real weight. The power of France, deemed already exorbitant, would have been increaſed by this acceſſion of dominion, in the hands of LEWIS the fourteenth: and the uſe he intended to make of it, by keeping Italy and Spain in awe, appears in the article that gave him the ports on the Tuſcan coaſt, and the province of Guipuſcoa. This king WILLIAM might, and I queſtion not did ſee; but that prince might think too, that for this very reaſon LEWIS the fourteenth would adhere, in all events, to the treaty of partition: and that theſe

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conſequences were more remote, and would be leſs dangerous, than thoſe of making no partition at all. The partition, even the worſt that might have been made, by a treaty of peace in one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſix, would have been the very reverſe of this. France would have been weakened, and her enemies ſtrengthened, by her conceſſions on the ſide of the Low Countries, of Germany, and Savoy. If a prince of her royal family had remained in poſſeſſion of Spain and the Weſt-Indies, no advantage would have accrued to her by it, and effectual bars would have been oppoſed to an union of the two monarchies. The houſe of Auſtria would have had a reaſonable ſatisfaction for that ſhadow of right, which a former partition gave her. She had no other after the will of CHARLES the ſecond: and this may be juſtly termed a ſhadow, ſince England, Holland and France could confer no real right to the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, nor to any part of it. She had de-

clined acceding to that partition, before France departed from it, and would have preferred the Italian provinces, without Spain and the Weſt-Indies, to Spain and the Weſt-Indies without the Italian provinces. The Italian provinces would have fallen to her ſhare by this partition. The particular demands of England and Holland would have ſuffered no difficulty, and thoſe that we were obliged by treaty to make for others would have been eaſy to adjuſt. Would not this have been enough, my lord, for the public ſecurity, for the common intereſt, and for the glory of our arms? To have humbled and reduced in five campaigns a power that had diſturbed and inſulted Europe almoſt forty years; to have reſtored, in ſo ſhort a time, the balance of power in Europe to a ſufficient point of equality, after it had been more than fifty years, that is from the treaty of Weſtphalia, in a gradual deviation from this point; in ſhort to have retrieved in one thouſand ſeven hun-

hundred and ſix, a game that was become deſperate at the beginning of the century. To have done all this, before the war had exhauſted our ſtrength, was the utmoſt ſure that any man could deſire who intended the public good alone: and no honeſt reaſon ever was, nor ever will be given, why the war was protracted any longer? why we neither made peace after a ſhort, vigorous and ſucceſsful war, nor put it entirely out of the power of France to continue at any rate a long one? I have ſaid, and it is true, that this had been entirely out of her power, if we had given greater interruption to the commerce of old and new Spain, and if we had hindered France from importing annually, from the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and two, ſuch immenſe treaſures as ſhe did import by the ſhips ſhe ſent, with the permiſſion of Spain, to the South Sea. It has been advanced, and it is a common opinion, that we were reſtrained by the jealouſy of the Dutch from making uſe of

the liberty given by treaty to them and us, and which, without his imperial majeſty's leave, ſince we entered into the war, we might have taken, of making conqueſts in the Spaniſh Weſt-Indies. Be it ſo. But to go to the South Seas, to trade there if we could, to pillage the Weſt-Indies without making conqueſts if we could not, and whether we traded or whether we pillaged, to hinder the French from trading there; was a meaſure that would have given, one ought to think, no jealouſy to the Dutch, who might, and it is to be ſuppoſed would, have taken their part in theſe expeditions; or if it had given them jealouſy, what could they have replied when a Britiſh miniſter had told them: 'That it little became them to find 'fault that we traded with or pillaged the 'Spaniards in the Weſt-Indies to the detri-'ment of our common enemy, whilſt we 'connived at them who traded with this 'enemy, to his and their great advantage, 'againſt our remonſtrances, and in viola-

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'tion of the condition upon which we had 'given the firſt augmentation of our forces 'in the Low Countries?' We might have purſued this meaſure notwithſtanding any engagement that we took by the treaty with Portugal, if I remember that treaty right: but inſtead of this, we waſted our forces, and ſquandered millions after millions in ſupporting our alliance with this crown, and in purſuing the chimerical project which was made the object of this alliance. I call it chimerical, becauſe it was equally ſo, to expect a revolution in favour of CHARLES the third on the ſlender authority of ſuch a trifler as the admiral of Caſtile; and when this failed us to hope to conquer Spain by the aſſiſtance of the Portugueſe, and the revolt of the Catalans. Yet this was the foundation upon which the new plan of the war was built, and ſo many ruinous engagements were taken.

The particular motives of private men, as well as of princes and ſtates, to protract the war, are partly known, and partly

gueſſed at this time. But whenever that time comes, and I am perſuaded it will come, when their ſecret motives, their ſecret deſigns, and intrigues, can be laid open, I preſume to ſay to your lordſhip that the moſt confuſed ſcene of iniquity, and folly, that it is poſſible to imagine, will appear. In the mean while, if your lordſhip conſiders only the treaty of barrier, as my lord TOWNSHEND ſigned it, without, nay in truth, againſt orders; for the duke of MARLBOROUGH, tho joint plenipotentiary, did not: if you conſider the famous preliminaries of one thouſand ſeven hundred and nine, which we made a mock ſhew of ratifying, tho we knew that they would not be accepted; for ſo the marquis of TORCY had told the penſionary before he left the Hague, as the ſaid marquis has aſſured me very often ſince that time: if you enquire into the anecdotes of Gertruydenberg, and if you conſult other authentic papers that are extant, your lordſhip will ſee

the policy of the new plan, I think, in this light. Tho we had refuſed, before the war began, to enter into engagements for the conqueſt of Spain, yet as ſoon as it began, when the reaſon of things was ſtill the ſame, for the ſucceſs of our firſt campaign cannot be ſaid to have altered it, we entered into theſe very engagements. By the treaty wherein we took theſe engagements firſt, Portugal was brought into the grand alliance; that is, ſhe conſented to employ her formidable forces againſt FRANCE, at the expence of England and Holland: provided we would debar ourſelves from making any acquiſitions, and the houſe of Auſtria promiſe, that ſhe ſhould acquire many important places in Spain, and an immenſe extent of country in America. By ſuch bargains as this, the whole confederacy was formed, and held together. Such means were indeed effectual to multiply enemies to France and Spain; but a project ſo extenſive and ſo difficult

difficult as to make many bargains of this kind neceſſary, and neceſſary for a great number of years, and for a very uncertain event, was a project into which, for this very reaſon, England and Holland ſhould not have entered. It is worthy your obſervation, my lord, that theſe bad bargains would not have been continued, as they were almoſt to our immediate ruin, if the war had not been protracted under the pretended neceſſity of reducing the whole Spaniſh monarchy to the obedience of the houſe of Auſtria. Now, as no other confederate except Portugal was to receive his recompence by any diſmemberment of dominions in old or new Spain, the engagements we took to conquer this whole monarchy had no viſible neceſſary cauſe, but the procuring the acceſſion of this power, that was already neuter, to the grand alliance. This acceſſion, as I have ſaid before, ſerved only to make us neglect immediate and certain advantages, for remote and uncertain hopes; and chuſe

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to attempt the conqueſt of the Spaniſh nation at our own vaſt expence, whom we might have ſtarved, and by ſtarving, reduced both the French and them, at their expence.

I CALLED the neceſſity of reducing the whole Spaniſh monarchy to the obedience of the houſe of Auſtria, a pretended neceſſity: and pretended it was, not real, without doubt. But I am apt to think your lordſhip may go further, and find ſome reaſons to ſuſpect, that the opinion itſelf of this neceſſity was not very real, in the minds of thoſe who urged it; in the minds I would ſay of the able men among them; for that it was real in ſome of our zealous Britiſh politicians, I do them the juſtice to believe. Your lordſhip may find reaſons to ſuſpect perhaps, that this opinion was ſet up rather to occaſion a diverſion of the forces of France, and to furniſh pretences for prolonging the war for other ends.

BEFORE the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and ten, the war was kept alive with alternate ſucceſs in Spain; and it may be ſaid therefore, that the deſign of conquering this kingdom continued, as well as the hopes of ſucceeding. But why then did the States General refuſe, in one thouſand ſeven hundred and nine, to admit an article in the barrier treaty, by which they would have obliged themſelves to procure the whole Spaniſh monarchy to the houſe of Auſtria, when that zealous politician my lord TOWNSHEND preſſed them to it? If their opinion of the neceſſity of carrying on the war, till this point could be obtained, was real; why did they riſque the immenſe advantages given them with ſo much profuſe generoſity by this treaty, rather than conſent to an engagement that was ſo conformable to their opinion?

AFTER the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and ten, it will not be ſaid, I pre-

preſume, that the war could be ſupported in Spain with any proſpect of advantage on our ſide. We had ſufficiently experienced how little dependance could be had on the vigour of the Portugueze; and how firmly the Spaniſh nation in general, the Caſtilians in particular, were attached to PHILIP. Our armies had been twice at Madrid, this prince had been twice driven from his capital, his rival had been there, none ſtirred in favour of the victorious, all wiſhed and acted for the vanquiſhed. In ſhort, the falſhood of all thoſe lures, by which we had been enticed to make war in Spain, had appeared ſufficiently in one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſix; but was ſo groſsly evident in one thouſand ſeven hundred and ten, that Mr. CRAGGS, who was ſent towards the end of that year by Mr. STANHOPE into England, on commiſſions that he executed with much good ſenſe and much addreſs, owned to me: that in Mr. STANHOPE's opinion, and he was not apt to deſpond

ſpond of ſucceſs, eſpecially in the execution of his own projects, nothing could be done more in Spain, the general attachment of the people to PHILIP, and their averſion to CHARLES conſidered: that armies of twenty or thirty thouſand men might walk about that country till doom's-day, ſo he expreſſed himſelf, without effect: that wherever they came, the people would ſubmit to CHARLES the third out of terror, and as ſoon as they were gone, proclaim PHILIP the fifth again out of affection: that to conquer Spain required a great army; and to keep it, a greater.

WAS it poſſible, after this, to think in good earneſt of conquering Spain, and could they be in good earneſt who continued to hold the ſame language, and to inſiſt on the ſame meaſures? Could they be ſo in the following year, when the emperor JOSEPH died? CHARLES was become then the ſole ſurviving male of the houſe

houſe of Auſtria, and ſucceeded to the empire as well as to all the hereditary dominions of that family. Could they be in earneſt, who maintained even in this conjuncture, that 'no peace could be ſafe, ho-'norable, or laſting, ſo long as the king-'dom of Spain and the Weſt-Indies re-'mained in the poſſeſſion of any branch 'of the houſe of Bourbon?' Did they mean that CHARLES ſhould be emperor and king of Spain? In this project they would have had the allies againſt them. Did they mean to call the duke of Savoy to the crown of Spain, or to beſtow it on ſome other prince? In this project they would have had his imperial majeſty againſt them. In either caſe the confederacy would have been broken: and how then would they have continued the war? Did they mean nothing, or did they mean ſomething more than they owned, ſomething more than to reduce the exorbitant power of France, and to force the whole

Spaniſh

Spaniſh monarchy out of the houſe of Bourbon?

BOTH theſe ends might have been obtained at Gertruydenberg: why were they not obtained? Read the preliminaries of one thouſand ſeven hundred and nine, which were made the foundation of this treaty. Inform yourſelf of what paſſed there, and obſerve what followed. Your lordſhip will remain aſtoniſhed. I remain ſo every time I reflect upon them, tho I ſaw theſe things at no very great diſtance, even whilſt they were in tranſaction; and tho I know moſt certainly that France loſt two years before, by the little ſkill and addreſs of her principal * miniſter, in anſwering overtures made during the ſiege of Liſle, by a principal perſon among the allies, ſuch an opportunity, and ſuch a correſpondence, as would have removed ſome of the obſtacles that lay now in her way, have prevented others, and have procured her peace.

* CHAMILLARD.

peace. An equivalent for the thirty-ſeventh article of the preliminaries, that is, for the ceſſion of Spain and the Weſt-Indies, was the point to be diſcuſſed at Gertruydenberg. Naples and Sicily, or even Naples and Sardinia would have contented the French, at leaſt they would have accepted them as the equivalent. BUYS and VANDERDUSSEN, who treated with them, reported this to the miniſters of the allies: and it was upon this occaſion that the duke of MARLBOROUGH, as BUYS himſelf told me, took immediately the lead, and congratulated the aſſembly on the near approach of a peace; ſaid, that ſince the French were in this diſpoſition, it was time to conſider what further demands ſhould be made upon them, according to the liberty reſerved in the preliminaries; and exhorted all the miniſters of the allies to adjuſt their ſeveral ulterior pretenſions, and to prepare their demands.

THIS proceeding, and what followed,

put me in mind of that of the Romans with the Carthaginians. The former were reſolved to conſent to no peace till Carthage was laid in ruins. They ſet a treaty however on foot, at the requeſt of their old enemy, impoſed ſome terms, and referred them to their generals for the reſt. Their generals purſued the ſame method, and by reſerving ſtill a right of making ulterior demands, they reduced the Carthaginians at laſt to the neceſſity of abandoning their city, or of continuing the war after they had given up their arms, their machines, and their fleet, in hopes of peace.

FRANCE ſaw the ſnare, and reſolved to run any riſque rather than to be caught in it. We continued to demand, under pretence of ſecuring, the ceſſion of Spain and the Weſt-Indies; that LEWIS the fourteenth ſhould take on him to dethrone his grandſon in the ſpace of two months; and if he did not effect it in that time, that we ſhould be at liberty to renew the war, without

without reſtoring the places that were to be put into our hands according to the preliminaries; which were the moſt important places France poſſeſſed on the ſide of the Low Countries. LEWIS offered to abandon his grandſon; and, if he could not prevail on him to reſign, to furniſh money to the allies, who might at the expence of France force him to evacuate Spain. The propoſition made by the allies had an air of inhumanity; and the reſt of mankind might be ſhocked to ſee the grandfather obliged to make war on his grandſon. But LEWIS the fourteenth had treated mankind with too much inhumanity in his proſperous days, to have any reaſon to complain even of this propoſition. His people indeed, who are apt to have great partiality for their kings, might pity his diſtreſs. This happened, and he found his account in it. PHILIP muſt have evacuated Spain, I think, notwithſtanding his own obſtinacy, the ſpirit of his queen, and the reſolute attachment of the Spaniards, if his grand-

father had inſiſted, and been in earneſt to force him: but if this expedient was, as it was, odious, why did we prefer to continue the war againſt France and Spain, rather than accept the other? why did we neglect the opportunity of reducing, effectually and immediately, the exorbitant power of France, and of rendering the conqueſt of Spain practicable? both which might have been brought about, and conſequently the avowed ends of the war might have been anſwered, by accepting the expedient that France offered. 'France, 'it was ſaid, was not ſincere: ſhe meant 'nothing more than to amuſe, and divide.' This reaſon was given at the time; but ſome of thoſe who gave it then, I have ſeen aſhamed to inſiſt on it ſince. France was not in condition to act the part ſhe had acted in former treaties: and her diſtreſs was no bad pledge of her ſincerity on this occaſion. But there was a better ſtill. The ſtrong places that ſhe muſt have put into the hands of the allies, would

would have expoſed her, on the leaſt breach of faith, to ſee, not her frontier alone, but even the provinces that lie behind it, deſolated: and prince EUGENE might have had the ſatisfaction, it is ſaid, I know not how truly, he deſired, of marching with the torch in his hand to Verſailles.

YOUR lordſhip will obſerve, that the conferences at Gertruydenberg ending in the manner they did, the inflexibility of the allies gave new life and ſpirit to the French and Spaniſh nations, diſtreſſed and exhauſted as they were. The troops of the former withdrawn out of Spain, and the Spaniards left to defend themſelves as they could, the Spaniards alone obliged us to retreat from Madrid, and defeated us in our retreat. But your lordſhip may think perhaps, as I do, that if LEWIS the fourteenth had bound himſelf by a ſolemn treaty to abandon his grandſon, had paid a ſubſidy to dethrone him, and had conſented to acknowledge another king of Spain, the

Spaniards would not have exerted the ſame zeal for PHILIP; the actions of Almenara and Saragoſſa might have been deciſive, and thoſe of Brihuega and Villa Vicioſa would not have happened. After all theſe events, how could any reaſonable man expect that a war ſhould be ſupported with advantage in Spain, to which the court of Vienna had contributed nothing from the firſt, ſcarce bread to their archduke; which Portugal waged faintly and with deficient quotas, and which the Dutch had in a manner renounced, by neglecting to recruit their forces? How was CHARLES to be placed on the Spaniſh throne, or PHILIP at leaſt to be driven out of it? By the ſucceſs of the confederate arms in other parts? But what ſucceſs, ſufficient to this purpoſe, could we expect? This queſtion may be anſwered beſt, by ſhewing what ſucceſs we had.

PORTUGAL and Savoy did nothing before the death of the emperor JOSEPH; and

and declared in form, as ſoon as he was dead, that they would carry on the war no longer to ſet the crown of Spain on the head of CHARLES, ſince this would be to fight againſt the very principle they had fought for. The Rhine was a ſcene of inaction. The ſole efforts, that were to bring about the great event of dethroning PHILIP, were thoſe which the duke of MARLBOROUGH was able to make. He took three towns in one thouſand ſeven hundred and ten, Aire, Bethune, and St. Venant: and one, Bouchain, in one thouſand ſeven hundred and eleven. Now this conqueſt being in fact the only one the confederates made that year, Bouchain may be ſaid properly and truly to have coſt our nation very near ſeven millions ſterling; for your lordſhip will find, I believe, that the charge of the war for that year amounted to no leſs. It is true that the duke of MARLBOROUGH had propoſed a very great project, by which incurſions would have been made during the

winter into France; the next campaign might have been opened early on our ſide; and ſeveral other great and obvious advantages might have been obtained: but the Dutch refuſed to contribute, even leſs than their proportion, for the queen had offered to take the deficiency on herſelf, to the expence of barracks and forage; and diſappointed by their obſtinacy the whole deſign.

WE were then amuſed with viſionary ſchemes of marching our whole army, in a year or two more, and after a town or two more were taken, directly to Paris, or at leaſt into the heart of France. But was this ſo eaſy or ſo ſure a game? The French expected we would play it. Their generals had viſited the ſeveral poſts they might take, when our army ſhould enter France, to retard, to incommode, to diſtreſs us in our march, and even to make a deciſive ſtand and to give us battle. I take what I ſay here from indiſputable authority,

authority, that of the perſons conſulted and employed in preparing for this great diſtreſs. Had we been beaten, or had we been forced to retire towards our own frontier in the Low Countries, after penetrating into France, the hopes on which we protracted the war would have been diſappointed, and I think the moſt ſanguine would have then repented refuſing the offers made at Gertruydenburg. But if we had beaten the French, for it was ſcarce lawful in thoſe days of our preſumption to ſuppoſe the contrary; would the whole monarchy of Spain have been our immediate and certain prize? Suppoſe, and I ſuppoſe it on good grounds, my lord, that the French had reſolved to defend their country inch by inch, and that LEWIS the fourteenth had determined to retire with his court to Lions or elſewhere, and to defend the paſſage of the Loire, when he could no longer defend that of the Seine, rather than ſubmit to the terms

impoſed on him: what ſhould we have done in this caſe? Muſt we not have accepted ſuch a peace as we had refuſed; or have protracted the war till we had conquered France firſt, in order to conquer Spain afterwards? Did we hope for revolutions in France? We had hoped for them in Spain: and we ſhould have been bubbles of our hopes in both. That there was a ſpirit raiſed againſt the government of LEWIS the fourteenth, in his court, nay in his family, and that ſtrange ſchemes of private ambition were formed and forming there, I cannot doubt: and ſome effects of this ſpirit produced perhaps the greateſt mortifications that he ſuffered in the latter part of his reign.

A LIGHT inſtance of this ſpirit is all I will quote at this time. I ſupped in the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifteen, at a houſe in France, where

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two * perſons of no ſmall figure, who had been in great company that night, arrived very late. The converſation turned on the events of the precedent war, and the negotiations of the late peace. In the proceſs of the converſation, one of them † broke looſe, and ſaid, directing his diſcourſe to me, *Vous auriez pu nous ecraſer dans ce temps-là: pourquoi ne l'avez vous pas fait?* I anſwered him coolly, *Par ce que dans ce temps-là, nous n'avons plus craint vôtre puiſſance.* This anecdote, too trivial for hiſtory, may find its place in a letter, and may ſerve to confirm what I have admitted, that there were perſons even in France, who expected to find their private account in the diſtreſs of their country. But theſe perſons were a few, men of wild imaginations and ſtrong paſſions, more enterprizing than capable, and of more name than credit. In ge-

* The dukes de la FEUILLADE and MORTEMAR.

† La FEUILLADE.

neral,

neral, the endeavours of LEWIS the fourteenth, and the ſacrifices he offered to make in order to obtain a peace, had attached his people more than ever to him: and if LEWIS had determined not to go farther than he had offered at Gertruydenberg, in abandoning his grandſon, the French nation would not have abandoned him.

BUT to reſume what I have ſaid or hinted already, the neceſſary conſequences of protracting the war in order to dethrone PHILIP, from the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and eleven incluſively, could be no other than theſe: our deſign of penetrating into France might have been defeated, and have become fatal to us by a reverſe of fortune: our firſt ſucceſs might not have obliged the French to ſubmit; and we might have had France to conquer, after we had failed in our firſt attempt to conquer Spain, and even in order to proceed to a ſecond: the French might have ſubmitted,

ted, and the Spaniards not; and whilſt the former had been employed to force the latter, according to the ſcheme of the allies; or whilſt, the latter ſubmitting likewiſe, PHILIP had evacuated Spain, the high allies might have gone together by the ears about dividing the ſpoil, and diſpoſing of the crown of Spain. To theſe iſſues were things brought by protracting the war; by refuſing to make peace, on the principles of the grand alliance at worſt, in one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſix; and by refuſing to grant it, even on thoſe of the new plan, in one thouſand ſeven hundred and ten. Such contingent events as I have mentioned ſtood in proſpect before us. The end of the war was removed out of ſight; and they, who clamoured rather than argued for the continuation of it, contented themſelves to affirm that France was not enough reduced, and that no peace ought to be made as long as a prince of the houſe of Bourbon remained on the Spaniſh throne.

throne. When they would think France enough reduced, it was impoſſible to gueſs. Whether they intended to join the Imperial and Spaniſh crowns on the head of CHARLES, who had declared his irrevocable reſolution to continue the war till the conditions inſiſted upon at Gertruydenberg were obtained? whether they intended to beſtow Spain and the Indies on ſome other prince? and how this great alteration in their own plan ſhould be effected by common conſent? how poſſeſſion ſhould be given to CHARLES or to any other prince, not only of Spain but of all the Spaniſh dominions out of Europe; where the attachment to PHILIP was at leaſt as ſtrong as in Caſtile, and where it would not be ſo eaſy, the diſtance and extent of theſe dominions conſidered, to oblige the Spaniards to ſubmit to another government? Theſe points, and many more equally neceſſary to be determined, and equally difficult to prepare, were neither determined nor prepared;

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ſo that we were reduced to carry on the war, after the death of the emperor JOSEPH, without any poſitive ſcheme agreed to as the ſcheme of the future peace by the allies. That of the grand alliance, we had long before renounced. That of the new plan was become ineligible; and if it had been eligible, it would have been impracticable, becauſe of the diviſion it would have created among the allies themſelves: ſeveral of whom would not have conſented, notwithſtanding his irrevocable reſolution, that the emperor ſhould be king of Spain. I know not what part the protracters of the war, in the depth of their policy, intended to take. Our nation had contributed, and acted ſo long under the direction of their councils, for the grandeur of the houſe of Auſtria, like one of the hereditary kingdoms uſurped by that family, that it is lawful to think their intention might be to unite the Imperial and Spaniſh crowns. But I rather think they had no very de-

terminate view, beyond that of continuing the war as long as they could. The late lord OXFORD told me, that my lord SOMERS being preſſed, I know not on what occaſion nor by whom, on the unneceſſary and ruinous continuation of the war; inſtead of giving reaſons to ſhew the neceſſity of it, contented himſelf to reply, that he had been bred up in a hatred of France. This was a ſtrange reply for a wiſe man: and yet I know not whether he could have given a better then, or whether any of his pupils could give a better now.

THE whig party in general acquired great and juſt popularity, in the reign of our CHARLES the ſecond, by the clamour they raiſed againſt the conduct of that prince in foreign affairs. They who ſucceeded to the name rather than the principles of this party, after the revolution, and who have had the adminiſtration of the government in their hands with very little interruption ever ſince, pretending to act

act on the ſame principle, have run into an extreme as vicious and as contrary to all the rules of good policy, as that which their predeceſſors exclaimed againſt. The old whigs complained of the inglorious figure we made, whilſt our court was the bubble, and our king the penſioner of France; and inſiſted that the growing ambition and power of LEWIS the fourteenth ſhould be oppoſed in time. The modern whigs boaſted and ſtill boaſt, of the glorious figure we made, whilſt we reduced ourſelves, by their councils, and under their adminiſtrations, to be the bubbles of our penſioners, that is of our allies: and whilſt we meaſured our efforts in war, and the continuation of them, without any regard to the intereſts and abilities of our own country; without a juſt and ſober regard, ſuch an one as contemplates objects in their true light, and ſees them in their true magnitude, to the general ſyſtem of power in Europe; and, in ſhort, with a principal regard merely to particular inte-

reſts at home and abroad. I ſay at home and abroad; becauſe it is not leſs true, that they have ſacrificed the wealth of their country to the forming and maintaining a party at home, than that they have done ſo to the forming and maintaining, beyond all pretences of neceſſity, alliances abroad. Theſe general aſſertions may be eaſily juſtified without having recourſe to private anecdotes, as your lordſhip will find when you conſider the whole ſeries of our conduct in the two wars; in that which preceded, and that which ſucceeded immediately the beginning of the preſent century, but above all in the laſt of them. In the adminiſtrations that preceded the revolution, trade had flouriſhed, and our nation had grown opulent: but the general intereſt of Europe had been too much neglected by us; and ſlavery, under the umbrage of prerogative, had been well-nigh eſtabliſhed among us. In thoſe that have followed, taxes upon taxes, and debts upon debts, have been perpetually accu-

accumulated, till a ſmall number of families have grown into immenſe wealth, and national beggary has been brought upon us; under the ſpecious pretences of ſupporting a common cauſe againſt France, reducing her exorbitant power, and poizing that of Europe more equally in the public balance: laudable deſigns no doubt, as far as they were real, but ſuch as, being converted into mere pretences, have been productive of much evil; ſome of which we feel and have long felt, and ſome will extend it's conſequences to our lateſt poſterity. The reign of prerogative was ſhort: and the evils and the dangers, to which we were expoſed by it, ended with it. But the reign of falſe and ſquandering policy has laſted long, it laſts ſtill, and will finally complete our ruin. Beggary has been the conſequence of ſlavery in ſome countries: ſlavery will be probably the conſequence of beggary in ours; and if it is ſo, we know at whoſe door to lay it. If we had finiſhed the

forward this great work, could eſcape none of them. In a letter to a friend it may be allowed me to ſay, that they did not eſcape me: and that I foreſaw, as contingent but not improbable events, a good part of what has happened to me ſince. Tho it was a duty therefore that we owed to our country, to deliver her from the neceſſity of bearing any longer ſo unequal a part in ſo unneceſſary a war, yet was there ſome degree of merit in performing it. I think ſo ſtrongly in this manner, I am ſo incorrigible, my lord, that if I could be placed in the ſame circumſtances again, I would take the ſame reſolution, and act the ſame part. Age and experience might enable me to act with more ability, and greater ſkill; but all I have ſuffered ſince the death of the queen ſhould not hinder me from acting. Notwithſtanding this, I ſhall not be ſurprized if you think that the peace of Utrecht was not anſwerable to the ſucceſs of the war, nor to the efforts made

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the reſolution of making peace, when the queen thought fit to change her miniſtry towards the end of the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and ten. It was high time indeed to ſave our country from abſolute inſolvency and bankruptcy, by putting an end to a ſcheme of conduct, which the prejudices of a party, the whimſy of ſome particular men, the private intereſt of more, and the ambition and avarice of our allies, who had been invited as it were to a ſcramble by the preliminaries of one thouſand ſeven hundred and nine, alone maintained. The perſons therefore, who came into power at this time, hearkened, and they did well to hearken, to the firſt overtures that were made them. The diſpoſition of their enemies invited them to do ſo, but that of their friends, and that of a party at home who had nurſed, and been nurſed by the war, might have deterred them from it; for the difficulties and dangers, to which they muſt be expoſed in carrying

muſt have ſhewn you, that there is no abſurd extreme, into which our party-politicians of Great Britain are not prone to fall, concerning the ſtate and conduct of public affairs. But if France was exhauſted; ſo were we, and ſo were the Dutch. Famine rendered her condition much more miſerable than ours, at one time, in appearance and in reality too. But as ſoon as this accident, that had diſtreſſed the French and frightened LEWIS the fourteenth to the utmoſt degree, and the immediate conſequences of it were over; it was obvious to obſerve, tho few made the obſervation, that whilſt we were unable to raiſe in a year, by ſome millions at leaſt, the expences of the year, the French were willing and able to bear the impoſition of the tenth, over and above all the other taxes that had been laid upon them. This obſervation had the weight it deſerved; and ſurely it deſerved to have ſome among thoſe who made it, at the time ſpoken of, and who did not think that the war was to

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be continued as long as a parliament could be prevailed on to vote money. But ſuppoſing it to have deſerved none, ſuppoſing the power of France to have been reduced as low as you pleaſe, with reſpect to her inward ſtate; yet ſtill I affirm, that ſuch a reduction could not be permanent, and was not therefore ſufficient. Whoever knows the nature of her government, the temper of her people, and the natural advantages ſhe has in commerce over all the nations that ſurround her, knows that an arbitrary government, and the temper of her people enable her on particular occaſions to throw off a load of debt much more eaſily, and with conſequences much leſs to be feared, than any of her neighbours can: that altho, in the general courſe of things, trade be cramped and induſtry vexed by this arbitrary government, yet neither one nor the other is oppreſſed; and the temper of the people, and the natural advantages of the country, are ſuch, that how great ſoever her diſtreſs,

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be at any point of time, twenty years of tranquillity ſuffice to re-eſtabliſh her affairs, and to enrich her again at the expence of all the nations of Europe. If any one doubts of this, let him conſider the condition in which this kingdom was left by LEWIS the fourteenth; the ſtrange pranks the late duke of Orleans played, during his regency and adminiſtration, with the whole ſyſtem of public revenue, and private property; and then let him tell himſelf, that the revenues of France, the tenth taken off, exceed all the expences of her government by many millions of livres already, and will exceed them by many more in another year.

UPON the whole matter, my lord, the low and exhauſted ſtate to which France was reduced, by the laſt great war, was but a momentary reduction of her power: and whatever real and more laſting reduction the treaty of Utrecht brought about in ſome inſtances, it was not ſufficient.

ent. The power of France would not have appeared as great as it did, when England and Holland armed themſelves and armed all Germany againſt her, if ſhe had lain as open to the invaſions of her enemies, as her enemies lay to her's. Her inward ſtrength was great; but the ſtrength of thoſe frontiers which LEWIS the fourteenth was almoſt forty years in forming, and which the folly of all his neighbours in their turns ſuffered him to form, made this ſtrength as formidable as it became. The true reduction of the exorbitant power of France, I take no notice of chimerical projects about changing her government, conſiſted therefore in diſarming her frontiers, and fortifying the barriers againſt her by the ceſſion and demolition of many more places than ſhe yielded up at Utrecht; but not of more than ſhe might have been obliged to ſacrifice to her own immediate relief, and to the future ſecurity of her neighbours. That ſhe was not obliged

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to make theſe ſacrifices, I affirm was owing ſolely to thoſe who oppoſed the peace: and I am willing to put my whole credit with your lordſhip, and the whole merits of a cauſe that has been ſo much conteſted, on this iſſue. I ſay a cauſe that has been ſo much conteſted; for in truth I think it is no longer a doubt any where, except in Britiſh pamphlets, whether the conduct of thoſe who neither declined treating, as was done in one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſix; nor pretended to treat without a deſign of concluding, as was done in one thouſand ſeven hundred nine and ten, but carried the great work of the peace forward to its conſummation; or the conduct of thoſe who oppoſed this work in every ſtep of its progreſs, ſaved the power of France from a greater and a ſufficient reduction at the treaty of Utrecht? The very miniſters, who were employed in this fatal oppoſition, are obliged to confeſs this truth. How ſhould they deny it? Thoſe of Vienna

enna may complain that the emperor had not the entire Spaniſh monarchy, or thoſe of Holland that the ſtates were not made maſters directly and indirectly of the whole Low Countries. But neither they, nor any one elſe that has any ſenſe of ſhame about him, can deny that the late queen, tho ſhe was reſolved to treat becauſe ſhe was reſolved to finiſh the war, yet was to the utmoſt degree deſirous to treat in a perfect union with her allies, and to procure them all the reaſonable terms they could expect; and much better than thoſe they reduced themſelves to the neceſſity of accepting, by endeavouring to wreſt the negotiation out of her hands. The diſunion of the allies gave France the advantages ſhe improved. The ſole queſtion is, who cauſed this diſ-union? and that will be eaſily decided by every impartial man, who informs himſelf carefully of the public anecdotes of that time. If the private anecdotes were to be laid open

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as well as thoſe, and I think it almoſt time they ſhould, the whole monſtrous ſcene would appear, and ſhock the eye of every honeſt man. I do not intend to deſcend into many particulars at this time: but whenever I, or any other perſon as well informed as I, ſhall deſcend into a full deduction of ſuch particulars, it will become undeniably evident, that the moſt violent oppoſition imaginable, carried on by the Germans and the Dutch in league with a party in Britain, began as ſoon as the firſt overtures were made to the queen; before ſhe had ſo much as begun to treat: and was therefore an oppoſition not to this or that plan of treaty, but in truth to all treaty; and eſpecially to one wherein Great-Britain took the lead, or was to have any particular advantage. That the Imperialiſts meant no treaty, unleſs a preliminary and impracticable condition of it was to ſet the crown of Spain on the emperor's head, will appear from this; that prince

EUGENE, when he came into England, long after the death of JOSEPH and elevation of CHARLES, upon an errand moſt unworthy of ſo great a man, treated always on this ſuppoſition: and I remember with how much inward impatience I aſſiſted at conferences held with him concerning quotas for renewing the war in Spain, in the very ſame room, at the cockpit, where the queen's miniſters had been told in plain terms, a little before, by thoſe of other allies, 'that their maſters would not conſent that the Imperial and Spaniſh crowns ſhould unite on the ſame head.' That the Dutch were not averſe to all treaty, but meant none wherein Great Britain was to have any particular advantage, will appear from this; that their miniſter declared himſelf ready and authorized to ſtop the oppoſition made to the queen's meaſures, by preſenting a memorial, wherein he would declare, 'that his maſters entered into them, and were reſolved not to continue the war for the recovery of Spain, provided

'provided the queen would conſent that 'they ſhould garriſon Gibraltar and Port-'mahon jointly with us, and ſhare equally 'the Aſſiento, the South Sea ſhip, and 'whatever ſhould be granted by the Spani-'ards to the queen and her ſubjects.' That the whigs engaged in this league with foreign powers againſt their country, as well as their queen, and with a phrenzy more unaccountable than that which made and maintained the ſolemn league and covenant formerly, will appear from this; that their attempts were directed not only to wreſt the negotiations out of the queen's hands, but to oblige their country to carry on the war, on the ſame unequal foot that had coſt her already about twenty millions more than ſhe ought to have contributed to it. For they not only continued to abet the emperor, whoſe inability to ſupply his quota was confeſſed; but the Dutch likewiſe, after the ſtates had refuſed to ratify the treaty their miniſter ſigned at London towards the end

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of the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and eleven, and by which the queen united herſelf more cloſely than ever to them; engaging to purſue the war, to conclude the peace, and to guaranty it, when concluded, jointly with them; 'provided they would keep the engagements 'they had taken with her, and the conditi-'ons of proportionate expence under which 'our nation had entered into the war.' Upon ſuch ſchemes as theſe was the oppoſition to the treaty of Utrecht carried on: and the means employed, and the means projected to be employed, were worthy of ſuch ſchemes; open, direct, and indecent defiance of legal authority, ſecret conſpiracies againſt the ſtate, and baſe machinations againſt particular men, who had no other crime than that of endeavouring to conclude a war, under the authority of the queen, which a party in the nation endeavoured to prolong, againſt her authority. Had the good policy of concluding the war been doubtful, it was

certainly as lawful for thoſe who thought it good to adviſe it, as it had been for thoſe who thought it bad to adviſe the contrary: and the deciſion of the ſovereign on the throne ought to have terminated the conteſt. But he who had judged by the appearances of things on one ſide, at that time, would have been apt to think, that putting an end to the war, or to Magna Charta, was the ſame thing; that the queen on the throne had no right to govern independently of her ſucceſſor; nor any of her ſubjects a right to adminiſter the government under her, tho called to it by her, except thoſe whom ſhe had thought fit to lay aſide. Extravagant as theſe principles are, no other could juſtify the conduct held at that time by thoſe who oppoſed the peace: and as I ſaid juſt now, that the phrenzy of this league was more unaccountable than that of the ſolemn league and covenant, I might have added, that it was not very many degrees leſs criminal. Some of thoſe, who charged

the queen's miniſters, after her death, with imaginary treaſons, had been guilty during her life of real treaſons: and I can compare the folly and violence of the ſpirit that prevailed at that time, both before the concluſion of the peace and under pretence of danger to the ſucceſſion after it, to nothing more nearly than to the folly and violence of the ſpirit that ſeized the tories ſoon after the acceſſion of GEORGE the firſt. The latter indeed, which was provoked by unjuſt and impolitic perſecution, broke out in open rebellion. The former might have done ſo, if the queen had lived a little longer. But to return.

THE obſtinate adherence of the Dutch to this league, in oppoſition to the queen, rendered the conferences of Utrecht, when they were opened, no better than mock conferences. Had the men who governed that commonwealth been wiſe and honeſt enough to unite, at leaſt then,

cordially with the queen, and ſince they could not hinder a congreſs, to act in concert with her in it; we ſhould have been ſtill in time to maintain a ſufficient union among the allies, and a ſufficient ſuperiority over the French. All the ſpecific demands that the former made, as well as the Dutch themſelves, either to incumber the negotiation, or to have in reſerve, according to the artifice uſually employed on ſuch occaſions, certain points from which to depart in the courſe of it with advantage, would not have been obtained; but all the eſſential demands, all in particular that were really neceſſary to ſecure the barriers in the Low Countries and of the four circles againſt France, would have been ſo. For France muſt have continued, in this caſe, rather to ſue for peace, than to treat on an equal foot. The firſt dauphin, ſon of LEWIS the fourteenth, died ſeveral months before this congreſs began: the ſecond dauphin, his grandſon, and the wife and the eldeſt

eldeſt ſon of this prince, died, ſoon after it began, of the ſame unknown diſtemper, and were buried together in the ſame grave. Such family misfortunes, following a long ſeries of national misfortunes, made the old king, tho he bore them with much ſeeming magnanimity, deſirous to get out of the war at any tolerable rate, that he might not run the riſque of leaving a child of five years old, the preſent king, engaged in it. The queen did all that was morally poſſible, except giving up her honor in the negotiation, and the intereſts of her ſubjects in the conditions of peace, to procure this union with the ſtates general. But all ſhe could do was vain; and the ſame phrenzy, that had hindered the Dutch from improving to their and to the common advantage the public misfortunes of France, hindered them from improving to the ſame purpoſes the private misfortunes of the houſe of Bourbon. They continued to flatter themſelves that they ſhould

force the queen out of her meaſures, by their intrigues with the party in Britain who oppoſed theſe meaſures, and even raiſe an inſurrection againſt her. But theſe intrigues, and thoſe of prince EUGENE, were known and diſappointed; and monſieur BUYS had the mortification to be reproached with them publicly, when he came to take leave of the lords of the council, by the earl of OXFORD; who entered into many particulars that could not be denied, of the private tranſactions of this ſort, to which BUYS had been a party, in compliance with his inſtructions, and as I believe, much againſt his own ſenſe and inclinations. As the ſeaſon for taking the field advanced, the league propoſed to defeat the ſucceſs of the congreſs by the events of the campaign. But inſtead of defeating the ſucceſs of the congreſs, the events of the campaign ſerved only to turn this ſucceſs in favour of France. At the beginning of the year, the queen and the ſtates, in concert, might have given

given the law to friend and foe, with great advantage to the former; and with ſuch a detriment to the latter, as the cauſes of the war rendered juſt, the events of it reaſonable, and the objects of it neceſſary. At the end of the year, the allies were no longer in a ſtate of giving, nor the French of receiving the law; and the Dutch had recourſe to the queen's good offices, when they could oppoſe and durſt inſult her no longer. Even then, theſe offices were employed with zeal, and with ſome effect, for them.

THUS the war ended, much more favourably to France than ſhe expected, or they who put an end to it deſigned. The queen would have humbled and weakened this power. The allies who oppoſed her would have cruſhed it, and have raiſed another as exorbitant on the ruins of it. Neither one nor the other ſucceeded, and they who meant to ruin the French pow-

er preſerved it, by oppoſing thoſe who meant to reduce it.

SINCE I have mentioned the events of the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and twelve, and the deciſive turn they gave to the negotiations in favour of France, give me leave to ſay ſomething more on this ſubject. You will find that I ſhall do ſo with much impartiality. The diſaſtrous events of this campaign in the Low Countries, and the conſequences of them, have been imputed to the ſeparation of the Britiſh troops from the army of the allies. The clamour againſt this meaſure was great at that time, and the prejudices which this clamour raiſed are great ſtill among ſome men. But as clamour raiſed theſe prejudices, other prejudices gave birth to this clamour: and it is no wonder they ſhould do ſo among perſons bent on continuing the war; ſince I own very freely, that when the firſt ſtep that led to this ſeparation came to my knowledge, which was

was not an hour, by the way, before I writ by the queen's order to the duke of ORMOND, in the very words in which the order was adviſed and given, 'that he 'ſhould not engage in any ſiege, nor ha-'zard a battle, till further order,' I was ſurprized and hurt. So much, that if I had had an opportunity of ſpeaking in private to the queen, after I had received monſieur DE TORCY's letter to me on the ſubject, and before ſhe went into the council, I ſhould have ſpoken to her, I think, in the firſt heat, againſt it. The truth is however, that the ſtep was juſtifiable at that point of time in every reſpect, and therefore that the conſequences are to be charged to the account of thoſe who drew them on themſelves, not to the account of the queen, nor of the miniſter who adviſed her. The ſtep was juſtifiable to the allies ſurely, ſince the queen took no more upon her, no not ſo much by far, in making it, as many of them had done by ſuſpending, or endangering, or defeating operations

ons in the heat of the war, when they declined to ſend their troops, or delayed the march of them, or neglected the preparations they were obliged to make, on the moſt frivolous pretences. Your lordſhip will find in the courſe of your enquiries many particular inſtances of what is here pointed out in general. But I cannot help deſcending into ſome few of thoſe that regard the emperor and the ſtates general, who cried the loudeſt and with the moſt effect, tho they had the leaſt reaſon, on account of their own conduct, to complain of the queen's. With what face could the emperor, for inſtance, preſume to complain of the orders ſent to the duke of ORMOND? I ſay nothing of his deficiencies, which were ſo great, that he had at this very time little more than one regiment that could be ſaid properly to act againſt France and Spain at his ſole charge; as I affirmed to prince EUGENE before the lords of the council, and demonſtrated upon paper the next day. I ſay nothing

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of all that preceded the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeven, on which I ſhould have much to ſay. But I deſire your lordſhip only to conſider, what you will find to have paſſed after the famous year one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſix. Was it with the queen's approbation or againſt her will, that the emperor made the treaty for the evacuation of Lombardy, and let out ſo great a number of French regiments time enough to recruit themſelves at home, to march into Spain, and to deſtroy the Britiſh forces at Almanza? Was it with her approbation or againſt her will, that inſtead of employing all his forces and all his endeavours, to make the greateſt deſign of the whole war, the enterprize on Thoulon, ſucceed, he detached twelve thouſand men to reduce the kingdom of Naples, that muſt have fallen of courſe? and that an opportunity of ruining the whole maritime force of France, and of ruining or ſubduing her provinces on that ſide, was loſt, merely

merely by this unneceſſary diverſion, and by the conduct of prince EUGENE, which left no room to doubt that he gave occaſion to this fatal diſappointment on purpoſe, and in concert with the court of Vienna.

TURN your eyes, my lord, on the conduct of the ſtates, and you will find reaſon to be aſtoniſhed at the arrogance of the men who governed in them at this time, and who preſumed to exclaim againſt a queen of Great Britain, for doing what their deputies had done more than once in that very country, and in the courſe of that very war. In the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and twelve, at the latter end of a war, when conferences for treating a peace were opened, when the leaſt ſiniſter event in the field would take off from that ſuperiority which the allies had in the congreſs, and when the paſt ſucceſs of the war had already given them as much of this ſuperiority as they

wanted to obtain a ſafe, advantageous, honorable and laſting peace, the queen directed her general to ſuſpend till further order the operations of her troops. In one thouſand ſeven hundred and three, in the beginning of a war, when ſomething was to be riſqued or no ſucceſs to be expected, and when the bad ſituation of affairs in Germany and Italy required in a particular manner, that efforts ſhould be made in the Low Countries, and that the war ſhould not languiſh there whilſt it was unſucceſsful every where elſe; the duke of MARLBOROUGH determined to attack the French, but the Dutch deputies would not ſuffer their troops to go on; defeated his deſign in the very moment of it's execution, if I remember well, and gave no other reaſon for their proceeding than that which is a reaſon againſt every battle, the poſſibility of being beaten. The circumſtance of proximity to their frontier was urged I know, and it was ſaid, that their provinces

vinces would be expoſed to the incurſions of the French if they loſt the battle. But beſides other anſwers to this vain pretence, it was obvious that they had ventured battles as near home as this would have been fought, and that the way to remove the enemy farther off was by action not inaction. Upon the whole matter; the Dutch deputies ſtopped the progreſs of the confederate army at this time, by exerciſing an arbitrary and independent authority over the troops of the ſtates. In one thouſand ſeven hundred and five, when the ſucceſs of the preceding campaign ſhould have given them an entire confidence in the duke of MARLBOROUGH's conduct, when returning from the Moſelle to the Low Countries, he began to make himſelf and the common cauſe amends, for the diſappointment which pique and jealouſy in the prince of BADEN, or uſual ſloth and negligence in the Ger-

Germans, had occaſioned juſt before, by forcing the French lines; when he was in the full purſuit of this advantage, and when he was marching to attack an enemy half defeated, and more than half diſpirited; nay when he had made his diſpoſitions for attacking, and part of his troops had paſſed the Dyle—the deputies of the ſtates once more tyed up his hands, took from him an opportunity too fair to be loſt; for theſe, I think, were ſome of the terms of his complaint: and in ſhort the confederacy received an affront at leaſt, where we might have obtained a victory. Let this that has been ſaid ſerve as a ſpecimen of the independency on the queen, her councils, and her generals, with which theſe powers acted in the courſe of the war; who were not aſhamed to find fault that the queen, once, and at the latter end of it, preſumed to ſuſpend the operations of her troops till farther order. But be it that they foreſaw what this farther order would

would be. They foreſaw then, that as ſoon as Dunkirk ſhould be put into the queen's hands, ſhe would conſent to a ſuſpenſion of arms for two months, and invite them to do the ſame. Neither this foreſight, nor the ſtrong declaration which the biſhop of Briſtol made by the queen's order at Utrecht, and which ſhewed them that her reſolution was taken not to ſubmit to the league into which they had entered againſt her, could prevail on them to make a right uſe of theſe two months, by endeavouring to renew their union and good underſtanding with the queen; tho I can ſay with the greateſt truth, and they could not doubt of it at the time, that ſhe would have gone more than half-way to meet them, and that her miniſters would have done their utmoſt to bring it about. Even then we might have reſumed the ſuperiority we began to loſe in the congreſs; for the queen, and the ſtates uniting, the principal allies would have united with them

them: and, in this caſe, it would have been ſo much the intereſt of France to avoid any chance of ſeeing the war renewed, that ſhe muſt, and ſhe would, have made ſure of peace, during the ſuſpenſion, on much worſe terms for herſelf and for Spain, than ſhe made it afterwards. But the prudent and ſober States continued to act like froward children, or like men drunk with reſentment and paſſion; and ſuch will the conduct be of the wiſeſt governments in every circumſtance, where a ſpirit of faction and of private intereſt prevails, among thoſe who are at the head, over reaſon of ſtate. After laying aſide all decency in their behaviour towards the Queen, they laid aſide all caution for themſelves. They declared "they would carry on the war without her." Landrecy ſeemed, in their eſteem, of more importance than Dunkirk: and the opportunity of waſting ſome French provinces, or of putting the whole event of the war on the deciſion of another battle, preferable

to the other meaſure that lay open to them; that, I mean, of trying, in good earneſt, and in an honeſt concert with the Queen, during the ſuſpenſion of arms, whether ſuch terms of peace, as ought to ſatisfy them and the other allies, might not be impoſed on France?

IF the confederate army had broke into France, the campaign before this, or in any former campaign; and if the Germans and the Dutch had exerciſed then the ſame inhumanity, as the French had exerciſed in their provinces in former wars; if they had burned Verſailles, and even Paris, and if they had diſturbed the aſhes of the dead princes that repoſe at Saint Denis, every good man would have felt the horror, that ſuch cruelties inſpire: no man could have ſaid that the retaliation was unjuſt. But in one thouſand ſeven hundred and twelve, it was too late, in every reſpect, to meditate ſuch projects. If the French had been unprepared to

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defend their frontier, either for want of means, or in a vain confidence that the peace would be made, as our king CHARLES the ſecond was unprepared to defend his coaſt at the latter end of his firſt war with Holland, the allies might have played a ſure game in ſatisfying their vengeance on the French, as the Dutch did on us in one thouſand ſix hundred and ſixty ſeven; and impoſing harder terms on them, than thoſe they offered, or would have accepted. But this was not the caſe. The French army was, I believe, more numerous than the army of the allies, even before ſeparation, and certainly in much a better condition than two or three years before, when a deluge of blood was ſpilt to diſlodge them, for we did no more, at Malplaquet. Would the Germans and the Dutch have found it more eaſy to force them at this time, than it was at that? Would not the French have fought with as much obſtinacy to ſave Paris, as they did to ſave Mons? and,

with all the regard due to the duke of ORMONDE and to prince EUGENE, was the abſence of the duke of MARLBOROUGH of no conſequence? Turn this affair every way in your thoughts, my lord, and you will find that the Germans and the Dutch had nothing in theirs, but to break, at any rate, and at any riſque, the negotiations that were begun, and to reduce Great Britain to the neceſſity of continuing, what ſhe had been too long, a province of the confederacy. A province indeed, and not one of the beſt treated; ſince the confederates aſſumed a right of obliging her to keep her pacts with them, and of diſpenſing with their obligations to her; of exhauſting her, without rule, or proportion, or meaſure, in the ſupport of a war, to which ſhe alone contributed more than all of them, and in which ſhe had no longer an immediate intereſt, nor even any remote intereſt that was not common, or, with reſpect to her, very dubious; and, after all this, of complaining that the Queen

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preſumed to hearken to overtures of peace, and to ſet a negotiation on foot, whilſt their humour and ambition required that the war ſhould be prolonged for an indefinite time, and for a purpoſe that was either bad or indeterminate.

THE ſuſpenſion of arms, that began in the Low Countries, was continued, and extended afterwards by the act I ſigned at Fontainebleau. The fortune of the war turned at the ſame time: and all thoſe diſgraces followed, which obliged the Dutch to treat, and to deſire the aſſiſtance of the Queen, whom they had ſet at defiance ſo lately. This aſſiſtance they had, as effectually as it could be given in the circumſtances, to which they had reduced themſelves, and the whole alliance: and the peace of Great Britain, Portugal, Savoy, Pruſſia, and the States General, was made, without his Imperial majeſty's concurrence, in the ſpring of one thouſand ſeven hundred and thirteen; as it might have been

made, much more advantageouſly for them all, in that of one thouſand ſeven hundred and twelve. Leſs obſtinacy on the part of the States, and perhaps more deciſive reſolutions on the part of the Queen, would have wound up all theſe divided threads in one, and have finiſhed this great work much ſooner and better. I ſay, perhaps more deciſive reſolutions on the part of the Queen; becauſe, altho I think that I ſhould have conveyed her orders for ſigning a treaty of peace with France, before the armies took the field, much more willingly, than I executed them afterwards in ſigning that of the ceſſation of arms; yet I do not preſume to decide, but ſhall deſire your lordſhip to do ſo, on a review of all circumſtances, ſome of which I ſhall juſt mention.

THE league made for protracting the war having oppoſed the Queen to the utmoſt of their power, and by means of every ſort, from the firſt appearances of a negotiation;

tiation; the general effect, of this violent oppoſition, on her and her miniſters was, to make them proceed by ſlower and more cautious ſteps: the particular effect of it was, to oblige them to open the eyes of the nation, and to inflame the people with a deſire of peace, by ſhewing, in the moſt public and ſolemn manner, how unequally we were burdened, and how unfairly we were treated by our allies. The firſt gave an air of diffidence and timidity to their conduct, which encouraged the league, and gave vigour to the oppoſition. The ſecond irritated the Dutch particularly; for the emperor and the other allies had the modeſty at leaſt, not to pretend to bear any proportion in the expence of the war: and thus the two powers, whoſe union was the moſt eſſential, were the moſt at variance, and the Queen was obliged to act in a cloſer concert with her enemy who deſired peace, than ſhe would have done if her allies had been leſs obſtinately bent to protract the war. During theſe

tranſactions, my lord OXFORD, who had his correſpondencies apart, and a private thread of negotiation always in his hands, entertained hopes that PHILIP would be brought to abandon Spain in favour of his father-in-law, and to content himſelf with the ſtates of that prince, the kingdom of Sicily, and the preſervation of his right of ſucceſſion to the crown of France. Whether my lord had any particular reaſons for entertaining theſe hopes, beſides the general reaſons founded on the condition of France, on that of the Bourbon family, and on the diſpoſition of LEWIS the fourteenth, I doubt very much. That LEWIS, who ſought, and had need of ſeeking peace, almoſt at any rate, and who ſaw that he could not obtain it, even of the Queen, unleſs PHILIP abandoned immediately the crown of Spain, or abandoned immediately, by renunciation and a ſolemn act of excluſion, all pretenſion to that of France; that LEWIS was deſirous of the former, I cannot doubt. That PHILIP would have

have abandoned Spain, with the equivalents that have been mentioned, or either of them, I believe likewiſe; if the preſent king of France had died, when his father, mother, and eldeſt brother did: for they all had the ſame diſtemper. But LEWIS would uſe no violent means to force his grandſon; the Queen would not continue the war to force him; PHILIP was too obſtinate, and his wife too ambitious, to quit the crown of Spain, when they had diſcovered our weakneſs, and felt their own ſtrength in that country, by their ſucceſs in the campaign of one thouſand ſeven hundred and ten: after which my lord STANHOPE himſelf was convinced that Spain could not be conquered, nor kept, if it was conquered, without a much greater army, than it was poſſible for us to ſend thither. In that ſituation it was wild to imagine, as the earl of OXFORD imagined, or pretended to imagine, that they would quit the crown of Spain, for a remote and uncertain proſpect of ſucceeding to that of France, and to content them-

themſelves to be, in the mean time, princes of very ſmall dominions. PHILIP therefore, after ſtruggling long that he might not be obliged to make his option till the ſucceſſion of France lay open to him, was obliged to make it, and made it, for Spain. Now this, my lord, was the very criſis of the negotiation: and to this point I apply what I ſaid above of the effect of more deciſive reſolutions on the part of the Queen. It was plain, that, if ſhe made the campaign in concert with her allies, ſhe could be no longer miſtreſs of the negotiations, nor have almoſt a chance for conducting them to the iſſue ſhe propoſed. Our ill ſucceſs in the field would have rendered the French leſs tractable in the congreſs: our good ſucceſs there would have rendered the allies ſo. On this principle the Queen ſuſpended the operations of her troops, and then concluded the ceſſation.

COMPARE now the appearances and effect of this meaſure, with the appearances

ances and effect, that another meaſure would have had. In order to arrive at any peace, it was neceſſary to do what the Queen did, or to do more: and, in order to arrive at a good one, it was neceſſary to be prepared to carry on the war, as well as to make a ſhew of it; for ſhe had the hard taſk upon her, of guarding againſt her allies, and her enemies both. But in that ferment, when few men conſidered any thing coolly, the conduct of her general, after he took the field, tho he covered the allies in the ſiege of Queſnoy, correſponded ill, in appearance, with the declarations of carrying on the war vigorouſly, that had been made, on ſeveral occaſions, before the campaign opened. It had an air of double dealing; and as ſuch it paſſed among thoſe, who did not combine in their thoughts all the circumſtances of the conjuncture, or who were infatuated with the notional neceſſity of continuing the war. The clamour could not have been greater, if the Queen had

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ſigned her peace ſeparately: and, I think, the appearances might have been explained as favourably in one caſe, as in the other. From the death of the emperor JOSEPH, it was neither our intereſt, nor the common intereſt, well underſtood, to ſet the crown of Spain on the preſent emperor's head. As ſoon therefore as PHILIP had made his option, and if ſhe had taken this reſolution early, his option would have been ſooner made, I preſume that the Queen might have declared, that ſhe would not continue the war an hour longer to procure Spain for his Imperial majeſty; that the engagements, ſhe had taken whilſt he was archduke, bound her no more; that, by his acceſſion to the empire, the very nature of them was altered; that ſhe took effectual meaſures to prevent, in any future time, an union of the crowns of France and Spain; and, upon the ſame principle, would not conſent, much leſs fight, to bring about an immediate union of the Imperial and Spaniſh crowns; that they,

they, who inſiſted to protract the war, intended this union; that they could intend nothing elſe, ſince they ventured to break with her, rather than to treat, and were ſo eager to put the reaſonable ſatisfaction, that they might have in every other caſe without hazard, on the uncertain events of war; that ſhe would not be impoſed on any longer in this manner, and that ſhe had ordered her miniſters to ſign her treaty with France, on the ſurrender of Dunkirk into her hands; that ſhe pretended not to preſcribe to her allies, but that ſhe had inſiſted, in their behalf, on certain conditions, that France was obliged to grant to thoſe of them, who ſhould ſign their treaties at the ſame time as ſhe did, or who ſhould conſent to an immediate ceſſation of arms, and during the ceſſation treat under her mediation. There had been more frankneſs, and more dignity in this proceeding, and the effect muſt have been more advantageous. France would have granted more for a ſeparate peace,

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than for a ceſſation : and the Dutch would have been more influenced by the proſpect of one, than of the other ; eſpecially ſince this proceeding would have been very different from theirs at Munſter, and at Nimeghen, where they abandoned their allies, without any other pretence than the particular advantage they found in doing ſo. A ſuſpenſion of the operations of the Queen's troops, nay a ceſſation of arms between her and France, was not definitive ; and they might, and they did, hope to drag her back under their, and the German yoke. This therefore was not ſufficient to check their obſtinacy, nor to hinder them from making all the unfortunate haſte they did make to get themſelves beaten at Denain. But they would poſſibly have laid aſide their vain hopes, if they had ſeen the Queen's miniſters ready to ſign her treaty of peace, and thoſe of ſome principal allies ready to ſign at the ſame time; in which caſe the miſchief, that followed, had been prevented, and

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better terms of peace had been obtained for the confederacy: a prince of the houſe of Bourbon, who could never be king of France, would have ſat on the Spaniſh throne, inſtead of an emperor: the Spaniſh ſcepter would have been weakened in the hands of one, and the Imperial ſcepter would have been ſtrengthened in thoſe of the other: France would have had no opportunity of recovering from former blows, nor of finiſhing a long unſucceſsful war by two ſucceſsful campaigns: her ambition, and her power, would have declined with her old king, and under the minority that followed: one of them at leaſt might have been ſo reduced by the terms of peace, if the defeat of the allies in one thouſand ſeven hundred and twelve, and the loſs of ſo many towns as the French took in that and the following year, had been prevented, that the other would have been no longer formidable, even ſuppoſing it to have continued; whereas I ſuppoſe that the tranquillity

quillity of Europe is more due, at this time, to want of ambition, than to want of power, on the part of France. But, to carry the compariſon of theſe two meaſures to the end, it may be ſuppoſed that the Dutch would have taken the ſame part, on the Queen's declaring a ſeparate peace, as they took on her declaring a ceſſation. The preparations for the campaign in the Low Countries were made; the Dutch, like the other confederates, had a juſt confidence in their own troops, and an unjuſt contempt for thoſe of the enemy; they were tranſported from their uſual ſobriety and caution by the ambitious proſpect of large acquiſitions, which had been opened artfully to them; the reſt of the confederate army was compoſed of Imperial and German troops: ſo that the Dutch, the Imperialiſts, and the other Germans, having an intereſt to decide which was no longer the intereſt of the whole confederacy, they might have united againſt the Queen in one caſe, as they did

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in the other; and the miſchief, that followed to them and the common cauſe, might not have been prevented. This might have been the caſe, no doubt. They might have flattered themſelves that they ſhould be able to break into France, and to force PHILIP, by the diſtreſs brought on his grandfather, to reſign the crown of Spain to the emperor, even after Great Britain, and Portugal, and Savoy too perhaps, were drawn out of the war; for theſe princes deſired as little, as the Queen, to ſee the Spaniſh crown on the emperor's head. But, even in this caſe, tho the madneſs would have been greater, the effect would not have been worſe. The Queen would have been able to ſerve theſe confederates as well by being mediator in the negotiations, as they left it in her power to do, by being a party in them: and Great Britain would have had the advantage of being delivered ſo much ſooner from a burden, which whimſical and wicked

politics had impoſed, and continued upon her, till it was become intolerable. Of theſe two meaſures, at the time when we might have taken either, there were perſons who thought the laſt preferable to the former. But it never came into public debate. Indeed it never could; too much time having been loſt in waiting for the option of PHILIP, and the ſuſpenſion and ceſſation having been brought before the council rather as a meaſure taken, than a matter to be debated. If your lordſhip, or any one elſe, ſhould judge, that, in ſuch circumſtances as thoſe of the confederacy in the beginning of one thouſand ſeven hundred and twelve, the latter meaſure ought to have been taken, and the Gordian knot to have been cut, rather than to ſuffer a mock treaty to languiſh on, with ſo much advantage to the French as the diſunion of the allies gave them; in ſhort, if ſlowneſs, perplexity, inconſiſtency, and indeciſion ſhould be objected, in ſome inſtances, to the Queen's councils at that time;

time; if it ſhould be ſaid particularly, that ſhe did not obſerve the preciſe moment when the conduct of the league formed againſt her, being expoſed to mankind, would have juſtified any part ſhe ſhould have taken (tho ſhe declared, ſoon after the moment was paſſed, that this conduct had ſet her free from all her engagements) and when ſhe ought to have taken that of drawing, by one bold meaſure, her allies out of the war, or herſelf out of the confederacy, before ſhe loſt her influence on France: if all this ſhould be objected, yet would the proofs brought to ſupport theſe objections ſhew, that we were better allies than politicians; that the deſire the Queen had to treat in concert with her confederates, and the reſolution ſhe took not to ſign without them, made her bear what no crowned head had ever borne before; and that where ſhe erred, ſhe erred principally by the patience, the compliance, and the condeſcenſion ſhe exerciſed towards them, and towards her own ſubjects in

league with them. Such objections as theſe may lye to the Queen's conduct, in the courſe of this great affair; as well as objections of human infirmity to that of the perſons employed by her in the tranſactions of it; from which neither thoſe who preceded, nor thoſe who ſucceeded, have, I preſume, been free. But the principles on which they proceeded were honeſt, the means they uſed were lawful, and the event they propoſed to bring about was juſt. Whereas the very foundation of all the oppoſition to the peace was laid in injuſtice and folly: for what could be more unjuſt, than the attempt of the Dutch and the Germans, to force the Queen to continue a war for their private intereſt and ambition, the diſproportionate expence of which oppreſſed the commerce of her ſubjects, and loaded them with debts for ages yet to come? a war, the object of which was ſo changed, that from the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and eleven ſhe made it not only

without

without any engagement, but againſt her own, and the common intereſt? What could be more fooliſh; you will think that I ſoften the term too much, and you will be in the right to think ſo: what could be more fooliſh, than the attempt of a party in Britain, to protract a war ſo ruinous to their country, without any reaſon that they durſt avow, except that of wreaking the reſentments of Europe on France, and that of uniting the Imperial and Spaniſh crowns on an Auſtrian head? one of which was to purchaſe revenge at a price too dear; and the other was to expoſe the liberties of Europe to new dangers, by the concluſion of a war which had been made to aſſert and ſecure them?

I HAVE dwelt the longer on the conduct of thoſe who promoted, and of thoſe who oppoſed, the negotiations of the peace made at Utrecht, and on the compariſon

of the meaſure purſued by the Queen with that which ſhe might have purſued, becauſe the great benefit we ought to reap from the ſtudy of hiſtory, cannot be reaped unleſs we accuſtom ourſelves to compare the conduct of different governments, and different parties, in the ſame conjunctures, and to obſerve the meaſures they did purſue, and the meaſures they might have purſued, with the actual conſequences that followed one, and the poſſible, or probable conſequences, that might have followed the other. By this exerciſe of the mind, the ſtudy of hiſtory anticipates, as it were, experience, as I have obſerved in one of the firſt of theſe letters, and prepares us for action. If this conſideration ſhould not plead a ſufficient excuſe for my prolixity on this head, I have one more to add that may. A rage of warring poſſeſſed a party in our nation till the death of the late Queen: a rage of negotiating has poſſeſſed the ſame party of men, ever ſince. You have ſeen the con-

conſequences of one: you ſee actually thoſe of the other. The rage of warring confirmed the beggary of our nation, which began as early as the revolution; but then it gave, in the laſt war, reputation to our arms, and our councils too. For tho I think, and muſt always think, that the principle, on which we acted after departing from that laid down in the grand alliance of one thouſand ſeven hundred and one, was wrong; yet muſt we confeſs that it was purſued wiſely, as well as boldly. The rage of negotiating has been a chargeable rage likewiſe, at leaſt as chargeable in it's proportion. Far from paying our debts, contracted in war, they continue much the ſame, after three and twenty years of peace. The taxes that oppreſs our mercantile intereſt the moſt are ſtill in mortgage; and thoſe that oppreſs the landed intereſt the moſt, inſtead of being laid on extraordinary occaſions, are become the ordinary funds for the current ſervice of every year. This is

grievous, and the more ſo to any man, who has the honour of his country, as well as her proſperity at heart, becauſe we have not, in this caſe, the airy conſolation we had in the other. The rage of negotiating began twenty years ago, under pretence of conſummating the treaty of Utrecht: and, from that time to this, our miniſters have been in one perpetual maze. They have made themſelves and us, often, objects of averſion to the powers on the continent: and we are become at laſt objects of contempt, even to the Spaniards. What other effect could our abſurd conduct have? What other return has it deſerved? We came exhauſted out of long wars; and, inſtead of purſuing the meaſures neceſſary to give us means and opportunity to repair our ſtrength and to diminiſh our burdens, our miniſters have acted, from that time to this, like men who ſought pretences to keep the nation in the ſame exhauſted condition, and under the ſame load of debt. This

may

may have been their view perhaps; and we could not be ſurpriſed if we heard the ſame men declare national poverty neceſſary to ſupport the preſent government, who have ſo frequently declared corruption and a ſtanding army to be ſo. Your good ſenſe, my lord, your virtue, and your love of your country, will always determine you to oppoſe ſuch vile ſchemes, and to contribute your utmoſt towards the cure of both theſe kinds of rage; the rage of warring, without any proportionable intereſt of our own, for the ambition of others; and the rage of negotiating, on every occaſion, at any rate, without a ſufficient call to it, and without any part of that deciding influence which we ought to have. Our nation inhabits an iſland, and is one of the principal nations of Europe; but, to maintain this rank, we muſt take the advantages of this ſituation, which have been neglected by us for almoſt half a century: we muſt always remember, that we are not part of the con-

continent, but we muſt never forget that we are neighbours to it. I will conclude, by applying a rule that HORACE gives for the conduct of an epic or dramatic poem, to the part Great Britain ought to take in the affairs of the continent, if you allow me to transform Britannia into a male divinity, as the verſe requires.

Nec Deus interſit, niſi dignus vindice nodus Inciderit.

If theſe reflections are juſt, and I ſhould not have offered them to your lordſhip had they not appeared both juſt and important to my beſt underſtanding, you will think that I have not ſpent your time unprofitably in making them, and exciting you by them to examine the true intereſt of your country relatively to foreign affairs; and to compare it with thoſe principles of conduct, that, I am perſuaded, have no other foundation than party-deſigns, prejudices, and habits; the private intereſt

intereſt of ſome men, and the ignorance and raſhneſs of others.

MY letter is grown ſo long, that I ſhall ſay nothing to your lordſhip at this time concerning the ſtudy of modern hiſtory, relatively to the intereſts of your country in domeſtic affairs; and I think there will be no need to do ſo at any other. The Hiſtory of the rebellion by your great grandfather, and his private memorials, which your lordſhip has in manuſcript, will guide you ſurely as far as they go: where they leave you, your lordſhip muſt not expect any hiſtory; for we have more reaſon to make this complaint, "abeſt "enim hiſtoria litteris noſtris," than TULLY had to put it into the mouth of ATTICUS in his firſt book Of laws. But where hiſtory leaves you, it is wanted leaſt: the traditions of this century, and of the latter end of the laſt, are freſh. Many, who were actors in ſome of theſe events, are alive; and many who have con-

converſed with thoſe that were actors in others. The public is in poſſeſſion of ſeveral collections and memorials, and ſeveral there are in private hands. You will want no materials to form true notions of tranſactions ſo recent. Even pamphlets, writ on different ſides and on different occaſions in our party diſputes, and hiſtories of no more authority than pamphlets, will help you to come at truth. Read them with ſuſpicion, my lord, for they deſerve to be ſuſpected: pay no regard to the epithets given, nor to the judgments paſſed; neglect all declamation, weigh the reaſoning, and advert to fact. With ſuch precautions, even BURNET's hiſtory may be of ſome uſe. In a word, your lordſhip will want no help of mine to diſcover, by what progreſſion the whole conſtitution of our country, and even the character of our nation, has been altered: nor how much a worſe uſe, in a national ſenſe, tho a better in the ſenſe of party politics, the men called Whigs have made of long wars and new ſyſtems

ſyſtems of revenue, ſince the revolution; than the men called Tories made before it, of long peace, and ſtale prerogative. When you look back three or four generations ago, you will ſee that the Engliſh were a plain, perhaps a rough, but a good-natured hoſpitable people, jealous of their liberties, and able as well as ready to defend them, with their tongues, their pens, and their ſwords. The reſtoration began to turn hoſpitality into luxury, pleaſure into debauch, and country peers and country commoners into courtiers and men of mode. But whilſt our luxury was young, it was little more than elegance: the debauch of that age was enlivened with wit, and varniſhed over with gallantry. The courtiers, and the men of mode, knew what the conſtitution was, reſpected it, and often aſſerted it. Arts and ſciences flouriſhed, and, if we grew more trivial, we were not become either groſsly ignorant, or openly profligate. Since the revolution, our kings have been reduced indeed

indeed to a ſeeming annual dependance on parliament; but the buſineſs of parliament, which was eſteemed in general a duty before, has been exerciſed in general as a trade ſince. The trade of parliament, and the trade of funds, have grown univerſal. Men, who ſtood forward in the world, have attended to little elſe. The frequency of parliaments, that increaſed their importance, and ſhould have increaſed the reſpect for them, has taken off from their dignity: and the ſpirit that prevailed, whilſt the ſervice in them was duty, has been debaſed ſince it became a trade. Few know, and ſcarce any reſpect, the Britiſh conſtitution: that of the Church has been long ſince derided; that of the State as long neglected; and both have been left at the mercy of the men in power, whoever thoſe men were. Thus the Church, at leaſt the hierarchy, however ſacred in it's origin or wiſe in it's inſtitution, is become an uſeleſs burden on the State: and the State is become, under ancient and

and known forms, a new and undefinable monſter; compoſed of a king without monarchical ſplendor, a ſenate of nobles without ariſtocratical independency, and a ſenate of commons without democratical freedom. In the mean time, my lord, the very idea of wit, and all that can be called taſte, has been loſt among the great; arts and ſciences are ſcarce alive; luxury has been increaſed, but not refined; corruption has been eſtabliſhed, and is avowed. When governments are worn out, thus it is: the decay appears in every inſtance. Public and private virtue, public and private ſpirit, ſcience, and wit, decline all together.

THAT you, my lord, may have a long and glorious ſhare in reſtoring all theſe, and in drawing our government back to the true principles of it, I wiſh moſt heartily. Whatever errors I may have committed in public life, I have always loved my country: whatever faults may be

be objected to me in private life, I have always loved my friend: whatever uſage I have received from my country, it ſhall never make me break with her: whatever uſage I have received from my friends, I never ſhall break with one of them, while I think him a friend to my country. Theſe are the ſentiments of my heart. I know they are thoſe of your lordſhip's: and a communion of ſuch ſentiments is a tye that will engage me to be, as long as I live,

My lord,

Your moſt faithful ſervant.

A PLAN

FOR A

General Hiſtory of EUROPE.

LETTER I.

I SHALL take the liberty of writing to you a little oftener than the three or four times a year, which, you tell me, are all you can allow yourſelf to write to thoſe you like beſt: and yet I declare to you with great truth, that you never knew me ſo buſy in your life, as I am at preſent. You muſt not imagine from hence, that I am writing memoirs of myſelf. The ſubject is too ſlight to deſcend to poſterity, in any other manner, than by that occaſional mention which may be made of any little actor in the hiſtory of our age.

impoſed on Italy by the famous triumvirate, TOLEDO at Milan, OSSUNA at Naples, and LA CUEVA at Venice. The diſtractions of France, as well as the ſtate-policy of the queen mother, ſeduced by Rome, and amuſed by Spain; the deſpicable character of our JAMES the firſt, the raſhneſs of the elector Palatine, the bad intelligence of the princes and ſtates of the league in Germany, the mercenary temper of JOHN GEORGE of Saxony, and the great qualities of MAXIMILIAN of Bavaria, raiſed FERDINAND the ſecond to the imperial throne; when, the males of the elder branch of the Auſtrian family in Germany being extinguiſhed at the death of MATTHIAS, nothing was more deſirable, nor perhaps more practicable, than to throw the empire into another houſe. Germany ran the ſame riſque as Italy had done: FERDINAND ſeemed more likely, even than CHARLES the fifth had been, to become abſolute maſter; and, if France had not furniſhed the greateſt miniſter, and the North

North the greateſt captain, of that age, in the ſame point of time, Vienna and Madrid would have given the law to the weſtern world.

As the Auſtrian ſcale ſunk, that of Bourbon roſe. The true date of the riſe of that power, which has made the kings of France ſo conſiderable in Europe, goes up as high as CHARLES the ſeventh, and LEWIS the eleventh. The weakneſs of our HENRY the ſixth, the looſe conduct of EDWARD the fourth, and perhaps the overſights of HENRY the ſeventh, helped very much to knit that monarchy together, as well as to enlarge it. Advantage might have been taken of the diviſions which religion occaſioned; and ſupporting the proteſtant party in France would have kept that crown under reſtraints, and under inabilities, in ſome meaſure equal to thoſe which were occaſioned anciently by the vaſt alienations of it's demeſnes, and by the exorbitant power of

it's vaſſals. But JAMES the firſt was incapable of thinking with ſenſe, or acting with ſpirit. CHARLES the firſt had an imperfect glimpſe of his true intereſt, but his uxorious temper, and the extravagancy of that madman BUCKINGHAM, gave RICHELIEU time to finiſh a great part of his project; and the miſeries, that followed in England, gave MAZARIN time and opportunity to complete the ſyſtem. The laſt great act of this cardinal's adminiſtration was the Pyrenean treaty.

HERE I would begin, by repreſenting the face of Europe ſuch as it was at that epocha, the intereſts and the conduct of England, France, Spain, Holland, and the Empire. A ſummary recapitulation ſhould follow of all the ſteps taken by France, during more than twenty years, to arrive at the great object ſhe had propoſed to herſelf in making this treaty: the moſt ſolemn article of which the miniſter, who

who negotiated it, deſigned ſhould be violated; as appears by his letters, writ from the Iſland of Pheaſants, if I miſtake not. After this, another draught of Europe ſhould have it's place, according to the relations, which the ſeveral powers ſtood in, one towards another, in one thouſand ſix hundred and eighty eight: and the alterations which the revolution in England made in the politics of Europe. A ſummary account ſhould follow of the events of the war that ended in one thouſand ſix hundred and ninety ſeven, with the different views of king WILLIAM the third, and LEWIS the fourteenth, in making the peace of Ryſwic; which matter has been much canvaſſed, and is little underſtood. Then the diſpoſitions made by the partition-treaties, and the influences and conſequences of theſe treaties; and a third draught of the ſtate of Europe at the death of CHARLES the ſecond of Spain. All this would make the ſubject of one or two books, and would be the moſt proper

introduction imaginable to an hiſtory of that war with which our century began, and of the peace which followed.

THIS war, foreſeen for above half a century, had been, during all that time, the great and conſtant object of the councils of Europe. The prize to be contended for was the richeſt, that ever had been ſtaked, ſince thoſe of the Perſian and Roman empires. The union of two powers, which ſeparately, and in oppoſition, had aimed at univerſal monarchy, was apprehended. The confederates therefore engaged in it, to maintain a balance between the two houſes of Auſtria and Bourbon, in order to preſerve their ſecurity, and to aſſert their independance. But with the ſucceſs of the war they changed their views: and, if ambition began it on the ſide of France, ambition continued it on the other. The battles, the ſieges, the ſurpriſing revolutions, which happened in the courſe of this war, are not to be paralleled

ralleled in any period of the ſame compaſs. The motives, and the meaſures, by which it was protracted, the true reaſons why it ended in a manner, which appeared not proportionable to it's ſucceſs; and the new political ſtate, into which Europe was thrown by the treaties of Utrecht and Baden, are ſubjects on which few perſons have the neceſſary informations, and yet every one ſpeaks with aſſurance, and even with paſſion. I think I could ſpeak on them with ſome knowledge, and with as much indifference as POLYBIUS does of the negotiations of his father LYCORTAS, even in thoſe points where I was myſelf an actor.

I WILL even confeſs to you, that I ſhould not deſpair of performing this part better than the former. There is nothing in my opinion ſo hard to execute, as thoſe political maps, if you will allow me ſuch an expreſſion, and thoſe ſyſtems of hints, rather than relations of events, which are neceſſary

neceſſary to connect and explain them; and which muſt be ſo conciſe, and yet ſo full; ſo complicate, and yet ſo clear. I know nothing of this ſort well done by the ancients. SALUST's introduction, as well as that of THUCYDIDES, might ſerve almoſt for any other piece of the Roman or Greek ſtory, as well as for thoſe, which theſe two great authors choſe. POLYBIUS does not come up, in his introduction, to this idea neither. Among the moderns, the firſt book of MACHIAVEL's Hiſtory of Florence is a noble original of this kind: and perhaps father PAUL's Hiſtory of Benefices is, in the ſame kind of compoſition, inimitable.

THESE are a few of thoſe thoughts, which come into my mind when I conſider how incumbent it is on every man, that he ſhould be able to give an account even of his leiſure; and, in the midſt of ſolitude; be of ſome uſe to ſociety.

I KNOW

I KNOW not whether I ſhall have courage enough to undertake the taſk I have chalked out: I diſtruſt my abilities with reaſon, and I ſhall want ſeveral informations, not eaſy, I doubt, for me to obtain. But, in all events, it will not be poſſible for me to go about it this year; the reaſons of which would be long enough to fill another letter, and I doubt that you will think this grown too bulky already.

Adieu.

OF THE

TRUE USE

OF

RETIREMENT and STUDY:

To the Right Honorable

Lord BATHURST.

LETTER II.

SINCE my laſt to your lordſhip, this is the firſt favourable opportunity I have had of keeping the promiſe I made you. I will avoid prolixity, as much as I can, in a firſt draught of my thoughts; but I muſt give you them as they riſe in my mind, without ſtaying to marſhal them in cloſe order.

As proud as we are of human reaſon, nothing can be more abſurd than the general ſyſtem of human life, and human know-

knowledge. This faculty of diſtinguiſhing true from falſe, right from wrong, and what is agreeable, from what is repugnant, to nature, either by one act, or by a longer proceſs of intuition, has not been given with ſo ſparing an hand, as many appearances would make us apt to believe. If it was cultivated, therefore, as early, and as carefully as it might be, and if the exerciſe of it was left generally as free as it ought to be, our common notions and opinions would be more conſonant to truth than they are: and, truth being but one, they would be more uniform likewiſe.

But this rightful miſtreſs of human life and knowledge, whoſe proper office it is to preſide over both, and to direct us in the conduct of one and the purſuit of the other, becomes degraded in the intellectual oeconomy. She is reduced to a mean and ſervile ſtate, to the vile drudgery of conniving at principles, defending opinions, and confirming habits, that are none of

of hers. They, who do her moſt honor, who conſult her oftener, and obey her too very often, are ſtill guilty of limiting her authority according to maxims, and rules, and ſchemes, that chance, or ignorance, or intereſt, firſt deviſed, and that cuſtom ſanctifies: cuſtom, that reſults of the paſſions and prejudices of many, and of the deſigns of a few: that ape of reaſon, who uſurps her ſeat, exerciſes her power, and is obeyed by mankind in her ſtead. Men find it eaſy, and government makes it profitable, to concur in eſtabliſhed ſyſtems of ſpeculation, and practice: and the whole turn of education prepares them to live upon credit all their lives. Much pains are taken, and time beſtowed, to teach us what to think, but little or none of either, to inſtruct us how to think. The magazine of the memory is ſtored and ſtuffed betimes; but the conduct of the underſtanding is all along neglected, and the free exerciſe of it is, in effect, forbid in all places, and in terms in ſome.

THERE

THERE is a ſtrange diſtruſt of human reaſon in every human inſtitution: this diſtruſt is ſo apparent, that an habitual ſubmiſſion to ſome authority, or other, is forming in us from our cradles; that principles of reaſoning, and matters of fact, are inculcated in our tender minds, before we are able to exerciſe that reaſon; and that, when we are able to exerciſe it, we are either forbid, or frightened from doing ſo, even on things that are themſelves the proper objects of reaſon, or that are delivered to us upon an authority whoſe ſufficiency or inſufficiency is ſo moſt evidently.

ON many ſubjects, ſuch as the general laws of natural religion, and the general rules of ſociety and good policy, men of all countries and languages, who cultivate their reaſon, judge alike. The ſame premiſſes have led them to the ſame concluſions, and ſo, following the ſame guide, they

they have trod in the ſame path: at leaſt, the differences are ſmall, eaſily reconciled, and ſuch as could not, of themſelves, contradiſtinguiſh nation from nation, religion from religion, and ſect from ſect. How comes it then that there are other points, on which the moſt oppoſite opinions are entertained, and ſome of theſe with ſo much heat, and fury, that the men on one ſide of the hedge will die for the affirmative, and the men on the other for the negative? "Toute opinion eſt aſſez forte "pour ſe faire épouſer au prix de la vie," ſays MONTAGNE, whom I often quote, as I do SENECA, rather for the ſmartneſs of expreſſion, than the weight of matter. Look narrowly into it, and you will find that the points agreed on, and the points diſputed, are not proportionable to the common ſenſe and general reaſon of mankind. Nature and truth are the ſame every where, and reaſon ſhews them every where alike. But the accidental and other cauſes, which give riſe and growth

ar opinions, both in ſpeculation and practice, are of infinite variety; and where ever their opinions are once confirmed by cuſtom and propagated by education, various, inconſiſtent, contradictory as they are, they all pretend (and all their pretences are backed by pride, by paſſion, and by intereſt) to have reaſon, or revelation, or both, on their ſide; tho neither reaſon nor revelation can be poſſibly on the ſide of more than one, and may be poſſibly on the ſide of none.

Thus it happens that the people of Tibet are Tartars and Idolaters, that they are Turks and Mahometans at Conſtantinople, Italians and Papiſts at Rome; and how much ſoever education may be leſs confined, and the means of knowledge more attainable, in France and our own country, yet thus it happens in great meaſure that Frenchmen and Roman Catholics are bred at Paris, and Engliſhmen and Proteſtants at London. For men, indeed, properly

properly ſpeaking, are bred no where: every one thinks the ſyſtem, as he ſpeaks the language, of his country; at leaſt there are few that think, and none that act, in any country, according to the dictates of pure unbiaſſed reaſon; unleſs they may be ſaid to do ſo, when reaſon directs them to ſpeak and act according to the ſyſtem of their country, or ſect, at the ſame time as ſhe leads them to think according to that of nature and truth.

THUS the far greateſt part of mankind appears reduced to a lower ſtate than other animals, in that very reſpect, on account of which we claim ſo great ſuperiority over them; becauſe inſtinct, that has it's due effect, is preferable to reaſon that has not. I ſuppoſe in this place, with philoſophers, and the vulgar, that which I am in no wiſe ready to affirm, that other animals have no ſhare of human reaſon: for, let me ſay by the way, it is much more likely other animals ſhould ſhare the hu-

man, which is denied, than that man ſhould ſhare the divine reaſon, which is affirmed. But, ſuppoſing our monopoly of reaſon, would not your lordſhip chuſe to walk upon four legs, to wear a long tail, and to be called a beaſt, with the advantage of being determined by irreſiſtible and unerring inſtinct to thoſe truths that are neceſſary to your well-being; rather than to walk on two legs, to wear no tail, and to be honored with the title of man, at the expence of deviating from them perpetually? Inſtinct acts ſpontaneouſly whenever it's action is neceſſary, and directs the animal according to the purpoſe for which it was implanted in him. Reaſon is a nobler and more extenſive faculty; for it extends to the unneceſſary as well as neceſſary, and to ſatisfy our curioſity as well as our wants: but reaſon muſt be excited, or ſhe will remain unactive; ſhe muſt be left free, or ſhe will conduct us wrong, and carry us farther aſtray from her own precincts than we ſhould go without

without her help: in the firſt caſe, we have no ſufficient guide; and in the ſecond, the more we employ our reaſon, the more unreaſonable we are.

Now if all this be ſo, if reaſon has ſo little, and ignorance, paſſion, intereſt, and cuſtom ſo much to do, in forming our opinions and our habits, and in directing the whole conduct of human life; is it not a thing deſirable by every thinking man, to have the opportunity, indulged to ſo few by the courſe of accidents, the opportunity "ſecum eſſe, et ſecum vivere," of living ſome years at leaſt to ourſelves, and for ourſelves, in a ſtate of freedom, under the laws of reaſon, inſtead of paſſing our whole time in a ſtate of vaſſalage under thoſe of authority and cuſtom? Is it not worth our while to contemplate ourſelves, and others, and all the things of this world, once before we leave them, through the medium of pure, and, if I may ſay ſo, of undefiled reaſon? Is it not

worth our while to approve or condemn, on our own authority, what we receive in the beginning of life on the authority of other men, who were not then better able to judge for us, than we are now to judge for ourſelves?

THAT this may be done, and has been done to ſome degree, by men who remained much more mingled than I deſign to be for the future, in the company and buſineſs of the world, I ſhall not deny; but ſtill it is better done in retreat and with greater eaſe and pleaſure. Whilſt we remain in the world, we are all fettered down, more or leſs, to one common level, and have neither all the leiſure nor all the means and advantages, to ſoar above it, which we may procure to ourſelves by breaking theſe fetters in retreat. To talk of abſtracting ourſelves from matter, laying aſide body, and being reſolved, as it were, into pure intellect, is proud, metaphyſical, unmeaning jargon: but to abſtract

ſtract ourſelves from the prejudices, and habits, and pleaſures, and buſineſs of the world, is no more than many are, tho all are not, capable of doing. They who can do this, may elevate their ſouls in retreat to an higher ſtation, and may take from thence ſuch a view of the world, as the ſecond SCIPIO took in his dream, from the ſeats of the bleſſed, when the whole earth appeared ſo little to him, that he could ſcarce diſcern that ſpeck of dirt, the Roman empire. Such a view as this will encreaſe our knowledge by ſhewing us our ignorance; will diſtinguiſh every degree of probability from the loweſt to the higheſt, and mark the diſtance between that and certainty; will diſpel the intoxicating fumes of philoſophical preſumption, and teach us to eſtabliſh our peace of mind, where alone it can reſt ſecurely, in reſignation: in ſhort, ſuch a view will render life more agreeable, and death leſs terrible. Is not this buſineſs, my lord? Is not this pleaſure too, the higheſt pleaſure? The

world can afford us none ſuch; we muſt retire from the world to taſte it with a full guſt; but we ſhall taſte it the better for having been in the world. The ſhare of ſenſual pleaſures, that a man of my age can promiſe himſelf, is hardly worth attention: he ſhould be ſated, he will be ſoon diſabled; and very little reflection ſurely will ſuffice, to make his habits of this kind loſe their power over him, in proportion at leaſt as his power of indulging them diminiſhes. Beſides, your lordſhip knows that my ſcheme of retirement excludes none of theſe pleaſures that can be taken with decency and conveniency; and to ſay the truth, I believe that I allow myſelf more in ſpeculation, than I ſhall find I want in practice. As to the habits of buſineſs, they can have no hold on one who has been ſo long tired with it. You may object, that tho a man has diſcarded theſe habits, and has not even the embers of ambition about him to revive them, yet he cannot renounce all public buſineſs

as

as abſolutely as I ſeem to do; becauſe a better principle, a principle of duty, may ſummon him to the ſervice of his country. I will anſwer you with great ſincerity. No man has higher notions of this duty than I have. I think that ſcarce any age, or circumſtances, can diſcharge us entirely from it; no, not my own. But as we are apt to take the impulſe of our own paſſions, for a call to the performance of this duty; ſo when theſe paſſions impel us no longer, the call that puts us upon action muſt be real, and loud too. Add to this, that there are different methods, proportioned to different circumſtances and ſituations, of performing the ſame duty. In the midſt of retreat, where ever it may be fixed, I may contribute to defend and preſerve the Britiſh conſtitution of government: and you, my lord, may depend upon me, that whenever I can, I will. Should any one aſk you, in this caſe, from whom I expect my reward? Anſwer him by declaring to whom I pay this ſervice;

" Deo

" Deo immortali, qui me non accipere
" modo haec a majoribus voluit, ſed etiam
" poſteris prodere."

But, to lead the life I propoſe with ſatisfaction and profit, renouncing the pleaſures and buſineſs of the world, and breaking the habits of both, is not ſufficient: the ſupine creature whoſe underſtanding is ſuperficially employed, through life, about a few general notions, and is never bent to a cloſe and ſteddy purſuit of truth, may renounce the pleaſures and buſineſs of the world, for even in the buſineſs of the world we ſee ſuch creatures often employed, and may break the habits; nay he may retire and drone away life in ſolitude, like a monk, or like him over the door of whoſe houſe, as if his houſe had been his tomb, ſomebody writ, " Here
" lies ſuch an one." But no ſuch man will be able to make the true uſe of retirement. The employment of his mind, that would have been agreeable and eaſy if he had ac-

accuſtomed himſelf to it early, will be unpleaſant and impracticable late: ſuch men loſe their intellectual powers for want of exerting them, and, having trifled away youth, are reduced to the neceſſity of trifling away age. It fares with the mind juſt as it does with the body. He who was born, with a texture of brain as ſtrong as that of NEWTON, may become unable to perform the common rules of arithmetic: juſt as he who has the ſame elaſticity in his muſcles, the ſame ſuppleneſs in his joints, and all his nerves and ſinews as well braced as JACOB HALL, may become a fat unwieldy ſluggard. Yet farther, the implicit creature, who has thought it all his life needleſs, or unlawful, to examine the principles or facts that he took originally on truſt, will be as little able as the other, to improve his ſolitude to any good purpoſe: unleſs we call it a good purpoſe, for that ſometimes happens, to confirm and exalt his prejudices, ſo that he may live and die in one continued delirium. The confirmed prejudices of a thoughtful

life

life are as hard to change as the confirmed habits of an indolent life: and as ſome muſt trifle away age becauſe they have trifled away youth, others muſt labour on in a maze of error, becauſe they have wandered there too long to find their way out.

THERE is a prejudice in China in favour of little feet, and therefore the feet of girls are ſwathed and bound up from the cradle, ſo that the women of that country are unable to walk without tottering and ſtumbling all their lives. Among the ſavages of America, there are ſome who hold flat heads and long ears in great eſteem, and therefore preſs the one, and draw down the others ſo hard from their infancy, that they deſtroy irrecoverably the true proportions of nature, and continue all their lives ridiculous to every ſight but their own. Juſt ſo, the firſt of theſe characters cannot make any progreſs, and the ſecond will not attempt to make any,

in an impartial ſearch after real knowledge.

To ſet about acquiring the habits of meditation and ſtudy late in life, is like getting into a go-cart with a grey beard, and learning to walk when we have loſt the uſe of our legs. In general, the foundations of an happy old age muſt be laid in youth: and in particular, he who has not cultivated his reaſon young, will be utterly unable to improve it old.

"Manent ingenia ſenibus, modo permaneant ſtudium & induſtria."

Not only a love of ſtudy, and a deſire of knowledge, muſt have grown up with us, but ſuch an induſtrious application likewiſe, as requires the whole vigour of the mind to be exerted in the purſuit of truth, through long trains of ideas, and all thoſe dark receſſes wherein man, not God, has hid it.

THIS love and this deſire I have felt all my life, and I am not quite a ſtranger to this induſtry and application. There has been ſomething always ready to whiſper in my ear, whilſt I ran the courſe of pleaſure and of buſineſs, "Solve ſeneſcentem "mature ſanus equum."

BUT my Genius, unlike the demon of SOCRATES, whiſpered ſo ſoftly, that very often I heard him not, in the hurry of thoſe paſſions by which I was tranſported. Some calmer hours there were: in them I hearkened to him. Reflection had often it's turn, and the love of ſtudy and the deſire of knowledge have never quite abandoned me. I am not therefore entirely unprepared for the life I will lead, and it is not without reaſon that I promiſe myſelf more ſatisfaction in the latter part of it, than I ever knew in the former.

YOUR

YOUR lordſhip may think this perhaps a little too ſanguine, for one who has loſt ſo much time already: you may put me in mind, that human life has no ſecond ſpring, no ſecond ſummer: you may aſk me what I mean by ſowing in autumn, and whether I hope to reap in winter? My anſwer will be, that I think very differently from moſt men, of the time we have to paſs, and the buſineſs we have to do in this world. I think we have more of one, and leſs of the other, than is commonly ſuppoſed. Our want of time, and the ſhortneſs of human life, are ſome of the principal common-place complaints, which we prefer againſt the eſtabliſhed order of things: they are the grumblings of the vulgar, and the pathetic lamentations of the philoſopher; but they are impertinent and impious in both. The man of buſineſs deſpiſes the man of pleaſure, for ſquandering his time away; the man of pleaſure pities or laughs at the

man

man of buſineſs, for the ſame thing: and yet both concur ſuperciliouſly and abſurdly to find fault with the Supreme Being, for having given them ſo little time. The philoſopher, who miſpends it very often as much as the others, joins in the ſame cry, and authoriſes this impiety. THEOPHRASTUS thought it extremely hard to die at ninety, and to go out of the world when he had juſt learned how to live in it. His maſter ARISTOTLE found fault with nature, for treating man in this reſpect worſe than ſeveral other animals: both very unphiloſophically! and I love SENECA the better for his quarrel with the Stagirite on this head. We ſee, in ſo many inſtances, a juſt proportion of things, according to their ſeveral relations to one another; that philoſophy ſhould lead us to conclude this proportion preſerved, even where we cannot diſcern it; inſtead of leading us to conclude that it is not preſerved where we do not diſcern it; or where we think that we ſee the contrary.

To

To conclude otherwiſe, is ſhocking preſumption. It is to preſume that the ſyſtem of the univerſe would have been more wiſely contrived, if creatures of our low rank among intellectual natures had been called to the councils of the Moſt High; or that the Creator ought to mend his work by the advice of the creature. That life which ſeems to our ſelf-love ſo ſhort, when we compare it with the ideas we frame of eternity, or even with the duration of ſome other beings, will appear ſufficient, upon a leſs partial view, to all the ends of our creation, and of a juſt proportion in the ſucceſſive courſe of generations. The term itſelf is long: we render it ſhort; and the want we complain of flows from our profuſion, not from our poverty. We are all arrant ſpendthrifts; ſome of us diſſipate our eſtates on the trifles, ſome on the ſuperfluities, and then we all complain that we want the neceſſaries, of life. The much greateſt part never reclaim, but die bankrupts to God

and man. Others reclaim late, and they are apt to imagine, when they make up their accounts and ſee how their fund is diminiſhed, that they have not enough remaining to live upon, becauſe they have not the whole. But they deceive themſelves: they were richer than they thought, and they are not yet poor. If they huſband well the remainder, it will be found ſufficient for all the neceſſaries, and for ſome of the ſuperfluities, and trifles too perhaps, of life: but then the former order of expence muſt be inverted; and the neceſſaries of life muſt be provided, before they put themſelves to any coſt for the trifles or ſuperfluities.

Let us leave the men of pleaſure and of buſineſs, who are often candid enough to own that they throw away their time, and thereby to confeſs that they complain of the Supreme Being for no other reaſon than this, that he has not proportioned his bounty to their extravagance: let us con-

conſider the ſcholar and the philoſopher; who, far from owning that he throws any time away, reproves others for doing it: that ſolemn mortal who abſtains from the pleaſures, and declines the buſineſs of the world, that he may dedicate his whole time to the ſearch of truth, and the improvement of knowledge. When ſuch an one complains of the ſhortneſs of human life in general, or of his remaining ſhare in particular; might not a man, more reaſonable tho leſs ſolemn, expoſtulate thus with him?

"YOUR complaint is indeed conſiſtent "with your practice; but you would not, "poſſibly, renew your complaint if you "reviewed your practice. Tho reading "makes a ſcholar; yet every ſcholar is not "a philoſopher, nor every philoſopher a "wiſe man. It coſt you twenty years "to devour all the volumes on one ſide of "your library: you came out a great critic "in Latin and Greek, in the Oriental

" tongues, in hiſtory and chronology; but
" you was not ſatisfied: you confeſſed that
" theſe were the " literae nihil ſanantes;"
" and you wanted more time to acquire
" other knowledge. You have had this
" time: you have paſſed twenty years
" more on the other ſide of your library,
" among philoſophers, rabbies, commen-
" tators, ſchoolmen, and whole legions of
" modern doctors. You are extremely
" well verſed in all that has been written
" concerning the nature of God, and of
" the ſoul of man; about matter and form,
" body and ſpirit; and ſpace, and eternal
" eſſences, and incorporeal ſubſtances;
" and the reſt of thoſe profound ſpecula-
" tions. You are a maſter of the contro-
" verſies that have ariſen about nature and
" grace, about predeſtination and free-will,
" and all the other abſtruſe queſtions that
" have made ſo much noiſe in the ſchools,
" and done ſo much hurt in the world.
" You are going on, as faſt as the infir-
" mities, you have contracted, will permit,

" in

" in the ſame courſe of ſtudy; but you
" begin to foreſee that you ſhall want
" time, and you make grievous com-
" plaints of the ſhortneſs of human life.
" Give me leave now to aſk you, how
" many thouſand years God muſt prolong
" your life, in order to reconcile you to
" his wiſdom and goodneſs? It is plain, at
" leaſt highly probable, that a life as long
" as that of the moſt aged of the patri-
" archs, would be too ſhort to anſwer your
" purpoſes; ſince the reſearches and diſ-
" putes in which you are engaged, have
" been already for a much longer time
" the objects of learned enquiries, and re-
" main ſtill as imperfect and undetermined
" as they were at firſt. But let me aſk
" you again, and deceive neither yourſelf
" nor me; have you, in the courſe of theſe
" forty years, once examined the firſt
" principles, and the fundamental facts,
" on which all thoſe queſtions depend,
" with an abſolute indifference of judg-
" ment, and with a ſcrupulous exactneſs?

" with the ſame that you have employed
" in examining the various conſequences
" drawn from them, and the heterodox
" opinions about them? Have you not
" taken them for granted, in the whole
" courſe of your ſtudies? Or, if you have
" looked now and then on the ſtate of the
" proofs brought to maintain them, have
" you not done it as a mathematician looks
" over a demonſtration formerly made, to
" refreſh his memory, not to ſatisfy any
" doubt? If you have thus examined, it
" may appear marvellous to ſome, that
" you have ſpent ſo much time in many
" parts of thoſe ſtudies, which have re-
" duced you to this hectic condition, of ſo
" much heat and weakneſs. But if you
" have not thus examined, it muſt be evi-
" dent to all, nay to yourſelf on the leaſt
" cool reflection, that you are ſtill, not-
" withſtanding all your learning, in a
" ſtate of ignorance. For knowledge
" can alone produce knowledge: and
" without ſuch an examination of axioms

" and

" and facts, you can have none about in-
" ferences."

IN this manner one might expoſtulate very reaſonably with many a great ſcholar, many a profound philoſopher, many a dogmatical caſuiſt. And it ſerves to ſet the complaints about want of time, and the ſhortneſs of human life, in a very ridiculous but a true light. All men are taught their opinions, at leaſt on the moſt important ſubjects, by rote; and are bred to defend them with obſtinacy. They may be taught true opinions; but whether true or falſe, the ſame zeal for them, and the ſame attachment to them, is every where inſpired alike. The Tartar believes as heartily that the ſoul of FOE inhabits in his DAIRO, as the Chriſtian believes the hypoſtatic union, or any article in the Athanaſian creed. Now this may anſwer the ends of ſociety in ſome reſpects, and do well enough for the vulgar of all ranks: but it is not enough for the man who cultivates his reaſon, who is able to

think, and who ought to think, for himſelf. To ſuch a man, every opinion that he has not himſelf either framed, or examined ſtrictly and then adopted, will paſs for nothing more than what it really is, the opinion of other men; which may be true or falſe for aught he knows. And this is a ſtate of uncertainty, in which no ſuch man can remain, with any peace of mind, concerning thoſe things that are of greateſt importance to us here, and may be ſo hereafter. He will make them therefore the objects of his firſt and greateſt attention. If he has loſt time, he will loſe no more; and when he has acquired all the knowledge he is capable of acquiring on theſe ſubjects, he will be the leſs concerned whether he has time to acquire any farther. Should he have paſſed his life in the pleaſures or buſineſs of the world; whenever he ſets about this work, he will ſoon have the advantage over the learned philoſopher. For he will ſoon have ſecured what is neceſſary to his hap-

happineſs, and may ſit down in the peaceful enjoyment of that knowledge: or proceed with greater advantage and ſatisfaction to the acquiſition of new knowledge; whilſt the other continues his ſearch after things that are in their nature, to ſay the beſt of them, hypothetical, precarious, and ſuperfluous.

BUT this is not the only rule, by obſerving of which we may redeem our time, and have the advantage over thoſe who imagine they have ſo much in point of knowledge over your lordſhip or me, for inſtance, and who deſpiſe our ignorance. The rule I mean is this; to be on our guard againſt the common arts of deluſion, ſpoken of already; which, every one is ready to confeſs, have been employed to miſlead thoſe who differ from him. Let us be diffident of ourſelves, but let us be diffident of others too: our own paſſions may lead us to reaſon wrong; but the paſſions and intereſt of others may have the

the ſame effect. It is in every man's power, who ſets about it in good earneſt, to prevent the firſt: and when he has done ſo, he will have a conſcious certainty of it. To prevent the laſt, there is one, and but one ſure method; and that is, to remount, in the ſurvey of our opinions, to the firſt and even remoteſt principles on which they are founded. No reſpect, no habit, no ſeeming certainty whatever, muſt divert us from this: any affectation of diverting us from it ought to increaſe our ſuſpicion: and the more important our examination is, the more important this method of conducting it becomes. Let us not be frighted from it, either by the ſuppoſed difficulty or length of ſuch an enquiry; for, on the contrary, this is the eaſieſt and the ſhorteſt, as well as the only ſure way of arriving at real knowledge; and of being able to place the opinions we examine in the different claſſes of true, probable, or falſe, according to the truth, probability, or falſhood of the principles from

from whence they are deduced. If we find theſe principles falſe, and that will be the caſe in many inſtances, we ſtop our enquiries on theſe heads at once; and ſave an immenſe deal of time that we ſhould otherwiſe miſpend. The Muſſulman who enters on the examination of all the diſputes that have ariſen between the followers of OMAR and ALI and other doctors of his law, muſt acquire a thorough knowledge of the whole Mahometan ſyſtem; and will have as good a right to complain of want of time, and the ſhortneſs of human life, as any pagan or Chriſtian divine or philoſopher: but without all this time and learning, he might have diſcovered that MAHOMET was an impoſtor, and that the Koran is an heap of abſurdities.

IN ſhort, my lord, he who retires from the world, with a reſolution of employing his leiſure, in the firſt place to re-examine and ſettle his opinions, is inexcuſable if he does

does not begin with thoſe that are moſt important to him, and if he does not deal honeſtly by himſelf. To deal honeſtly by himſelf, he muſt obſerve the rule I have inſiſted upon, and not ſuffer the deluſions of the world to follow him into his retreat. Every man's reaſon is every man's oracle: this oracle is beſt conſulted in the ſilence of retirement; and when we have ſo conſulted, whatever the deciſion be, whether in favour of our prejudices or againſt them, we muſt reſt ſatisfied: ſince nothing can be more certain than this, that he who follows that guide in the ſearch of truth, as that was given him to lead him to it, will have a much better plea to make, whenever or wherever he may be called to account, than he, who has reſigned himſelf, either deliberately or inadvertently, to any authority upon earth.

When we have done this, concerning God, ourſelves, and other men; concerning the relations in which we ſtand to him and to them; the duties that reſult from theſe

theſe relations, and the poſitive will of the Supreme Being, whether revealed to us in a ſupernatural, or diſcovered by the right uſe of our reaſon in a natural way — we have done the great buſineſs of our lives. Our lives are ſo ſufficient for this, that they afford us time for more, even when we begin late: eſpecially if we proceed in every other enquiry by the ſame rule. To diſcover error in axioms, or in firſt principles grounded on facts, is like the breaking of a charm. The enchanted caſtle, the ſteepy rock, the burning lake diſappear: and the paths that lead to truth, which we imagined to be ſo long, ſo embarraſſed, and ſo difficult, ſhew as they are, ſhort, open, and eaſy. When we have ſecured the neceſſaries, there may be time to amuſe ourſelves with the ſuperfluities, and even with the trifles, of life. "Dulce eſt deſi-"pere," ſaid HORACE: "Vive la baga-"telle!" ſays SWIFT. I oppoſe neither; not the Epicurean, much leſs the Chriſtian philoſopher: but I inſiſt that a principal part

part of theſe amuſements be the amuſements of ſtudy and reflection, of reading and converſation. You know what converſation I mean; for we loſe the true advantage of our nature and conſtitution, if we ſuffer the mind to come, as it were, to a ſtand. When the body, inſtead of acquiring new vigour, and taſting new pleaſures, begins to decline, and is ſated with pleaſures or grown incapable of taking them, the mind may continue ſtill to improve and indulge itſelf in new enjoyments. Every advance in knowledge opens a new ſcene of delight; and the joy that we feel in the actual poſſeſſion of one, will be heightened by that which we expect to find in another: ſo that, before we can exhauſt this fund of ſucceſſive pleaſures, death will come to end our pleaſures and our pains at once. "In his ſtudiis laboribuſ-"que viventi, non intelligitur quando ob-"repit ſenectus: ita ſenſim ſine ſenſu "aetas ſeneſcit, nec ſubito frangitur, ſed "diuturnitate extinguitur."

THIS,

THIS, my lord, is the wiſeſt, and the moſt agreeable manner in which a man of ſenſe can wind up the thread of life. Happy is he whoſe ſituation and circumſtances give him the opportunity and means of doing it! Tho he ſhould not have made any great advances in knowledge, and ſhould ſet about it late, yet the taſk will not be found difficult, unleſs he has gone too far out of his way; and unleſs he continues too long to halt, between the diſſipations of the world, and the leiſure of a retired life.

—Vivendi recte qui prorogat horam,
Ruſticus expectat dum defluat amnis,—

You know the reſt. I am ſenſible, more ſenſible than any enemy I have, of my natural infirmities, and acquired diſadvantages: but I have begun, and I will perſiſt; for he who jogs forward on a battered horſe, in the right way, may get to the end of

of his journey; which he cannot do, who gallops the fleeteſt courſer of New-Market, out of it.

ADIEU, my dear lord. Tho I have much more to ſay on this ſubject, yet I perceive, and I doubt you have long perceived, that I have ſaid too much, at leaſt for a letter, already. The reſt ſhall be reſerved for converſation whenever we meet: and then I hope to confirm, under your lordſhip's eye, my ſpeculations by my practice. In the mean time let me refer you to our friend POPE. He ſays I made a philoſopher of him: I am ſure he has contributed very much, and I thank him for it, to the making an hermit of me.

REFLECTIONS

UPON

EXILE.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THAT the public may not be impoſed upon by any lame and unequal tranſlation, of the following treatiſe, from the French, in which language part of it has been lately printed, and retailed in a monthly Mercury; it is judged proper to add it here, at the end of this ſecond volume, from the author's original manuſcript, as he himſelf had finiſhed it for the preſs.

REFLECTIONS

UPON

EXILE*.

MDCCXVI.

DISSIPATION of mind, and length of time, are the remedies to which the greateſt part of mankind truſt in their afflictions. But the firſt of theſe works a temporary, the ſecond a ſlow, effect: and both are unworthy of a wiſe man. Are we to fly from ourſelves that we may fly from our misfortunes, and fondly to

* Several paſſages of this little treatiſe are taken from SENECA: and the whole is writ with ſome alluſion to his ſtyle and manner, "quanquam non "omnino temere ſit, quod de ſententiis illius "queritur Fabius," &c. ERAS. De ſen. jud.

imagine that the diſeaſe is cured becauſe we find means to get ſome moments of reſpite from pain? Or ſhall we expect from time, the phyſician of brutes, a lingering and uncertain deliverance? Shall we wait to be happy till we can forget that we are miſerable, and owe to the weakneſs of our faculties a tranquillity which ought to be the effect of their ſtrength? Far otherwiſe. Let us ſet all our paſt and our preſent afflictions at once before our eyes *. Let us reſolve to overcome them, inſtead of flying from them, or wearing out the ſenſe of them by long and ignominious patience. Inſtead of palliating remedies, let us uſe the inciſion-knife and the cauſtic, ſearch the wound to the bottom, and work an immediate and radical cure.

THE recalling of former misfortunes ſerves to fortify the mind againſt later. He muſt bluſh to ſink under the anguiſh of one wound, who ſurveys a body ſeamed

* SEN. De con. ad Hel.

over

over with the ſcars of many, and who has come victorious out of all the conflicts wherein he received them. Let ſighs, and tears, and fainting under the lighteſt ſtrokes of adverſe fortune, be the portion of thoſe unhappy people whoſe tender minds a long courſe of felicity has enervated: while ſuch, as have paſſed through years of calamity, bear up, with a noble and immoveable conſtancy, againſt the heavieſt. Uninterrupted miſery has this good effect, as it continually torments, it finally hardens.

SUCH is the language of philoſophy: and happy is the man who acquires the right of holding it. But this right is not to be acquired by pathetic diſcourſe. Our conduct can alone give it us: and therefore, inſtead of preſuming on our ſtrength, the ſureſt method is to confeſs our weakneſs, and, without loſs of time, to apply ourſelves to the ſtudy of wiſdom. This was the advice which the oracle gave to

ZENO *, and there is no other way of ſecuring our tranquillity amidſt all the accidents to which human life is expoſed. Philoſophy has, I know, her THRASOS, as well as War: and among her ſons many there have been, who, while they aimed at being more than men, became ſomething leſs. The means of preventing this danger are eaſy and ſure. It is a good rule, to examine well before we addict ourſelves to any ſect: but I think it is a better rule, to addict ourſelves to none. Let us hear them all, with a perfect indifferency on which ſide the truth lies: and, when we come to determine, let nothing appear ſo venerable to us as our own underſtandings. Let us gratefully accept the help of every one who has endeavoured to correct the vices, and ſtrengthen the minds of men; but let us chuſe for ourſelves, and yield univerſal aſſent to none. Thus, that I may inſtance the ſect already mentioned, when we have laid aſide the wonderful

* DIOG. LAERT.

and

and ſurpriſing ſentences, and all the paradoxes of the Portic, we ſhall find in that ſchool ſuch doctrines as our unprejudiced reaſon ſubmits to with pleaſure, as nature dictates, and as experience confirms. Without this precaution, we run the riſque of becoming imaginary kings, and real ſlaves. With it, we may learn to aſſert our native freedom, and live independent on fortune.

IN order to which great end, it is neceſſary that we ſtand watchful, as centinels, to diſcover the ſecret wiles and open attacks of this capricious goddeſs, before they reach us*. Where ſhe falls upon us unexpected, it is hard to reſiſt; but thoſe who wait for her, will repel her with eaſe. The ſudden invaſion of an enemy overthrows ſuch as are not on their guard; but they who foreſee the war, and prepare themſelves for it before it breaks out, ſtand, without difficulty, the firſt and the fierceſt

* SEN. De con. ad Hel.

onſet.

onſet. I learned this important leſſon long ago, and never truſted to fortune even while ſhe ſeemed to be at peace with me. The riches, the honors, the reputation, and all the advantages which her treacherous indulgence poured upon me, I placed ſo, that ſhe might ſnatch them away without giving me any diſturbance. I kept a great interval between me and them. She took them, but ſhe could not tear them from me. No man ſuffers by bad fortune, but he who has been deceived by good. If we grow fond of her gifts, fancy that they belong to us, and are perpetually to remain with us, if we lean upon them, and expect to be conſidered for them; we ſhall ſink into all the bitterneſs of grief, as ſoon as theſe falſe and tranſitory benefits paſs away, as ſoon as our vain and childiſh minds, unfraught with ſolid pleaſures, become deſtitute even of thoſe which are imaginary. But, if we do not ſuffer ourſelves to be tranſported by proſperity, neither

ſhall

ſhall we be reduced by adverſity. Our ſouls will be of proof againſt the dangers of both theſe ſtates: and, having explored our ſtrength, we ſhall be ſure of it; for in the midſt of felicity, we ſhall have tried how we can bear misfortune.

IT is much harder to examine and judge, than to take up opinions on truſt; and therefore the far greateſt part of the world borrow, from others, thoſe which they entertain concerning all the affairs of life and death*. Hence it proceeds that men are ſo unanimouſly eager in the purſuit of things, which, far from having any inherent real good, are varniſhed over with a ſpecious and deceitful gloſs, and contain nothing anſwerable to their appearances†. Hence it proceeds, on the other hand, that, in thoſe things which

* Dum unuſquiſque mavult credere, quam judicare, nunquam de vita judicatur, ſemper creditur. SEN. De vita beat.

† SEN. De con. ad. Hel.

are

are called evils, there is nothing ſo hard and terrible as the general cry of the world threatens. The word exile comes indeed harſh to the ear, and ſtrikes us like a melancholy and execrable ſound, through a certain perſuaſion which men have habitually concurred in. Thus the multitude has ordained. But the greateſt part of their ordinances are abrogated by the wiſe.

REJECTING therefore the judgment of thoſe who determine according to popular opinions, or the firſt appearances of things, let us examine what exile really is *. It is, then, a change of place; and, leſt you ſhould ſay that I diminiſh the object, and conceal the moſt ſhocking parts of it, I add, that this change of place is frequently accompanied by ſome or all of the following inconveniences: by the loſs of the eſtate which we enjoyed, and the rank which we held; by the

* SEN. De con. ad Hel.

loſs

loſs of that conſideration and power which we were in poſſeſſion of; by a ſeparation from our family and our friends; by the contempt which we may fall into; by the ignominy with which thoſe who have driven us abroad, will endeavour to ſully the innocence of our characters, and to juſtify the injuſtice of their own conduct.

ALL theſe ſhall be ſpoke to hereafter. In the mean while, let us conſider what evil there is, in change of place, abſtractedly and by itſelf.

To live deprived of one's country is intolerable *. Is it ſo? How comes it then to paſs that ſuch numbers of men live out of their countries by choice? Obſerve how the ſtreets of London and of Paris are crowded. Call over thoſe millions by name, and aſk them one by one, of what country they are: how many will

* SEN. De con. ad Hel.

you

you find, who, from different parts of the earth, come to inhabit theſe great cities, which afford the largeſt opportunities, and the largeſt encouragement, to virtue and to vice? Some are drawn by ambition, and ſome are ſent by duty; many reſort thither to improve their minds, and many to improve their fortunes; others bring their beauty, and others their eloquence, to market. Remove from hence, and go to the utmoſt extremities of the Eaſt or the Weſt: viſit the barbarous nations of Africa, or the inhoſpitable regions of the North: you will find no climate ſo bad, no country ſo ſavage, as not to have ſome people who come from abroad, and inhabit there by choice.

AMONG numberleſs extravagancies which have paſſed through the minds of men, we may juſtly reckon for one that notion of a ſecret affection, independent of our reaſon, and ſuperior to our reaſon, which we are ſuppoſed to have for our country,

country; as if there were ſome phyſical virtue in every ſpot of ground, which neceſſarily produced this effect in every one born upon it.

"—Amor patriae ratione valentior omni*."

As if the heimvei was an univerſal diſtemper, inſeparable from the conſtitution of an human body, and not peculiar to the Swiſs, who ſeem to have been made for their mountains, as their mountains ſeem to have been made for them†. This notion may have contributed to the ſecurity and grandeur of ſtates. It has therefore been not unartfully cultivated, and the prejudice of education has been with care put on it's ſide. Men have come in this caſe, as in many, from believing that it ought to be ſo, to perſuade others, and even to believe themſelves that it is ſo. PROCOPIUS relates that ABGARUS came to Rome,

* Ov. De Ponto, El. iv.
† Card. BENTI. Let.

and

and gained the eſteem and friendſhip of AUGUSTUS to ſuch a degree, that this emperor could not reſolve to let him return home: that ABGARUS brought ſeveral beaſts, which he had taken one day in hunting, alive to AUGUSTUS: that he placed in different parts of the Circus ſome of the earth which belonged to the places where each of theſe animals had been caught: that as ſoon as this was done, and they were turned looſe, every one of them ran to that corner where his earth lay: that AUGUSTUS, admiring their ſentiment of love for their country which nature has graved in the hearts of beaſts, and ſtruck by the evidence of the truth, granted the requeſt which ABGARUS immediately preſſed upon him, and allowed, tho with regret, the tetrarch to return to Edeſſa. But this tale deſerves juſt as much credit as that which follows in the ſame place, of the letter of ABGARUS to JESUS CHRIST, of our Saviour's anſwer, and of the cure of ABGARUS. There is nothing,

nothing, ſurely, more groundleſs than the notion here advanced, nothing more abſurd. We love the country in which we are born, becauſe we receive particular benefits from it, and becauſe we have particular obligations to it: which ties we may have to another country, as well as to that we are born in; to our country by election, as well as to our country by birth. In all other reſpects, a wiſe man looks on himſelf as a citizen of the world: and, when you aſk him where his country lies, points, like ANAXAGORAS, with his finger to the heavens.

THERE are other perſons, again, who have imagined that as the whole univerſe ſuffers a continual rotation, and nature ſeems to delight in it, or to preſerve herſelf by it, ſo there is in the minds of men a natural reſtleſſneſs, which inclines them to change of place, and to the ſhifting their habitations*. This opinion has at leaſt

* SEN. De con. ad Hel.

an appearance of truth, which the other wants; and is countenanced, as the other is contradicted, by experience. But, whatever the reaſons be, which muſt have varied infinitely in an infinite number of caſes, and an immenſe ſpace of time; true it is in fact, that the families and nations of the world have been in a continual fluctuation, roaming about on the face of the globe, driving and driven out by turns. What a number of colonies has Aſia ſent into Europe! The Phoenicians planted the coaſts of the Mediterranean ſea, and puſhed their ſettlements even into the ocean. The Etrurians were of Aſiatic extraction; and, to mention no more, the Romans, thoſe lords of the world, acknowledged a Trojan exile for the founder of their empire. How many migrations have there been, in return to theſe, from Europe into Aſia? They would be endleſs to enumerate; for, beſides the Aeolic, the Ionic, and others of almoſt equal fame, the Greeks, during ſeveral ages, made continual expeditions, and

and built cities in ſeveral parts of Aſia. The Gauls penetrated thither too, and eſtabliſhed a kingdom. The European Scythians over-ran theſe vaſt provinces, and carried their arms to the confines of Egypt. ALEXANDER ſubdued all from the Helleſpont to India, and built towns, and eſtabliſhed colonies, to ſecure his conqueſts, and to eterniſe his name. From both theſe parts of the world Africa has received inhabitants and maſters; and what ſhe has received ſhe has given. The Tyrians built the city, and founded the republic, of Carthage; and Greek has been the language of Egypt. In the remoteſt antiquity we hear of BELUS in Chaldæa, and of SESOSTRIS planting his tawny colonies in Colchos: and Spain has been, in theſe later ages, under the dominion of the Moors. If we turn to Runic hiſtory, we find our fathers, the Goths, led by WODEN and by THOR, their heroes firſt and their divinities afterwards, from the Aſiatic Tartary into Europe: and who can aſſure us that

this was their firſt migration? They came into Aſia perhaps by the eaſt, from that continent to which their ſons have lately ſailed from Europe by the weſt: and thus, in the proceſs of three or four thouſand years, the ſame race of men have puſhed their conqueſts and their habitations round the globe: at leaſt this may be ſuppoſed, as reaſonably as it is ſuppoſed, I think by GROTIUS, that America was peopled from Scandinávia. The world is a great wilderneſs, wherein mankind have wandered and joſtled one another about from the creation. Some have removed by neceſſity, and others by choice. One nation has been fond of ſeizing what another was tired of poſſeſſing: and it will be difficult to point out the country which is to this day in the hands of it's firſt inhabitants.

THUS fate has ordained that nothing ſhall remain long in the ſame ſtate: and what are all theſe tranſportations of people, but ſo many public Exiles? VARRO, the moſt

moſt learned of the Romans, thought, ſince Nature* is the ſame wherever we go, that this ſingle circumſtance was ſufficient to remove all objections to change of place, taken by itſelf, and ſtripped of the other inconveniences which attend exile. M. BRUTUS thought it enough that thoſe, who go into baniſhment, cannot be hindered from carrying their Virtue along with them. Now, if any one judge that each of theſe comforts is in itſelf inſufficient, he muſt however confeſs that both of them, joined together, are able to remove the terrors of exile. For what trifles muſt all we leave behind us be eſteemed, in compariſon of the two moſt precious things which men can enjoy, and which, we are ſure, will follow us wherever we turn our ſteps, the ſame Nature, and our proper Virtue †? Believe me, the providence of God has eſtabliſhed ſuch an order in the world, that of all which belongs to us the leaſt valuable parts can alone fall under the will of others.

* SEN. De con. ad Hel. † Ib.

Whatever is beſt is ſafeſt; lies out of the reach of human power; can neither be given nor taken away. Such is this great and beautiful work of nature, the world. Such is the mind of man, which contemplates and admires the world whereof it makes the nobleſt part. Theſe are inſeparably ours, and as long as we remain in one we ſhall enjoy the other. Let us march therefore intrepidly wherever we are led by the courſe of human accidents. Wherever they lead us, on what coaſt ſoever we are thrown by them, we ſhall not find ourſelves abſolutely ſtrangers. We ſhall meet with men and women, creatures of the ſame figure, endowed with the ſame faculties, and born under the ſame laws of nature. We ſhall ſee the ſame virtues and vices, flowing from the ſame general principles, but varied in a thouſand different and contrary modes, according to that infinite variety of laws and cuſtoms which is eſtabliſhed for the ſame univerſal end, the preſervation of ſociety. We ſhall feel

the

the ſame revolution of ſeaſons, and the ſame ſun and moon * will guide the courſe of our year. The ſame azure vault, beſpangled with ſtars, will be every where ſpred over our heads. There is no part of the world from whence we may not admire thoſe planets which roll, like ours, in different orbits round the ſame central ſun; from whence we may not diſcover an object ſtill more ſtupendous, that army of fixed ſtars hung up in the immenſe ſpace of the univerſe, innumerable ſuns whoſe beams enlighten and cheriſh the unknown worlds which roll around them: and whilſt I am raviſhed by ſuch contemplations as theſe, whilſt my ſoul is thus raiſed up to heaven, it imports me little what ground I tread upon.

* PLUT. Of baniſhment. He compares thoſe who cannot live out of their own country, to the ſimple people who fancied that the moon of Athens was a finer moon than that of Corinth.

—— labentem coelo quae ducitis annum.
VIR. Geo.

BRUTUS*, in the book which he writ on virtue, related that he had ſeen MARCELLUS in exile at Mytilene, living in all the happineſs which human nature is capable of, and cultivating, with as much aſſiduity as ever, all kinds of laudable knowledge. He added that this ſpectacle made him think that it was rather he who went into baniſhment, ſince he was to return without the other, than the other who remained in it. O MARCELLUS, far more happy when BRUTUS approved thy exile, than when the commonwealth approved thy conſulſhip! How great a man muſt thou have been, to extort admiration from him who appeared an object of admiration even to his own CATO! The ſame BRUTUS reported further, that CAESAR overſhot Mytilene, becauſe he could not ſtand the ſight of MARCELLUS reduced to a ſtate ſo unworthy of him. His reſtoration was at length obtained by

* SEN. De con. ad Hel.

the

the public interceſſion of the whole ſenate, who were dejected with grief to ſuch a degree, that they ſeemed all upon this occaſion to have the ſame ſentiments with BRUTUS, and to be ſuppliants for themſelves, rather than for MARCELLUS *. This was to return with honor; but ſurely he remained abroad with greater, when BRUTUS could not reſolve to leave him, nor CAESAR to ſee him; for both of them bore witneſs of his merit. BRUTUS grieved, and CAESAR bluſhed to go to Rome without him.

Q. METELLUS NUMIDICUS had undergone the ſame fate ſome years before, while the people, who are always the ſureſt inſtruments of their own ſervitude, were laying, under the conduct of MARIUS, the foundations of that tyranny which was perfected by CAESAR. METELLUS a-

* MARCELLUS was aſſaſſinated at Athens, in his return home, by CHILO, an old friend, and fellow-ſoldier of his. The motive of CHILO is not explained in hiſtory. CAESAR was ſuſpected, but he ſeems to be juſtified by the opinion of BRUTUS.

lone,

lone, in the midſt of an intimidated ſenate, and outrageous multitude, refuſed to ſwear to the pernicious laws of the tribune SATURNINUS. His conſtancy became his crime, and exile his puniſhment. A wild and lawleſs faction prevailing againſt him, the beſt men of the city armed in his defence, and were ready to lay down their lives that they might preſerve ſo much virtue to their country. But he, having failed to perſuade, thought it not lawful to conſtrain. He judged in the phrenſy of the Roman commonwealth, as PLATO judged in the dotage of the Athenian. METELLUS knew, that if his fellow-citizens amended, he ſhould be recalled; and if they did not amend, he thought he could be no where worſe than at Rome. He went voluntarily into exile, and wherever he paſſed he carried the ſure ſymptom of a ſickly ſtate, and the certain prognoſtic of an expiring commonwealth. What temper he continued in abroad will beſt appear by a fragment of one of his letters which GELLIUS*, in a pedantic compila-

* Lib. xvii. cap. 2.

tion

tion of phraſes uſed by the annaliſt Q. CLAUDIUS, has preſerved for the ſake of the word Fruniſcor. "Illi vero omni jure "atque honeſtate interdicti: ego neque "aqua neque igne careo: et ſumma gloria "fruniſcor." Happy METELLUS! happy in the conſcience of thy own virtue! happy in thy pious ſon, and in that excellent friend who reſembled thee in merit and in fortune!

RUTILIUS had defended Aſia againſt the extortions of the publicans, according to the ſtrict juſtice of which he made profeſſion, and to the particular duty of his office. The Equeſtrian order were upon this account his enemies, and the Marian faction was ſo of courſe, on account of his probity, as well as out of hatred to METELLUS. The moſt innocent man of the city was accuſed of corruption. The beſt man was proſecuted by the worſt, by APICIUS; a name dedicated to infamy*. Thoſe who had ſtirred up the falſe accuſation ſat as

* There was another APICIUS, in the reign of TIBERIUS, famous for his gluttony, and a third in the time of TRAJAN.

judges,

judges, and pronounced the unjuſt ſentence againſt him. He hardly deigned to defend his cauſe, but retired into the Eaſt, where that roman virtue, which Rome could not bear, was received with honor *. Shall RUTILIUS now be deemed unhappy, when they who condemned him are, for that action, delivered down as criminals to all future generations? when he quitted his country with greater eaſe than he would ſuffer his exile to finiſh? when he alone durſt refuſe the dictator SYLLA, and being recalled home, not only declined to go, but fled farther off?

WHAT do you propoſe, it may be ſaid, by theſe examples, multitudes of which are to be collected from the memorials of former ages? I propoſe to ſhew that as Change of Place, ſimply conſidered, can render no man unhappy, ſo the other evils which are objected to exile, either cannot happen to wiſe and virtuous men; or, if they do happen to them, cannot render

* SEN. L. De prov. cap. 3.

them

them miſerable. Stones are hard, and cakes of ice are cold: and all who feel them, feel them alike*. But the good or the bad events, which fortune brings upon us, are felt according to what qualities we, not they, have. They are in themſelves indifferent and common accidents, and they acquire ſtrength by nothing but our vice or our weakneſs. Fortune can diſpenſe neither felicity nor infelicity unleſs we cooperate with her. Few men, who are unhappy under the loſs of an eſtate, would be happy in the poſſeſſion of it: and thoſe, who deſerve to enjoy the advantages which exile takes away, will not be unhappy when they are deprived of them.

IT grieves me to make an exception to this rule; but TULLY was one ſo remarkably, that the example can be neither concealed, nor paſſed over. This great man, who had been the ſaviour of his country, who had feared, in the ſupport of that cauſe, neither the inſults of a deſperate party, nor the daggers of aſſaſſins, when he came to

* PLUT. On exile.

ſuffer

[illegible] for the same cause, sunk under the weight. He dishonored that banishment which indulgent providence meant to be the means of rendering his glory complete. Uncertain where he should go, or what he should do, fearful as a woman, and froward as a child, he lamented the loss of his rank, of his riches, and of his splendid popularity. His eloquence served only to paint his ignominy in stronger colors. He wept over the ruins of his fine house which Clodius had demolished: and his separation from Terentia, whom he repudiated not long afterwards, was perhaps an affliction to him at this time. Every thing becomes intolerable to the man who is once [illegible]* He regrets what he took no pleasure in enjoying, and, overloaded already, he shrinks at the weight of a feather. [illegible] in short, was such that his friends, as well as his enemies, believed him to have lost his senses †. CAESAR

* [illegible] intolerabilia. Etenim [illegible] [illegible] ep. [illegible]

† [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], et [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Ib.

beheld

beheld, with a ſecret ſatisfaction, the man, who had refuſed to be his lieutenant, weeping under the rod of CLODIUS. POMPEY hoped to find ſome excuſe for his own ingratitude in the contempt which the friend, whom he had abandoned, expoſed himſelf to. Nay ATTICUS judged him too meanly attached to his former fortune, and reproached him for it. ATTICUS, whoſe great talents were uſury and trimming, who placed his principal merit in being rich, and who would have been noted with infamy at Athens, for keeping well with all ſides, and venturing on none §: even ATTICUS bluſhed for TULLY, and the moſt plauſible man alive aſſumed the ſtyle of CATO.

I HAVE dwelt the longer on this inſtance, becauſe, whilſt it takes nothing from the truth which has been eſtabliſhed, it teaches us another of great importance. Wiſe men are certainly ſuperior to all the evils of exile. But in a ſtrict ſenſe he, who has left any one paſſion in his ſoul unſubdued, will not de-

§ PLUT. Vit. Solon.

ſerve

ſerve that appellation. It is not enough that we have ſtudied all the duties of public and private life, that we are perfectly acquainted with them, and that we live up to them in the eye of the world. A paſſion that lies dormant in the heart, and has eſcaped our ſcrutiny, or which we have obſerved and indulged as venial, or which we have perhaps encouraged, as a principle to excite and to aid our virtue, may one time or other deſtroy our tranquillity, and diſgrace our whole character. When virtue has ſhield the mind on every ſide, we are invulnerable on every ſide: but ACHILLES was wounded in the heel. The leaſt part, overlooked or neglected, may expoſe us to receive a mortal blow. Reaſon cannot obtain the abſolute dominion of our ſouls by one victory. Vice has many reſerves, which muſt be beaten; many ſtrongholds, which muſt be forced; and we may be found proof in many trials, without being ſo in all. We may reſiſt the ſevereſt, and yield to the weakeſt attacks of fortune. We may have got the better of avarice,

the

the moſt epidemical diſeaſe of the mind, and yet be ſlaves to ambition.* We may have purged our ſouls of the fear of death, and yet ſome other fear may venture to lurk behind. This was the caſe of CICERO. Vanity was his cardinal vice.† It had, I queſtion not, warmed his zeal, quickened his induſtry, animated the love of his country, and ſupported his conſtancy againſt CATALINE: but it gave to CLODIUS an entire victory over him. He was not afraid to dye, and part with eſtate,

* SENECA ſays the contrary of all this, according to the Stoical ſyſtem, which however he departs from on many occaſions. "Si contra unam quam-"libet partem fortunae ſatis tibi roboris eſt, idem "adverſus omnes erit.—Si avaritia dimiſit, vehe-"mentiſſima generis humani peſtis, moram tibi am-"bitio non faciet. Si ultimum diem, &c. *De Con. ad Hel.*

Non ſingula vitia ratio, ſed pariter omnia proſternit. In univerſum ſemel vincitur. *Ibid.*

Nec audacem quidem timoris abſolvimus: ne prodigum quidem avaritiâ liberamus. *De Benef.* l. 4. c. 27.

Qui autem habet vitium unum, habet omnia. *Ib.* l. 5. c. 15.

† In animo autem gloriae cupido, qualis fuit Ciceronis, plurimum poteſt. *Vel. Pat.* l. 1.

eſtate, rank, honor, and every thing which he lamented the loſs of: but he was afraid to live deprived of them. "Ut vivus haec amitterem."* He would probably have met death on this occaſion with the ſame firmneſs with which he ſaid to POPILIUS LAENAS, his client and his murderer, "approach veteran, and, "if at leaſt thou canſt do this well, cut "off my head." But he could not bear to ſee himſelf, and to be ſeen by others, ſtripped of thoſe trappings which he was accuſtomed to wear. This made him break out into ſo many ſhameful expreſſions. "Poſſum obliviſci qui fuerim? "non ſentire qui ſim? quo caream honore? quâ gloriâ?" And ſpeaking of his brother — "Vitavi ne viderem; ne "aut illius luctum ſqualoremque aſpi"cerim, aut me quem ille florentiſ"ſimum reliquerat perditum illi afflic"tumque offerrem." He had thought of death, and prepared his mind for it. There

* Ep. ad Attic. l. 3. ep. 3, 7, 10. et paſſim.
L. 3. Ep. 10. ad Attic.

There were occaſions too where his vanity might be flattered by it. But the ſame vanity hindered him in his proſperous eſtate from ſuppoſing ſuch a reverſe as afterwards happened to him. When it came, it found him unprepared, it ſurprized him, it ſtunned him; for he was ſtill fond of the pomp and hurry of Rome, "fumum, et opes, ſtrepitumque Romae," and unweaned from all thoſe things which habit renders neceſſary, and which nature has left indifferent.

WE have enumerated them above, and it is time to deſcend into a more particular examination of them. Change of place then may be borne by every man. It is the delight of many. But who can bear the evils which accompany exile? you who aſk the queſtion can bear them. Every one who conſiders them as they are in themſelves, inſtead of looking at them thro the falſe optic which prejudice holds before our eyes. For what?

you have loſt your eſtate: reduce your deſires, and you will perceive yourſelf to be as rich as ever, with this conſiderable advantage to boot, that your cares will be diminiſhed.* Our natural and real wants are confined to narrow bounds, whilſt thoſe which fancy and cuſtom create are confined to none. Truth lyes within a little and certain compaſs, but error is immenſe. If we ſuffer our deſires therefore to wander beyond theſe bounds, they wander eternally. "Neſcio "quid curtae ſemper abeſt rei." We become neceſſitous in the midſt of plenty, and our poverty encreaſes with our riches. Reduce your deſires, be able to ſay with the apoſtle of Greece, to whom ERASMUS was ready to addreſs his prayers, "quam multis ipſe non egeo!" baniſh out of your

* Naturalia deſideria finita ſunt: ex falſâ opinione naſcentia ubi deſinant non habent, nullus enim terminus falſo eſt. *Sen. Ep.* 16.

Excerp. ex Lib. Sen. falſely ſo called.

Si ad naturam vives, nunquam eris pauper; ſi ad opinionem, nunquam dives. Exiguum natura deſiderat, opinio immenſum. *Sen. Ep.* 16.

your exile all imaginary, and you will ſuffer no real wants. The little ſtream which is left will ſuffice to quench the thirſt of nature, and that which cannot be quenched by it, is not your thirſt, but your diſtemper; a diſtemper formed by the vicious habits of your mind, and not the effect of exile. How great a part of mankind bear poverty with chearfulneſs, becauſe they have been bred in it, and are accuſtomed to it? *Shall we not be able to acquire, by reaſon and by reflection, what the meaneſt artiſan poſſeſſes by habit? Shall thoſe who have ſo many advantages over him be ſlaves to wants and neceſſities of which he is ignorant? The rich whoſe wanton appetites neither the produce of one country, nor of one part of the world can ſatisfy, for whom the whole habitable globe is ranſacked, for whom the caravans of the eaſt are continually in march, and the remoteſt ſeas are covered with ſhips; theſe pampered creatures, ſated with ſuperfluity,

* Sen. de Con. ad Hel.

ty, are often glad to inhabit an humble cot, and to make an homely meal. They run for refuge into the arms of frugality. Madmen that they are to live always in fear of what they ſometimes wiſh for, and to fly from that life which they find it luxury to imitate! Let us caſt our eyes backwards on thoſe great men who lived in the ages of virtue, of ſimplicity, of frugality, and let us bluſh to think that we enjoy in baniſhment more than they were maſters of in the midſt of their glory, in the utmoſt affluence of their fortune. Let us imagine that we behold a great dictator giving audience to the Samnite ambaſſadors, and preparing on the hearth his mean repaſt with the ſame hand which had ſo often ſubdued the enemies of the commonwealth, and borne the triumphal lawrel to the capitol. Let us remember that PLATO had but * three ſervants,

* PLATO's will, in Diog. Laer. mentions four ſervants, beſides Diana, to whom he gave her freedom.

APULEIUS makes his eſtate conſiſt in a little garden near the academy, two ſervants, a patten for ſacrifices,

ſervants, and that ZENO had none.* SOCRATES, the reformer of his country, was maintained, as MENENIUS AGRIPPA, the arbiter of his country was buried, by contribution.† While ATTILIUS REGULUS beat the Carthaginians in Afric, the ſlight of his ploughman reduced his family to diſtreſs at home, and the tillage of his little farm became the public care. SCIPIO dyed without leaving enough to marry his daughters, and their portions were payed out of the treaſury of the

 ſtate;

ſacrifices, and as much gold as would ſerve to make ear-rings for a child.

* ZENO was owner of a thouſand talents when he came from Cyprus into Greece, and he uſed to lend his money out upon ſhips at an high intereſt. He kept, in ſhort, a kind of inſurance-office. He loſt this eſtate perhaps when he ſaid, "rectè ſanè agit fortu-"na, quae nos ad philoſophiam impellit." Afterwards he received many and great preſents from Antigonus. So that his great frugality and ſimplicity of life, was the effect of his choice, and not of neceſſity. *Vid. Dio. Laer.*

† *Diog. Laer. vit. Soc.* quotes Ariſtoxenus for affirming that Socrates uſed to keep a box, and lived upon the money which was put into it: "Poſitâ igitur arculâ, colligiſſe pecuniam quae daretur; conſumptâ autem eâ, rurſus poſuiſſe."

ſtate; for ſure it was juſt that the people of Rome ſhould once pay tribute to him, who had eſtabliſhed a perpetual tribute on Carthage. After ſuch examples ſhall we be afraid of poverty? ſhall we diſdain to be adopted into a family which has ſo many illuſtrious anceſtors? ſhall we complain of baniſhment for taking from us what the greateſt philoſophers, and the greateſt heroes of antiquity never enjoyed?

You will find fault perhaps, and attribute to artifice, that I conſider ſingly misfortunes which come all together on the baniſhed man, and overbear him with their united weight. You could ſupport change of place if it was not accompanied with poverty, or poverty if it was not accompanied with the ſeparation from your family and your friends, with the loſs of your rank, conſideration, and power, with contempt and ignominy. Whoever he be who reaſons in this manner, let him take the following anſwer.

The

The leaſt of theſe circumſtances is ſingly ſufficient to render the man miſerable who is not prepared for it, who has not diveſted himſelf of that paſſion upon which it is directed to work. But he who has got the maſtery of all his paſſions, who has foreſeen all theſe accidents, and prepared his mind to endure them all, will be ſuperior to all of them, and to all of them at once as well as ſingly. He will not bear the loſs of his rank, becauſe he can bear the loſs of his eſtate: but he will bear both, becauſe he is prepared for both; becauſe he is free from pride as much as he is from avarice.

You are ſeparated from your family and your friends. Take the liſt of them, and look it well over. How few of your family will you find who deſerve the name of friends? and how few among theſe who are really ſuch? Eraſe the names of ſuch as ought not to ſtand on the roll, and the voluminous catalogue

logue will ſoon dwindle into a narrow compaſs. Regret, if you pleaſe, your ſeparation from this ſmall remnant. Far be it from me, whilſt I declaim againſt a ſhameful and vicious weakneſs of mind, to proſcribe the ſentiments of a virtuous friendſhip. Regret your ſeparation from your friends; but regret it like a man who deſerves to be theirs. This is ſtrength, not weakneſs of mind; it is virtue, not vice.

BUT the leaſt uneaſineſs under the loſs of the rank which we held is ignominious. There is no valuable rank among men, but that which real merit aſſigns. The princes of the earth may give names, and inſtitute ceremonies, and exact the obſervation of them; their imbecillity and their wickedneſs may prompt them to cloathe fools and knaves with robes of honor, and emblems of wiſdom and virtue: but no man will be in truth ſuperior to another, without ſuperior merit; and that rank can no more be taken from

us, than the merit which eſtabliſhes it. The ſupreme authority gives a fictitious and arbitrary value to coin, which is therefore not current alike in all times and in all places; but the real value remains invariable, and the provident man, who gets rid as faſt as he can of the droſſy piece, hoards up the good ſilver. Thus merit will not procure the ſame conſideration univerſally. But what then? the title to this conſideration is the ſame, and will be found alike in every circumſtance by thoſe who are wiſe and virtuous themſelves. If it is not owned by ſuch as are otherwiſe, nothing is however taken from us; we have no reaſon to complain. They conſidered us for a rank which we had; for our denomination, not for our intrinſic value. We have that rank, that denomination no longer, and they conſider us no longer: they admired in us what we admired not in ourſelves. If they learn to neglect us, let us learn to pity them Their aſſiduity was impor-

tunate: let us not complain of the eaſe which this change procures us; let us rather apprehend the return of that rank and that power, which, like a ſunny day, would bring back theſe little inſects, and make them ſwarm once more about us. I know how apt we are, under ſpecious pretences, to diſguiſe our weakneſſes and our vices, and how often we ſucceed not only in deceiving the world, but even in deceiving ourſelves. An inclination to do good is inſeparable from a virtuous mind, and therefore the man, who cannot bear with patience the loſs of that rank and power which he enjoyed, may be willing to attribute his regrets to the impoſſibility which he ſuppoſes himſelf reduced to of ſatisfying this inclination. But let ſuch an one know, that a wiſe man contents himſelf with doing as much good as his ſituation allows him to do; that there is no ſituation wherein we may not do a great deal; and that when we are deprived of greater power to do more good, we

* Sen. de Con. ad Hel.

we eſcape at the ſame time the temptation of doing ſome evil.

THE inconveniencies, which we have mentioned, carry nothing along with them difficult to be borne by a wiſe and virtuous man; and thoſe which remain to be mentioned, contempt and ignominy, can never fall to his lot. It is impoſſible that he who reverences himſelf ſhould be deſpiſed by others: and how can ignominy affect the man who collects all his ſtrength within himſelf, who appeals from the judgment of the multitude to another tribunal, and lives independent of mankind and of the accidents of life? CATO loſt the election of praetor, and that of conſul; but is any one blind enough to truth to imagine that theſe repulſes reflected any diſgrace on him? The dignity of thoſe two magiſtracies would have been encreaſed by his wearing them. They ſuffered, not CATO.

YOU have fulfilled all the duties of a good citizen, you have been true to your truſt,

truſt, conſtant in your engagements, and have purſued the intereſt of your country without regard to the enemies you created, and the dangers you run. You ſevered her intereſt as much as lay in your power from thoſe of her factions, and from thoſe of her neighbours and allies too, when they became different. She reaps the benefit of theſe ſervices, and you ſuffer for them. You are baniſhed and purſued with ignominy, and thoſe whom you hindered from triumphing at her expence revenge themſelves at yours. The perſons, in oppoſition to whom you ſerved, or even ſaved the public, conſpire and accompliſh your private ruin. Theſe are your accuſers, and the giddy ungrateful crowd your judges. Your name is hung up in the tables of proſcription, and art joined to malice endeavours to make your beſt actions paſs for crimes, and to ſtain your character. For this purpoſe the ſacred voice of the ſenate is made to pronounce a lye, and thoſe records, which ought to be the eternal monuments

numents of truth, become the vouchers of impoſture and calumny. Such circumſtances as theſe you think intolerable, and you would prefer death to ſo ignominious an exile. Deceive not yourſelf. The ignominy remains with them who perſecute unjuſtly, not with him who ſuffers unjuſt perſecution. "Recalcitrat undique tutus." Suppoſe that in the act which baniſhes you, it was declared that you have ſome contagious diſtemper, that you are crooked, or otherwiſe deformed. This would render the legiſlators ridiculous.* The other renders them infamous. But neither one nor the other can affect the man who, in an healthful well proportioned body enjoys a conſcience void of all the offences aſcribed to him. Inſtead of ſuch an exile, would you compound, that you might live at home in eaſe and plenty, to be the inſtrument of blending theſe contrary intereſts

* The dialogue between Cicero and Philiſcus, *Dion. Caſſ.* l. 38.

tereſts once more together, and of giving but the third place to that of your country? Would you proſtitute her power to the ambition of others, under the pretence of ſecuring her from imaginary dangers, and drain her riches into the pockets of the meaneſt and vileſt of her citizens, under the pretence of paying her debts? If you could ſubmit to ſo infamous a compoſition, you are not the man to whom I addreſs my diſcourſe, or with whom I will have any commerce: and if you have virtue enough to diſdain it, why ſhould you repine at the other alternative? Baniſhment from ſuch a country, and with ſuch circumſtances is like being delivered from priſon. DIOGENES was driven out of the kingdom of Pontus for counterfeiting the coin, and STRATONICUS thought that forgery might be committed in order to get baniſhed from Scriphos. But you have obtained your liberty by doing your duty.

 BANISH-

BANISHMENT, with all its train of evils, is ſo far from being the cauſe of contempt, that he who bears up with an undaunted ſpirit againſt them, while ſo many are dejected by them, erects on his very misfortunes a trophy to his honor: for ſuch is the frame and temper of our minds, that nothing ſtrikes us with greater admiration than a man intrepid in the midſt of misfortunes. Of all ignominies an ignominious death muſt be allowed to be the greateſt, and yet where is the blaſphemer who will preſume to defame the death of SOCRATES *? This ſaint entered the priſon with the ſame countenance with which he reduced thirty tyrants, and he took off ignominy from the place; for how could it be deemed a priſon when SOCRATES was there? ARISTIDES was led to execution in the ſame city; all thoſe who met the ſad proceſſion, caſt their eyes to the ground, and with throbbing hearts bewailed, not the innocent man, but Ju-

* Sen. de con. ad Hel.

ſtice herſelf, who was in him condemned. Yet there was a wretch found, for monſters are ſometimes produced in contradiction to the ordinary rules of nature, who ſpit in his face as he paſſed along. ARISTIDES wiped his cheek, ſmiled, turned to the magiſtrate, and ſaid, "Admoniſh this man not to be ſo naſty for the future."

IGNOMINY then can take no hold on virtue *; for virtue is in every condition the ſame, and challenges the ſame reſpect. We applaud the world when ſhe proſpers; and when ſhe falls into adverſity we applaud her. Like the temples of the Gods, ſhe is venerable even in her ruins. After this muſt it not appear a degree of madneſs to defer one moment acquiring the only arms capable of defending us againſt attacks, which at every moment we are expoſed to? Our being miſerable, or not miſerable, when we fall into misfortunes, depends on the manner in which we have enjoyed proſperity. If

* Sen. de con. ad Hel.

we

we have applied ourſelves betimes to the ſtudy of wiſdom, and to the practice of virtue, theſe evils become indifferent; but if we have neglected to do ſo, they become neceſſary. In one caſe they are evils, in the other they are remedies for greater evils than themſelves. ZENO * rejoyced that a ſhip-wreck had thrown him on the Athenian coaſt: and he owed to the loſs of his fortune the acquiſition which he made of virtue, of wiſdom, of immortality. There are good and bad airs for the mind as well as for the body. Proſperity often irritates our chronical diſtempers, and leaves no hopes of finding any ſpecific but in adverſity. In ſuch caſes baniſhment is like change of air, and the evils we ſuffer are like rough medicines applied to inveterate diſeaſes. What † ANACHARSIS ſaid of the vine, may aptly enough be ſaid of proſperity. She bears the three grapes of drunkenneſs, of pleaſure, and of ſorrow: and happy it is if

* Dio. Laer. † Sen.

the laſt can cure the miſchief which the former work. When afflictions fail to have their due effect, the caſe is deſperate. They are the laſt remedy which indulgent Providence uſes: and if they fail, we muſt languiſh and dye in miſery and contempt. Vain men! how ſeldom do we know what to wiſh or to pray for? When we pray againſt misfortunes, and when we fear them moſt, we want them moſt. It was for this reaſon that PYTHAGORAS forbid his diſciples to aſk any thing in particular of God. The ſhorteſt and the beſt prayer which we can addreſs to him, who knows our wants, and our ignorance in aſking, is this: "Thy will be done."

TULLY ſays, in ſome part of his works, that, as happineſs is the object of all philoſophy, ſo the diſputes among philoſophers ariſe from their different notions of the ſovereign good. Reconcile them in that point, you reconcile them in the reſt.

The ſchool of ZENO placed this ſovereign good in naked virtue, and wound the principle up to an extreme beyond the pitch of nature and truth. A ſpirit of oppoſition to another doctrine, which grew into great vogue while ZENO flouriſhed, might occaſion this exceſs. EPICURUS placed the ſovereign good in pleaſure. His terms were wilfully, or accidentally miſtaken. His ſcholars might help to pervert his doctrine, but rivalſhip enflamed the diſpute; for in truth there is not ſo much difference between ſtoiciſm reduced to reaſonable intelligible terms, and genuine orthodox epicuriſm, as is imagined. The faelicis animi immota tranquillitas, and the voluptas of the latter are near enough a-kin: and I much doubt whether the firmeſt hero of the Portic would have borne a fit of the ſtone, on the principles of ZENO, with greater magnanimity and patience than EPICURUS did, on thoſe of his own philoſophy. How-

ever *; ARISTOTLE took a middle way, or explained himſelf better, and placed happineſs in the joint advantages of the mind, of the body, and of fortune. They are reaſonably joined; but certain it is, that they muſt not be placed on an equal foot. We can much better bear the privation of the laſt than of the others; and poverty itſelf, which mankind is ſo afraid of, "per mare pauperiem fugens, per ſaxa, "per ignes," is ſurely preferable to madneſs or the ſtone, tho † CHRYSIPPUS thought it better to live mad, than not to live! If baniſhment therefore, by taking from us the advantages of fortune, cannot take from us the more valuable advantages of the mind and the body, when we have them; and if the ſame accident

* Compare the repreſentations made ſo frequently of the doctrine of volupty taught by EPICURUS, with the account which he himſelf gives in his letter to MENOECEUS, of the ſenſe wherein he underſtood this word. Vid. Diog. Laer.

† In his third book of nature, cited by PLUTARCH, in the treatiſe on the contradictions of the Stoics.

is able to reſtore them to us, when we have loſt them, baniſhment is a very ſlight misfortune to thoſe who are already under the dominion of reaſon, and a very great bleſſing to thoſe who are ſtill plunged in vices which ruin the health both of body and mind. It is to be wiſhed for, in favour of ſuch as theſe, and to be feared by none. If we are in this caſe, let us ſecond the deſigns of Providence in our favour, and make ſome amends for neglecting former opportunities by not letting ſlip the laſt. "Si nolis ſanus, curres hydropicus." We may ſhorten the evils which we might have prevented, and as we get the better of our diſorderly paſſions, and vicious habits, we ſhall feel our anxiety diminiſh in proportion. All the approaches to virtue are comfortable. With how much joy will the man, who improves his misfortunes in this manner, diſcover that thoſe evils, which he attributed to his exile, ſprung from his vanity and folly, and vaniſh with them?

He will ſee that, in his former temper of mind, he reſembled the effeminate prince who could drink no † water but that of the river Choaſpes; or the ſimple queen, in one of the tragedies of EURIPIDES, who complained bitterly, that ſhe had not lighted the nuptial torch, and that the river Iſmenus had not furniſhed the water at her ſon's wedding. Seeing his former ſtate in this ridiculous light, he will labour on with pleaſure towards another as contrary as poſſible to it; and when he arrives there, he will be convinced by the ſtrongeſt of all proofs, his own experience, that he was unfortunate becauſe he was vicious, not becauſe he was baniſhed.

IF I was not afraid of being thought to refine too much, I would venture to put ſome advantages of fortune, which are due to exile, into the ſcale againſt thoſe which we loſe by exile. One there is which has been neglected even by great

† Plut. on baniſhment.

and

and wiſe men. DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS, after his expulſion from Athens, became firſt miniſter to the king of Egypt; and THEMISTOCLES found ſuch a reception at the court of Perſia, that he uſed to ſay his fortune had been loſt if he had not been ruined. But DEMETRIUS expoſed himſelf by his favour under the firſt PTOLEMY to a new diſgrace under the ſecond: and THEMISTOCLES, who had been the captain of a free people, became the vaſſal of the prince he had conquered. How much better is it to take hold of the proper advantage of exile, and to live for ourſelves, when we are under no obligation of living for others? SIMILIS, a captain of great reputation under TRAJAN and ADRIAN, having obtained leave to retire, paſſed ſeven years in his retreat, and then dying, ordered this inſcription to be put on his tomb: that he had been many years on earth †, but that he had lived only ſeven. If you are wiſe, your leiſure will

† Xiphil.

be

be worthily employed, and your retreat will add new luſtre to your character. Imitate THUCYDIDES in Thracia, or XENOPHON in his little farm at Scillus. In ſuch a retreat you may ſit down, like one of the inhabitants of Elis, who judged of the Olympic games, without taking any part in them. Far from the hurry of the world, and almoſt an unconcerned ſpectator of what paſſes in it, having payed in a public life what you owed to the preſent age, pay in a private life what you owe to poſterity. Write, as you live, without paſſion; and build your reputation, as you build your happineſs, on the foundations of truth. If you want the talents, the inclination, or the neceſſary materials for ſuch a work, fall not however into ſloth. Endeavour to copy after the example of SCIPIO at Linternum. Be able to ſay to yourſelf,

" Innocuas amo delicias doctamque quietem."

Rural amuſements, and philoſophical meditations will, make your hours glide ſmoothly on; and if the indulgence of Heaven has given you a friend like LELIUS, nothing is wanting to make you completely happy.

Theſe are ſome of thoſe reflexions which may ſerve to fortify the mind under baniſhment, and under the other misfortunes of life, which it is every man's intereſt to prepare for, becauſe they are common to all men *: I ſay they are common to all men; becauſe even they who eſcape them are equally expoſed to them. The darts of adverſe fortune are always levelled at our heads. Some reach us, ſome graze againſt us, and fly to wound our neighbours. Let us therefore impoſe an equal temper on our minds, and pay without murmuring the tribute which we owe to humanity. The winter brings cold, and we muſt freeze. The ſummer returns with heat, and we muſt melt. The in-

* Sen. Ep. 107.

cle-

clemency of the air diſorders our health, and we muſt be ſick. Here we are expoſed to wild beaſts, and there to men more ſavage than the beaſts: and if we eſcape the inconveniencies and dangers of the air and the earth, there are perils by water and perils by fire. This eſtabliſhed courſe of things it is not in our power to change; but it is in our power to aſſume ſuch a greatneſs of mind as becomes wiſe and virtuous men; as may enable us to encounter the accidents of life with fortitude, and to conform ourſelves to the order of nature, who governs her great kingdom, the world, by continual mutations. Let us ſubmit to this order, let us be perſuaded that whatever does happen ought to happen, and never be ſo fooliſh as to expoſtulate with nature. The beſt reſolution we can take is to ſuffer what we cannot alter, and to purſue, without repining, the road which Providence, who directs every thing, has marked out to us: for it is not enough to follow; and

he

he is but a bad ſoldier who ſighs, and marches on with reluctancy, We muſt receive the orders with ſpirit and chearfulneſs, and not endeavour to ſlink out of the poſt which is aſſigned us in this beautiful diſpoſition of things, whereof even our ſufferings make a neceſſary part. Let us addreſs ourſelves to God, who governs all, as CLEANTHES did in thoſe admirable verſes, which are going to loſe part of their grace and energy in my tranſlation of them.

Parent of nature! Maſter of the world!
Where'er thy Providence directs, behold
My ſteps with chearful reſignation turn.
Fate leads the willing, drags the backward on.
Why ſhould I grieve, when grieving I muſt bear?
Or take with guilt, what guiltleſs I might ſhare?

Thus let us ſpeak, and thus let us act. Reſignation to the will of God is true magnanimity. But the ſure mark of a puſilanimous and baſe ſpirit, is to ſtruggle againſt

against, to examine the order of Providence, and instead of mending our own manners, to set up for correcting that of our Maker.

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

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